question which caused the greatest inquietude and awakened most violent passions-the transference of the seat of Government to Versailles. The Assembly seemed disposed to pass this measure, which contained a whole revolution; but at the last moment it reconsidered itself, and has left the question in statu quo. This was wise. If it be for the good of the nation that the Government quit Paris to establish itself at Versailles or elsewhere, it does not belong to the present Assembly to make so radical a change, but to that body to be elected hereafter, which shall decide the political future of France and construct its Constitution. The Assembly, then, whatever it may say, proves by its acts that this mission does not rest in its hands. Invested with sovereign authority, to adopt the measures demanded by a provisional and exceptional situation, it will naturally dissolve itself as soon as the end of this situation has evidently been reached, to give place to another Assembly brought together with orders to establish public affairs on a definite basis. This is the conclusion we must arrive at, on considering the general features of the situation, and the decisions of the Assembly itself. LÉON VEER. FRASER'S MAGAZINE. NOVEMBER 1871. REPORTS ON THE MILITARY FORCES OF PRUSSIA AND THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1868-1870. A TRANSLATED BY C. E. H. VINCENT, 23RD ROYAL WELCH FUSILIERS. INTRODUCTION. MONG all the French Imperial papers referring to events antecedent to the late war, none are more striking than the Reports of M. le Baron Stoffel upon the Military Forces of Prussia, the Garde Nationale Mobile of France, and the Political Movement in Germany, of some of which the following is a translation. Colonel Stoffel was accredited to the Prussian Court, as military attaché, during the war of 1866, and afterwards from his important and difficult post at Berlin he indited these wonderful despatches. A very able, conscientious, and bold man, he unhesitatingly extolled, in language so vigorous and cutting that sorry justice has been rendered to it in the translation, those properties which pre-eminently distinguish the Prussian nation, and which we have now seen rendered her, as he clearly predicted, so terrible and invincible when opposed to the vanity and frivolity of France to her illorganised, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and undisciplined army, recruited from the worst class of an ignorant and debased nation, administered by a popularity-hunting, impotent Government, who lacked foresight as much as they were deficient of cognisance of passing events, and who failed to perceive in the future what VOL. IV.-NO. XXIII. NEW SERIES. every political infant knew to be inevitable a nation struck with blindness. That the Emperor should have had these despatches in his hand before declaring war seems alike strange and unaccountable. Framed by an officer he trusted, and faithful to his own cause, they showed him unerringly what must be the inevitable result of a FrancoPrussian conflict. Can it be that he knew that any amelioration was impossible from the state into which French society had declined—that succeeding years must only drag her farther down into the mire of degradation, and with her own fall would come that of his dynasty? That reading the final despatch of June 24, 1870, in which Baron Stoffel gives October 1, 1871, as the date from which the whole Germanic race would enter upon all the advantages of its military reorganisation, he resolved to strike at once, knowing that time was indeed the surest ally of the Prussian Chancellor?' Baron Stoffel predicted that a small, insignificant event would probably set ablaze the flame long smouldering between the two countries;' and such it was-the empty throne of helpless Spain. The despatches themselves must now take up the narrative; and if in reading them any Englishman think that the ignorance, the arrogance, the presumption, and the PP 2 blindness' of the French before the war are in some degree applicable to his country, let him resolve individually to steer clear of the faults of that unhappy people. If we unite, like Prussia, in encouraging the Government to put the country in a proper state to maintain her integrity, honour, and dignity, even at the cost of some little sacrifice of personal comfort, we shall never require our Jena, our Sedan, to bring us to a sense of our duty to ourselves and to civilisation. THE ELEMENTS OF SUPERIORITY IN THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. April 23, 1868. REPORT OF THE MINISTER of War. IN the midst of the numerous and various studies which occupy the attention of an officer placed in my position, there is one great question, which constantly and involuntarily presents itself before him: If war were to break out to-morrow between France and Prussia, would the Prussian army be in any way superior to that of the French, either as regards its armament, its organisation, its instruction, or in military spirit? If any elements of superiority exist, what are they? And, lastly, what must we do to remedy our inferiority? For the present, I propose to take no notice of those points which lie deeper than the upper surface, such as the command-in-chief which certainly is one of the most important features of armies-the number of combatants at the disposal of the two nations, and the general resources of the two countries. To make my meaning clearer, I will suppose that these details are equal on both sides. Even now, the problem which I propose to handle is one of the most difficult to solve, as it is my intention to treat as fully as possible of the most important matters in the composition of armies. I intend, however, to avoid any direct verdict, either in favour of the one side or the other, but to examine carefully and impartially the various properties which would give the Prussians a great advantage in the event of an early war. The elements of superiority which one army possesses over another are distinctly divisible into two classes: The one refers to the character of the nation-its physical temperament, its traditions, its history, the degree of education it possesses, &c.; which may be termed 'moral' elements. The other is the result of the organisation of the army, the military education of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men; the quality and quantity of the ma terial of war, of the armament, of the equipment of the troops, &c. These are the material' elements. I need not speak on this subject with reference to the French army, as the qualities which distinguish it are well known. All intelligent military men in Prussia recognise the greater individuality, the greater intelligence, the incomparable élan, which our troops possess. They look upon the French humour, gaiety, and care lessness, as precious virtues in time of war; they acknowledge that our troops are more ingenious, and that they march better. They also admit the superiority which the longer period of service with the colours and the presence of old soldiers in the ranks give the French army; but Prussia as a rule is a flat country. It is well known that the inhabitants of flat districts march worse than the inhabitants of hilly countries. This was clearly shown to be the case in the war of 1866. The corps d'armée recruited from East Prussia, Pomerania, and Brandenburg suffered far more from the wearisome marches through the Bohemian mountain passes than the Silesian corps for instance. above all, they envy our establishment of non-commissioned officers.1 With respect to the armament of the infantry I have already acquainted you how concerned the Prussian authorities are about the superiority of our new rifle, and how every effort is being brought to bear on the improvement of the Prussian weapon. Taking account only of the officers, what a brilliant example they give to the other classes! The highborn and the wealthy do not live as elsewhere in a deplorable state of idleness and self-indulgence. Far from it. The members of the richest families, of the most ancient houses, become officers, and submit to the labour and hardships of a I must now confine myself to the military life. They set the example; Prussian army. MORAL ELEMENTS OF SUPERIORITY. Under the moral head, there are two things which combine to secure to the Prussian service an incontestable advantage over other European armies: (1) the system of obligatory military service; (2) the education of every class of society. Obligatory Service. It is useless to dwell further (I did so at length in my reports of 1866) on the moral value of the presence in the ranks of every class of the nation, and of the conviction that the army and the landwehr combined represent the entire country in arms. Whatever defects one may discover in the Prussian military organisation, it is impossible to suppress one's admiration for a people who, understanding that the first condition of happiness for nations as well as for individuals is to be independent, resolved that the army should be the first and the most honoured institution; that every available citizen should share the duties and honour of defending the country, or of extending its power and dominion; and that they should, above all others, be honoured and esteemed.2 and, beholding such a sight, it is impossible to restrain one's admiration for that rough and philosophic nation; but one cannot help a feeling of awe when thinking of the nation which possesses in its army such unparalleled advantages. Compulsory Education. The system of compulsory education has been adopted in Prussia for thirty years, and one may almost say from the time of Frederick the Great; thus the Prussian nation is the most enlightened in Europe, owing to the education so thoroughly distributed among every class of society. The Polish provinces alone are somewhat inferior in an intellectual point of view. In France one is so completely ignorant of all that refers to foreign countries, that nothing is known of the vast school of learning so firmly rooted in Northern Germany. Large schools abound in great numbers; and while in France the seats of learning and intellectual development are confined to a few great cities, Germany is covered with such institutions, and to enumerate them it would be necessary to include towns even of the third and fourth order. I will not dwell on the advantages The Prussian army certainly has non-commissioned officers of long service, but the number is limited in consequence of the system of obligatory service, which necessitates the enrolment of the whole annual contingent. 2 I have frequently stated that all honours, advantages, and favours are reserved for those who are serving, or who have served, in the army. He who has not been a soldier never finds employment, and in towns and villages he is constantly exposed to the taunts and sneers of his fellows. which an extensive education affords in the composition of an army. But is it not somewhat strange that in France men who have a reputation for ability and clearness of mind refuse to believe in them? Is it not tantamount to denying that instruction and education develop the faculties of man, and elevate his ideas by giving him a greater sense of his own dignity? Those savants innocently affirm that an army of rough, uncivilised soldiers, but accustomed to warfare, will defeat an army composed of well-educated men, who, however, have no warlike experiences. Sense of Duty. I cannot omit to call attention to terises the Prussian nation, and a quality which particularly characwhich serves to increase the moral value of its army, namely, the sense of Duty. It is so extraordinarily developed in every section of the community, that the more one studies the Prussian character the more one marvels at it. As, how ever, it is not in my province to search for the root of this sentiment, I content myself with stating it as a fact. The most remarkable proof of this devotion is shown by the employés of the various civil departments of the Government, men I simply ask what general would hesitate in choosing between the command of two armies, each consist-paid ing of one hundred thousand men, the one composed of pupils of the Ecole Polytechnique and St. Cyr, and the other composed of uncouth peasants from Limousin and Berry; both armies being equal in point of discipline, physical force, and length of service? If he took but one con sideration into account-the rapid training of his recruits-it alone must instantly determine his decision. But there are other moral advantages, which he could not ig nore, and which make the one army worth ten times as much as the other. I can further bring the experience I acquired in Bohemia in 1866 to bear on this subject; for Prussian officers and sergeants, proud of their victories, ascribed them in a great measure to the in tellectual superiority of their men, and told me, 'When, after the first battles, our men found themselves in the presence of Austrian prisoners, when they examined and questioned them, and found that the majority hardly knew the right hand from the left, there was not a Prussian who did not conceive himself a god compared to such miserable wretches, and this conviction increased. our strength tenfold.' with surprising parsimony, generally burdened with large fa milies, but who slave all day with an indefatigable zeal, without a content or of a wish to rise into a murmur or giving evidence of dismore comfortable position. M. de Bismarck said to me a few days ago, We take good care to leave this hardworking and ill-paid, do our class as they are; this bureaucratie, work admirably, and constitute one of our principal supports.' MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF SUPERIORITY. Special Corps permanently organised. Among the principal material advantages possessed by Prussia, the facility which its military organisa tion gives it of creating special ser vices, such as railway and telegraphic companies, companies of bearers of the wounded, is one of the most important. In my reports of 1866 I dwelt on the most important details connected with these services; I described the numbers, composition, and duties of each service; so that it only remains for me now to add that, by means of the landwehr, these services are maintained without deducting a single combatant from the active army; and morein time of peace they are on a over, |