and the Company's commandant Major Knipe condemned Fort William as untenable. But Knipe died at Madras, and Forresti was dismissed by the Court as an extravagant schemer. In 1747 Commodore Griffin saw the fort and pronounced it indefensible. Captain Fenwick in vain attempted to induce the President to erect works to include the fatal church that commanded the gorges of all four bastions. Jaspar Jones, a captain of artillery, addressed to the Council a letter declaring that there was not an embrasure fit to hold a gun or a carriage fit to mount one; the Council only observed that his letter was irregular. So, between the President's indolence and the Council's apathy, the Court's dislike of spending money and the death or neglect of every person competent to advise upon military affairs, Fort William, with ruinous walls unable to bear a gun, with great windows cut in its curtains, with out-buildings that obstructed the fire of the bastions, and with a church and houses near at hand commanding it, looked like a deserted Moorish fort instead of a European stronghold. Meanwhile, under English rule, Calcutta had grown wealthy and populous, deserving of more prudent Governors. Charnock's mud huts had long given place to well-built mansions. The beauty and prosperity of the settlement is attested by both French and Dutch neighbours. Its population, which Hamilton at the beginning of the century had estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 was estimated by Holwell fifty years later at 400,000. That, like other estimates unsupported by enumeration, is an exaggerated figure; but beyond doubt in Hamilton's time Calcutta was a small town; in Holwell's a large city. Its revenues had grown twenty-fold. As in the other principal settlements of the Company, a Mayor's Court had been established for civil, and a Court of Quarter Sessions for criminal justice. The latter must have been extremely necessary. Young writers' were often wild, and seafaring men licentious; while the Council considered itself capable only of sending offenders home. On one occasion a ship's mate had made a man stand still by threats of murder, while he caned him to the effusion of blood. On another, an officer of the garrison ran a man through while he was protesting that he was too drunk to fight. But an even more important tribunal was the Cutchery Court, in which the Zemindar sat to dispense summary justice. This court was established in 1704, and at the beginning was just like the Choultry Court at Madras. But, whereas the latter was always confined to petty causes and misdemeanours, the Court of Cutchery became the main court for native justice; and the Zemindar could sit and give sentence even on murderers, his judgment merely requiring confirmation by the President. As the Zemindar also collected the revenues, he was, in effect, the controller and manager of the native city. As in early days at Madras, so also in Calcutta, frequent efforts were made by the Company to impose new taxation and by the inhabitants to resist it. Assessments were made for the repair of roads and the building of a court-house and jail; but, though these evoked great clamour, the city continued to grow in wealth and prosperity. Such was the state of affairs just before the middle of the 18th century, when Dupleix was laying his schemes for the extension of French influence. The twelve years which include the capture of Madras by La Bourdonnais, the capture of Calcutta by Siraj-ud-daula, the overthrow of that Prince and the establishment of Mir Jafar by English arms, are too crowded with momentous events for a detailed narrative to be attempted here. But the general connexion of events may be briefly suggested. It is very clear that alike in Madras and Calcutta long immunity from attack had bred a general feeling of confidence and carelessness; and at both settlements there was an enormous miscalculation of the action of the native powers. Madras, though far from being in such a helpless condition as Fort William, was still ill-fortified. The western face of Fort St George, in particular, was an old wall supported only by the houses built against it. But though the formation of a new front was under discussion, nothing had been done when La Bourdonnais anchored in the Madras roads. The garrison was recruited, so the Council complained, partly from Newgate and partly from Bedlam. The Directors had resolved on raising the garrison to six hundred Europeans; but there were not three hundred when Madras was captured in 1746. This was bad; but the fatal mistake was made in discouraging Barnett and the English squadron from attacking Pondichery in 1745. This was done merely in order to soothe the Nawab, Anwar-ud-din Khan. It would have been justifiable if Morse had acceded to Dupleix's proposals for a neutrality in 1744. But Morse displayed an extraordinary pitch of folly in not employing the English squadron to destroy an enemy with whom he had refused to enter into terms. He was, in fact, faced with the choice of disobeying the orders of the Company, who forbade a neutrality with the French, or those of the Nawab, who forbade an attack upon them. By doing neither thoroughly, Morse threw away the English chances at the opening of the war. His error was completed by Peyton, who succeeded to the command of the squadron after Barnett's death. He delivered Madras into Dupleix's hands by deserting it without a shadow of excuse. Thus Madras fell; but not the English with it; for then were seen the fruits of the preceding century of progress. Fort St David at once took up the struggle. The Company was unwilling to lose its wealthy presidency. Recruits were sent out. The Ministry despatched an expedition; and many of those who sailed on it entered permanently into the Company's service. Before ten years were out, the military strength of the English in southern India was wonderfully increased in numbers as well as improved in personnel and in experience of war. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Calcutta had been living in fear of a French attack, but quite unconscious of the storm that was actually approaching them. Allah wirdi Khan died, prognosticating evil, it was said, of the atrocious European doings in the South, where the Moghal's peace had been so scandalously violated. He was succeeded by Siraj-ud-daula, the very sight of whom was thought ill-omened by his subjects. Angry at an insult supposed or real, he resolved to teach the Europeans a lesson. He appeared before Calcutta. To the surprise of all, it fell. The progress of the war in the South allowed Madras to send Clive and Watson to reconquer the English position in Bengal; it was recovered as easily as it had been lost; and Siraj-ud-daula, losing his confidence at once, made peace. Then emerged a situation of the greatest interest. Siraj-ud-daula could not be trusted; already he was seeking for French help to punish the English for their insolence. The French were again at war with the English. Hitherto, neutrality had always been observed in the Ganges; but that had been in the days of strong Nawabs, resolved on maintaining order in their dominions. The English had learnt to their cost the danger of trusting to benevolence. And could the French engage themselves to a firm neutrality? Negotiations took place. Renault at Chandernagore could speak for himself, but could not answer for the authorities at Pondichery or the Mauritius. The true French policy was obvious enough, as Law at Murshidabad urged on Renault. It was to form an alliance with the Nawab and expel the English, even if that necessitated Bussy's marching from the Deccan. Such a policy was perfectly feasible. But De Leyrit from Pondichery had already forbidden it. The truth was that the efforts of the French were spread over an area too wide for their resources. They could not maintain their supremacy in the South, at Aurangabad and in Bengal at the same time. De Leyrit wished to avoid trouble in Bengal, in order that he might secure his position in the South; he could not resolve to order Bussy northwards; he preferred an illusory to a real advantage. Had Renault possessed greater force of character, he might have disobeyed De Leyrit's orders. But the fate of La Bourdonnais and Dupleix was not encouraging to French administrators. So Renault would not ally himself with Sirajud-daula, but could not guarantee neutrality. It was the case of Morse once more. Fear of the Abdali and fear of the English kept Siraj-ud-daula from sending effective help to Chandernagore. Thus it fell before Clive and Watson; and the only power which could have supported Siraj-ud-daula was safely removed. The rest of the tragedy was soon played out. The Nawab, after allowing the French to be overthrown, continued his urgent messages to Bussy for help; he sent money to the Frenchman Law, and uttered threats against Watts and imprecations on the English. Unaccustomed to self-restraint, his heart broke out at every moment. Watched by young impetuous Scrafton, sleepless with excitement at the great impending event, and by subtle, clear-sighted Watts, with his impenetrable caution; urged on to excesses by the Setts, the great native bankers, eager to hasten his fall lest they themselves should be numbered with his victims; terrified by the mysterious whispers of Omichand, and faced by the iron resolution of Clive, the Nawab displayed a fatuity and incompetence that could hardly be surpassed. All Calcutta knew of the conspiracy against him. The bankers of his capital had already discounted it. Yet he chose such a time to quarrel with the leader of his army, and his destined successor, Mir Jafar, and never ceased to disgust and offend his principal ministers. So the inevitable end came with the scattering of his suspicious troops at Plassey, his hurried flight, his recognition by a victim of his cruelty, and his murder in the palace at Murshidabad. Thus closely were events both in the Carnatic and Bengal woven together. Without the increased establishment caused by the French war, Clive could not have recovered Calcutta; without Dupleix's ambition, the French war need not have spread to India; without the opulence and power engendered by a century of quiet growth, the Company could neither have possessed fortresses and cities, nor have enlisted the English Ministry on its behalf. There could have been no wars had not great interests been at stake; and those great interests were of older growth. The origin of the whole must therefore be sought, not in the vain schemes of Dupleix or even the resolute genius of Clive, but in the obscure doings of humble factors' for a hundred years before. Even when deduction is made for their vices and errors, surely they were profitable servants. H. DODWELL. PENGE PUBLIC LIBRARY Vol. 219.-No. 437. 2 c |