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NE of the most eminent seamen of modern times has recently passed away. Admiral Tegethoff not only gave to the Austrian Navy a history, but to the older navies of the world a new lesson in seamanship. The late commander-in-chief of the Austrian Navy first gained a European reputation in the Danish war of 1864.

In the action off Heligoland, it was not so much the discrepancy of forces, against which Captain Tegethoff had to contend, which made victory doubtful, as the overwhelming voice of history. Heretofore, the navy of Austria held the lowest place, in professional estimation, of any considerable Power. Manned by nationalities as mixed as the Austrian Empire itself, the crews spoke a variety of languages, many of which were unknown to their officers. Seamanship, gunnery, and professional esprit, were in the lowest condition, and no heroic annals prompted to high deeds of courage in the future. The Danes, on the other hand, had a seaman-like history worthy of a Lation's pride, and one which commanded the respect of even our To reverse the verdict of history was the far higher task to be accomplished off Heligoland, than is represented by the mere disparity of contending forces. Hence the éclat which accompanied an achievement which, had it been accomplished by a British squadron over a similar force, would have merited less acclaim.

own navy.

It was, however, for the subsequent action off Lissa, against the Italian fleet under the Marquis de Persano, that Admiral Tegethoff will be chiefly remembered. Since Trafalgar, no such opportunity had · occurred of contending fleets meet

ing in open water. Though steam had superseded the wind as the chief motive power of ships of war, the conservative instincts of seamen still clung tenaciously to tactics in which sails were regarded as the principal motor. All experience of naval war had been gained under sail, and none knew what effect the new agent would have on general actions. To whatever slight extent British officers studied naval tactics at all, it was those of Rodney, St. Vincent, and Nelson, for use with wooden ships and adapted to the action of the. wind, which alone found favour. But, in truth, the tactical manoeuvring of single ships or fleets for the purposes of war formed no part of a British officer's necessary study. It is not taught in any way, and does not enter into the elementary instruction of midshipmen at all; nor do text-books on such subjects enrich the libraries of British ships. Indeed, few British officers could intelligibly explain the bearing which the tactical conduct of ships had on former victories, whether of single, squadron or fleet actions. The tactical history of the British navy has yet to be written. Clarke of Eldin, a writer of the last century, long out of print, still to be found in old libraries, who directed his attention chiefly to the famous manoeuvre of breaking the line, is almost unknown amongst officers serving afloat. The naval Signal Book, which gave the only glimpse of tactical knowledge to British officers, was based on the experiences of the last century, and was moreover-the single copy being in constant use-hardly within reach of young officers. It is not to be wondered at that tactical studies were out of favour amongst those

to whom they were unknown; and a vague reliance on British pluck formed the chief hope of most naval men. But our great sea-fights were won as much through the professional skill of naval commanders as by the energy and daring of those who fought under their auspices. Naval tactics was a science unknown to even the heads of the modern profession, and decried as a theoretical speculation arguing a lack of practical skill on the part of the student. Nor was it the only professional science similarly tabooed, as though there was an insurmountable divorce between theory and practice, and the careful student could not be a practical sailor, or as though ignorance was the mother of seamanship. We must remember,' wrote that able officer, Admiral Jerningham, twenty years ago, 'that the course of naval science is across the deep and through the storm; that its his. tory is the history of impossibilities made possible-that is to say, of difficulties overcome by study, energy, and perseverance. For the rest, it is the especial office of professional prejudice to condemn; and accordingly it has condemned in turn locks, sights, tanks, chain cables, percussion tubes-everything.'

The strange and seemingly endless changes which the last twenty years have developed in naval construction and appliances have so shaken this conservatism, that the more eminent rising officers are now convinced that principles rather than forms must be the basis of all true study, and that naval education must be elevated to a much higher standard than heretofore. But before Lissa was fought, a distinguished British Admiral, recently delegated, as most of the more distinguished naval men have been, to the retired list, in the height of their bodily and mental activity and usefulness, had made the new motor the subject of elaborate and exact experi

Meanwhile, Sir George Sartorius, an old officer who had served with distinction under the flag of Portugal, struck with the number and fatality of accidental collisions between steam vessels, conceived the idea of converting this accidental into a systematic agent of destruction. It had been generally observed that when collisions occurred the vessel which charged the other end on and received the shock on her stem escaped scatheless, whilst the vessel which received the blow on the side was cut into as by a knife, from the gunwale to below the water-line, foundering almost immediately. Admiral Sartorius proposed that the art of effecting a collision, in a manner favourable to the attack, should be studied and turned into a weapon of war. To facilitate the attack, it was suggested that the bows of steam ships should be fortified and their stems armed with submerged beaks of various designs. But against the proposal, it was contended that, whilst accidental collisions could not always be avoided, even by the united exertions of both commanders, the difficulty of bringing about a predetermined collision at a destructive angle, which one of the vessels was resolved to prevent, was Successful ramming appeared so problematical that no attempt was made to determine, experimentally, the truth or

enormous.

represents a momentum of which the multiple is 250 lbs., instead of 32 lbs., as in the former case, might be supposed to compensate, were it not that the penetrating power of the 250-lb. shot against the ironclad is dependent on the angle of incidence, and is thus vastly inferior to that of the 32-pounder against the wooden hull. The diminished rate of firing from the heavier guns, and the increased difficulty of aiming consequent on the rapid evolutions of steam ships, obviously strengthen the case against the guns still further. After careful and dispassionate examination of some firing experiments made at sea, in a recent paper on The Attack and Defence of Fleets, Captain P. H. Colomb sums up the present position of the guns, as represented in the Monarch, which is now regarded as the most powerful ship afloat: In six minutes, which will have elapsed from the opening of her fire on the sister ship at one thousand yards' (till that ship has come into collision), 'she will have fired twelve shots, of which one will have hit and another will have glanced, and it remains an even chance whether the single hit will have penetrated the enemy's armour.' These were some of the problems which a well-conducted sea-fight was expected to solve, and on which the action off Lissa threw new light.

In anticipation of that action, the Italian navy is understood to have discussed some of these questions, and to have deliberately decided in favour of artillery and of the old tactics, till then adhered to by the British navy. The Austrians, on the other hand, deliberately examined and rejected the old tactics and weapons, and resolved to risk the fate of battle on the untried weapon and on new manoeuvres. Whether we contemplate the moral courage of this decisiou or the boldness of its execution, we cannot

but admire the genius which led a young, inexperienced, and almost unknown navy into an action the results of which have been so creditable to the Austrian arms.

It was on the 20th of July, 1866, that the Italian and Austrian fleets met off Lissa, an Austrian island, port, and fortress on the Adriatic, the scene of a noted British naval action. The Italians, four days from their own ports, had successfully bombarded Lissa during the two previous days, suffering somewhat in men, but gaining experience in their weapons and confidence from their success. The Austrians had left port on the previous day to relieve the falling fortress, confident in their commander, but otherwise with little in their favour. The forces opposed were pretty equal in form,' though the Austrians were somewhat inferior in actual numbers, in the size of guns, and in thickness of armour. The ironclads actually engaged were:

The Austrians had also a wooden ninety-two-gun ship, six wooden frigates, and nine gunboats, carrying a broadside of one hundred and seventy-seven guns, incapable, however, of piercing armour plates; though, as will be remembered, the wooden ninety-two-gun ship Kaiser did good service in attempts to ram, and by drawing upon her vulnerable sides the chief part of the Italian fire, by which two-thirds of the Austrian loss was sustained by her crew. They had also three gunless vessels for repeating signals. Whilst the Italians had a wooden squadron, consisting of eight frigates and eight paddle-wheel corvettes and gunboats, which held aloof from the action, but by their presence probably

contributed to the cessation of the Austrian attack.

Immediately the Austrian fleet was sighted to windward, Admiral Persano collected his ships and formed the ironclads in single line ahead, at right angles to the path of the approaching foe, with his wooden ships at some distance to leeward. Admiral Tegethoff, with his ships in three divisions behind one another, each division forming an obtuse angle and a thousand yards apart, approached in compact mass, at full speed, to run over their opponents. This angular formation, difficult to maintain, and still more so to manœuvre in, is quite beyond the use of ships which have not been long accustomed to exercise together; the officers observing their relative speeds and turning powers with the utmost nicety.

If intentionally adopted by the Austrians, the example is one rather to be avoided than imitated; but the angular formation was probably the accidental result of difference of speed. Blinded by the smoke of their own guns, the Austrians penetrated through a wide opening in the Italian line, leaving their foes astonished, divided, but untouched. The swiftness with which the Austrians had passed over the space covered by artillery fire had insured their own safety. Both fleets, physically intact, had changed sides, but the moral advantage had all been on the side of the Austrians, who in a still unbroken and compact mass had divided the Italians into two separate parts. This breaking of the line, once the certain prelude to victory, though no longer of such essential importance, is still of considerable value in creating disorder, isolation, and demoralisation in the opposite line. Before the Austrians could return to the charge, their fleet had to be reversed. The essential importance to all united effort, and, indeed, for the prevention of utter disintegra

tion, of an accurate appreciation of, the relative turning powers and speed of individual ships, for the successful accomplishment of a manœuvre fraught, under such circumstances, with peril to friendly ships, is obvious. In proportion as high speeds and ramming tactics are introduced into large fleets, must be the careful comparison of turning powers and their improvement, if those fleets are to act together in compact masses without danger to one another. Explaining why the Italian fleet were not pursued after the action, Admiral Tegethoff reported, that the great difference existing in the relative speed of the several vessels under my command rendered a compact and rapid advance impracticable, and forbade the possibility of bringing on a general action.'

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By what tactical movement the Austrian fleet was reversed we are not told; but that utter confusion resulted when, relying mainly on their stems, they once more charged the Italian ships, is evident. latter, relying chiefly upon their artillery, do not appear to have attempted to meet ram by ram. The remainder of the action appears to have been a general mêlée, the two fleets mingling for two hours or more in dire confusion, the Italians directing chief attention to their wooden opponents, and keeping up a rapid independent firing, with attempts on the part of their one specially-prepared ram to run down foes; the Austrians firing by broadsides, and charging through the smoke. The Kaiser, Austrian two-decker, being the special object of attack, made several ineffectual attempts to ram, in which her bowsprit and masts were lost, and her chief ironclad opponent, the Re de Portugallo, seriously shaken. The commanding officer of my flagship, Archduke Ferdinand Max,' reports Tegethoff, 'was enabled, by the exercise of equal science and bravery,