assigned in Austria-Hungary's self-denying scheme for the reorganisation of the Balkans. These two nations were to embody the steady conservative elements of the Orient; they were to present a formidable counterpoise to the restlessness of the giddy Serbs and Greeks. For their aptitude for these functions history and tradition offered a seemingly solid guarantee. And at first both sides fell in with the arrangement. But this preestablished harmony was turned to discord in London by Dr Daneff at the moment when victorious Bulgaria deemed herself the hub of the universe, and that active statesman became her prophet and guide. Deputed to come to terms with Roumanian diplomacy on the vexed question of the cession of a strip of the Dobrudja, he seems to have fallen into the capital error of thinking that a negotiator can sit down at the green table with empty hands, and dispense even with honeyed words. Austria-Hungary had been confidently looked to by King Carol and his advisers for something more than moral sympathy in this diplomatic encounter. She was expected to espouse Roumania's cause and to obtain that rectification of its frontiers which had for a generation been yearned for as at once a military precaution against threatened Bulgarian aggression and a political bond of union with the Bulgarian people.

But Austria-Hungary's hands were not free. They were caught in the meshes of the net which holds together the integral elements of the Dual State. Count Berchtold could not, therefore, efficaciously favour Roumania's demands without forfeiting Bulgaria's allegiance. And, as he had reserved the chief part in the cast of the Balkan drama for the rising Slav State, he shrank from incurring the risk. This calculation may come as a surprise to many. But it was nowise fanciful. King Ferdinand's people are often regarded as Slav only in name, and it is admitted on all hands that they are anything but Slav in temperament. Bulgaria's sympathies move in the direction of anticipated material advantage. In the shaping of her action sentiment has no part; interest alone is decisive. This is well illustrated by her veering policy. Her next aim, the restoration of the ancient Tsardom with its centre on the Golden Horn, sets up a barrier between her and Russia. To accomplish

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her lofty mission' and establish herself on the shores of the Bosphorus, she has need of the good offices of one or other of the two great rival Empires; and, as the Hapsburg State alone can contemplate without dismay the transfer of King Ferdinand's capital from Sofia to Constantinople, it behove Bulgaria to keep in the good graces of AustriaHungary. That feat achieved, she can at will return to Russia as the prodigal and repentant daughter, sure of a cordial welcome. Aware that Bulgaria's co-operation could be had only on these terms, the Vienna Foreign Office confined its plea for Roumania to a eulogy of her exemplary conduct and a fervent hope that Bulgaria would act generously by her. As pressure was not attempted, the practical outcome was nil. In Bucharest disappointment was intense; and protests waxed loud against the thirty-five years' policy, of which disillusion was the most palpable and durable result.

Such a mood of despondency and impotent wrath is the tempter's opportunity. Russia's discreet advances to Roumania, made, as it chanced, while this fit of despair was on, seemed to be instigated by friendship and were characterised by tact. No wonder they were not repelled. Very soon 'correctness' of official intercourse between St Petersburg and Bucharest was superseded by cordiality; and when, at last, it was decided that the Bulgaro-Roumanian dispute should be referred to arbitration, the statesmen of Bucharest chose St Petersburg as the place, and M. Sazonoff as the president of the International Tribunal. That was the first outward token of an intention on the part of King Carol's Government to vary the lines on which it had so long been transacting the nation's foreign business. And in the Tsardom this was noted, understood, and appreciated. France and Russia at once constituted themselves the champions of their new client, and ended by restoring to her all that could still be saved after the lost opportunity.

At the time the deliberations of the ambassadors in the Russian capital were kept secret, but since then certain salient incidents have become the common property of an inner circle which was not, therefore, greatly surprised at Roumania's recent declaration that she would intervene if Bulgaria went to war with Servia. Roumania now knows to whom she is beholden for such Vol. 219.-No. 436.

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satisfaction as she then received. Silistria and a belt of three kilometres exhausted the concessions which Bulgaria was directed by the arbiters to make. A sop to the amour-propre of the nation, this rectification of frontier failed to satisfy either the military or the civil advisers of King Carol. The former complained that, by leaving the height of Kali Petrova outside the ceded zone, Bulgarian troops will in war time be able, from their masked batteries behind it, to annihilate Roumania's positions and play havoc with Silistria. The latter came to the conclusion that the Bulgarians, irritated by the necessity of signing away a strip of territory, insignificant though it be, will bear a lasting grudge against Roumania. They are certain that, if they ever contrived to obtain from Bulgaria, by fair means or by violence, the entire stretch of territory which would satisfy them, she would nurse a feeling of implacable animosity against their nation until such time as she could remove the material cause. As, therefore, the pursuit of her legitimate aims is incompatible with a Bulgarian alliance, Roumania feels moved to eschew close partnership with the rising Slav nation, which has yet to learn that the correlate of take is give. In Bucharest the conviction is rife that if the Bulgarian nation once rose to a paramount position in the Balkan Peninsula, it would feel no ruth for its helpmate and display no gratitude for the services to which it owed its triumph. Hence that consummation must be hindered.

Such would appear to be the train of thought which led first to Roumania's declaration that war between Servia and Bulgaria would be met in Bucharest by a mobilisation order followed by formal intervention. Clearly, then, a strong sense of the requirements of a sound national policy is sufficient to account for and justify the decision of MM. Jonescu and Majorescu, without ascribing it to Russian influence. The responsibility for taking it lies with the two Cabinet Ministers just named; but it is safe to assert that, if the Liberal Opposition had held the reins of power, it would not have behaved differently.

Roumania's emancipation from the guardianship of the Dual Monarchy-for that, in sum, is what her action, however we may account for it, really amounts to— cannot be said to concern any vital British interest.

But

upon Austria's somewhat mechanical scheme of Balkan reconstruction its effect may be swiftly disastrous. Indeed, one might liken it to the loss of the linch-pin in a carriage on a remote country road. Experience will soon familiarise statesmen with the hopelessness of confiding to any of the growing and restless Balkan States the peculiar functions discharged by Turkey in the international economy.

A matter of wider interest is the question to what extent this hitch in the working of Austria-Hungary's reconstructive scheme will modify European politics. And one may hazard the answer that its effect will probably cut deeper than is yet realised. For it alters the root-conception of the future Balkan state-system as conceived by the politicians of Vienna. In this scheme Roumania and Bulgaria, their interests running parallel, were to occupy the place vacated by Turkey. In peace their interests would restrain Servia's spirit of adventure, while in war-time their armies would hold her troops in check. That was the postulate which enabled the Dual Monarchy to watch without misgivings the passing of the Ottoman Empire and to dispense with territorial compensation.

That Count Berchtold's assumption was not gratuitous will be freely conceded. But that it was at most an assumption on which no reliance could be placed was the considered view of the Berlin Government, which at once set to work to adjust its land defences to the new order of things. If Roumania secedes finally from Bulgaria, the equilibrium of Balkan forces postulated by AustriaHungary is upset. King Ferdinand's dream of a Bulgarian Empire with its seat in Constantinople must remain a dream, and the utmost the Powers of Central Europe could then compass would be free access for their wares to Eastern markets through the port of Salonica. Even their active support would not relieve Bulgaria from the necessity of forswearing the leading rôle she had reserved for herself in the Peninsula. Despite the unity of purpose and lack of scrupulousness displayed by her politicians, the Prussian militarism of her people, and their spirit of heroic self-sacrifice, she would be outmatched in numbers, financial resources, and foreign backing. For the Serbs, on the other hand, these might

be halcyon days. They would be fully insured against territorial loss which in any less favourable set of conditions they might reasonably apprehend from Bulgaria, and they would be ready to utilise to the full any opportunities of extending their frontiers that might offer— opportunities which they might reasonably expect in an age when the high tides of circumstance swell more quickly than at any previous period of human history. Naturally the correlative of these advantages and anticipations would be a growing indisposition on the part of the Serbs to merge their political interests in those of the Dual Monarchy.

For those who look beneath the surface of things in the Balkan Peninsula it has long been evident that no settled equilibrium can be established in that area without some sort of a supremacy being exercised either by Bulgaria or by Servia. It was open to the Powers, perhaps also to Russia single-handed, to favour the former State by reviving the San Stefano type of settlement. For reasons which need not here be gone into this was not done; and, in view of the momentous events which have since taken place, and of the inclinations which have been unwittingly revealed by Bulgaria's intricate and crooked policy, it may be surmised that, in the moulding of the destinies of the Balkan peoples, that nation will not be permitted to play a larger part than falls fairly to her lot. On this matter Russia's mind would seem to be definitely made up.

The unsettlement of the public mind produced by Bulgaria's blameworthy action in waging without declaring war on her ex-allies has tended to isolate her morally. Invited, together with the other three Governments, to send a delegate to St Petersburg to plead the Bulgarian cause there, the Cabinet of Sofia seems to have decided first to capture certain strategic positions held by the Greeks and the Serbs, and then to discuss a settlement. In the execution of this plan the Bulgarians suddenly assumed the offensive, taking their adversaries unawares, and at Ghevgheli, where Serbs and Greeks were in contact, sundered them by a living wedge. Meanwhile the head of the Bulgarian Government was allaying the apprehensions of the Russian Minister at Sofia with assurances of his pacific intentions and conciliatory schemes. And