the Turkish commander-in-chief in Macedonia, should then have been able to prevent the junction of the Allies and crush each of them in detail, as did Napoleon in the defensive campaign of 1814, or Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862. The great distances and the many obstacles between the allied columns and the general direction of the railways and roads would all have been in favour of strategy of this sort. But Ali Riza Pasha had not the necessary force. What exactly were the respective numbers has not transpired; but the Turks in this area were probably in a minority of roughly one to three, and even interior lines will hardly counterbalance such heavy odds.

Imagine, then, the Turkish commander somewhere within the semicircle, having at his disposal say, 100,000 men, knowing that the population was disaffected, feeling that his communications were insecure, expecting from 25,000 to 50,000 Bulgarians to appear from the direction of Sofia, 150,000 Servians from the direction of Nish, 80,000 Greeks from the direction of Larissa, from 20,000 to 40,000 Montenegrins from the direction of Ipek -total close upon 300,000 men-what was he to do?

Ali Riza Pasha might have found much to help him in history, for the problem before him was one that has often had to be faced before by generals in the early stages of campaigns-by Sir George White, for instance, in Natal in October 1899. To gain time should have been his first consideration-time for reinforcements to arrive and so restore the balance. How gain time? By erecting obstacles, destroying bridges, holding defiles and passes in front of the advancing columns; by employing small bodies to delay the advance of the larger ones; but always avoiding serious fighting, for the essence of success lies in the smaller body not allowing itself to become so engaged as to have its organic unity destroyed by defeat. Field-Marshal Von der Goltz, in an article published last month in the Neue Freie Presse-his apology for himself and the Turks-suggests an alternative plan, and states that his advice was that all the Macedonian troops should concentrate about Istib and there establish themselves in a fortified camp. But the objections to surrendering Macedonia, its resources and

all lines of supply, without a blow, and going to earth at once, are obvious; and that policy must have led to the Turks being besieged in a locality undefended by forts or heavy guns.

In the next place, how were reinforcements to arrive? That was the crux of the matter from the point of view of the Turks. Reinforcements could only arrive by railway from Thrace, or by sea. From Thrace neither troops nor rolling stock could well be spared; and from junction to junction, Doiran to Demotika, the distance is about 250 miles, and the line was much exposed. For all practical purposes, then, reinforcements and supplies could only come by sea. Command of the Aegean was thus vital to this western Turkish army, based upon a seaport, Salonica, and depending upon Asia Minor and Syria for both reinforcements and supplies. Command of the direct sea passage from Smyrna to Salonica was preferable, of course; but, failing that, command at least of the less direct but more easily protected routes from Smyrna or ports to the north of it to Dedeagatch or Kavalla was required.

Now until Oct. 15 the Aegean was commanded by the Italian fleet, a fact which, incidentally, must have played havoc with Turkish military measures in Macedonia for many months prior to the outbreak of the Balkan War. After peace with Italy was signed, all Ali Riza Pasha's hopes, all possibility of bringing the Macedonian campaign to a successful issue, depended upon the Turks regaining command of the sea. On paper the

Turkish fleet was superior to that of the Greeks; not much, perhaps, but certainly not so weak as to be unable to risk a naval action, considering how vital was the issue. For, even had the battle gone against them, the Turks should have been able to inflict such loss upon the hostile fleet as to render the latter incapable thereafter of effectively blockading the whole Asiatic coast. To the lasting discredit of those responsible for the conduct of the Turkish operations, no risks were taken; and the command of the Aegean was passively surrendered to the Greeks, while the Turkish fleet endeavoured to conceal its shame by bombarding undefended Bulgarian ports.

Thus Ali Riza Pasha was left to his fate. Whether he was warned or not we do not know. If warned, his policy should, it seems, have been to prepare to evacuate Macedonia; to delay the Allied advance but to keep open at all costs the Salonica-Dedeagatch railway; and, as a last resort, to retire along it into Thrace. In Thrace his army might have been of some practical value to the Turkish cause as a whole; it is conceivable indeed that, in certain circumstances, it might have turned the scale. To remain in Macedonia with his natural lines of communication in hostile hands at the outset meant that, even if unbeaten in battle, his army must eventually surrender or starve. Ali Riza Pasha, however, decided to stay. What his general plan was, if any, is not clear; but he seems to have divided his forces into as many columns as there were bodies of invaders, and to have left each to look after itself. Each in turn stood and was defeated; and no policy could have been more quickly fatal.

Now for the strategy of the Allies. If we bear in mind the overwhelming importance of communications in this campaign and especially of railways, the points which the Allies would naturally first make for are self-evident. Let them but take Salonica, Uskub and some point on the line near Drama Seres, and the whole railway system was theirs. That, briefly, is what the Allies did.

On the next day after the declaration of war, October 18, Servians, Greeks and Bulgars were all on the move. Bulgaria placed at the disposal of the Servians the railway to Kustendil through Pirot and Sofia; and the latter therefore started in four columns. Of these the two northern were directed upon Novi Bazar and Pristina, places of minor strategical importance, and met with slight opposition. The main column advanced from Vrania and, supported by that from Kustendil, gained on Oct. 24 the important victory of Kumanovo. Two days later the Servians entered Uskub. About the same time a volunteer contingent of Macedonian Bulgars is reported to have occupied Drama; so that within the first week two out of the three primary objectives in the western area had been reached. The third, Salonica, took longer; and its capture became a race between the Bulgarian 7th division starting from Dubnitza, and the

main Greek army from Larissa, the distance being, in each case, about 190 miles.

The Greeks crossed the frontier on Oct. 18, and five days later occupied Serfidze after a fight in the hills south of that place. Thence the advance, though practically unopposed, was comparatively slow as far as Veria, which, though only 35 miles distant, was not reached until Oct. 29. On Nov. 2 a battle was fought with the Turks near Yenidje, probably the most serious in which the Greeks have been engaged; and on the 8th they entered Salonica, anticipating the Bulgarian 7th division by a few hours. The latter had been opposed in considerable force at the frontier near Suma-i-Bala and had encountered great physical difficulties in its march down the Struma valley. The capture of the third main objective, Salonica, and the junction in that neighbourhood of the three converging forces, Servian, Greek and Bulgar, meant the final domination of all possible lines of supply, and therefore for all practical purposes the end of the war in this western area.

Meanwhile both Servians and Greeks were advancing upon Monastir. The movements of the Greek column which started from Kozani on Oct. 26 are still wrapt in mystery, but there is little doubt that it suffered a serious reverse somewhere near Banitza, 25 miles southeast of Monastir, and eventually fell back upon Kozani. The Turks on this occasion captured at least 12 guns and gained what is practically their only success throughout the war. The Servians fared better. On Nov. 6 they defeated the Turks near Prilip in an engagement of some importance; and later, after a four days' battle commencing on Nov. 17 (the date of the first Bulgarian attack upon the Chatalja lines), they captured Monastir. Details of the minor operations of Servian, Greek and Bulgarian columns in this western area are of political rather than strategical importance, for they have had little or no effect upon the issue as a whole. It is interesting to note that the Turkish troops appear to have held more or less together, and to have attempted throughout regular rather than guerilla tactics. The latter are in any case rarely successful unless the troops adopting them are, first, more mobile than their enemy, and, secondly, are operating in their own country or amongst a friendly

population; and neither of these advantages was on the side of the Turks.*

We may now turn to the eastern area of the war. From the point of view of both sides the general strategical aspect in Thrace on the outbreak of war differed considerably from that prevailing in Macedonia. For the Turks the situation was incomparably more favourable. Their bases, Constantinople and Rodosto, were closely linked with Asia and secure from all attack. With the Rhodope and the Maritza on the left, and the Black Sea, commanded by their fleet, on the right, only the northern frontier of Thrace was exposed to invasion; and here, dominating the main line of advance, were the first-class fortress of Adrianople and, dividing the distance between that fortress and the sea, the garrison and entrenched camp of Kirk Kilisseh. Given time, the Turks could concentrate behind these outposts an army of numerical superiority to that which the Bulgarians, with their more limited resources, could bring against it; and for the Turkish general staff the main initial problem was the selection of the area in which to effect this concentration. The nearer to the frontier the more closely could the main army support its covering detachments, and the better placed would it be for eventual offensive action; the further from the frontier the greater the probable gain in time. Nazim Pasha appears to have recognised the strength of his position, and little fault can be found with his plan as a whole; it was in the execution that it altogether failed.

For the Bulgarians the end was no less obvious-to reach and defeat the Turkish main army before its preparations and its numerical superiority were assured. Adrianople lay between them and their objective; and a fortress containing a large mobile garrison could not be ignored, for the latter would directly threaten the flank and communications of any force attempting to pass by or round it. Adrianople, therefore, had to be attacked,

The foregoing summary of the Macedonian operations is compiled mostly from reports published in the press. For the following outline of the campaign in Thrace the writer is indebted to an eye-witness whose information, at any rate so far as the operations of the Bulgarian fieldarmy are concerned, is beyond dispute.