pave the way to the goal at which each Muscovite Tsar in succession has aimed?

With the practical disappearance of the Turk from Europe has arisen a series of Near-Eastern questions which are at least as important as the old problem of Macedonia. The difficulty of reconciling the territorial ambitions of Servia and Bulgaria, not to mention those of Greece and, in a less important degree, of Montenegro, the limits of an autonomous Albania, the future of the Aegean Islands-all these are new questions which have surged up within the last two months. But above all looms that of the future of Constantinople-a question which vitally affects European policy as a whole.

Whatever be the issue of the present negotiations, it can hardly be doubted that the Turk will be left in possession of Constantinople and of sufficient territory to ensure his control of the Straits. His hold will, it is true, be but artificial, since it will depend on the general determination of the Great Powers that Russia shall not control the Dardanelles. But, if artificial, it need not be insecure, for that determination is based upon the common interest of Europe. The only alternative to the Turk is the Bulgar. No doubt a Bulgarian Tsar on the Bosphorus would be more acceptable to Europe than a Russian; while the acquisition of such a prize would more than balance concessions to Servia which would satisfy her ambitions and eliminate a dangerous rivalry. But, in the first place, the Turk is there; and, in the second, for fairly obvious reasons, the Bulgar does not want Constantinople. Such a possession would be splendid, but it would be too corrupting, too responsible, and above all too much exposed.

There is yet another solution, that the Turk should migrate across the Straits, and that the capital should become a free city, under the guarantee of the Powers. But here national jealousy steps in. Neither Serb nor Bulgar would like to see Constantinople in the hands of the Greek; for that, owing to the strength of the Greek element in the population, would soon be its fate. Salonika may indeed be neutralised, and a bone of contention may thus be removed; but not Constantinople. There, for the present at least, the Turk must stay; and

Europe will have to see that Russia does not turn him out. It has been suggested that the Balkan States should admit the Turk into their League; but, apart from the fact that the continuance of the League is highly precarious, it is inconceivable that they should undertake the charge of defending his Asiatic Empire. On the other hand, a more limited alliance with the League, or better still with Bulgaria alone, for the defence of Constantinople and nothing more, is not out of the question.

The possibility of the formation of a Near-Eastern Confederation creates a new factor to be reckoned with in European politics. The Balkan League has been widely regarded as a new agent on the side of the Triple Entente, chiefly owing to the undisguised language of German military experts, who have harped on the need of maintaining and strengthening the predominance of Turkish military power in the Near East, especially with a view to a possible Anglo-German conflict, and the consequent desirability of framing German policy in accordance with Turkish interests. The results of the two wars in which Turkey has recently been engaged have undoubtedly dealt a serious blow at German expectations in this direction. Whether this will have a pacific effect, or the reverse, remains to be seen.

The position is complicated at present by the vacillating policy of Bukarest. During the past decade Roumania has turned persistently to Vienna for instructions; and there was a period when it was understood that she had given Turkey a definite promise to oppose actively any attack on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. No renewal was made of that compact; but, for all that, Roumania held herself aloof from the Balkan Alliance. She has now realised the folly of that policy of separation; and, since she can scarcely hope to obtain any appreciable territorial concession from Bulgaria in return for her non-interference, her only hope of any ultimate expansion is in the direction of the region of Transylvania wherein a certain number of Roumanians are settled. Such a policy would of course entail a direct breach with Vienna, and would be only likely to succeed in the event of Austria giving a blunt refusal to the adherents of the Trialist idea; but it is

clear that the adhesion of Roumania to a Near-Eastern Confederation would, while strengthening the bulwark against Russian aggression, also largely increase the difficulties of Austria-Hungary.

The immediate prospects of European peace can scarcely be regarded as golden. The overthrow of Turkey, it is true, deprives the German Powers of a valuable ally; but the Balkan League, even if it may be reckoned as naturally leaning to the Triple Entente, and even if it succeeds in coming to terms with the Porte, is of an unstable character, and will, for some time to come, be occupied in reconciling the divergent interests of its members. Unless, then, the conflict between the Germanic and Slavonic nations, which is becoming more and more a general menace, breaks out within the next few months, and only then if the fortunes of war turn decidedly against the Slav, the Balkan Powers are not likely to intervene. At most they can be regarded as neutralising the Turk. Italy, moreover, having obtained all she could hope for from Turkey, is hardly likely to join heartily in a European conflict on the very remote chance of picking Tunis out of the fire. In view of her obvious interests, her recent pronounced flirtations with Russia, and the many causes of friction with Austria-Hungary, it would be a mistake to regard too seriously the premature renewal of the Triple Alliance a few weeks ago, a measure obviously designed for immediate use in regard to the Austro-Servian imbroglio. In spite of all this, there are, no doubt, certain considerations which might lead the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to decide on war. There is, in the first place, the fact that Russian military organisation is still far from having recovered from the shock of the Japanese war, and that the season of midwinter offers serious obstacles to Russian mobilisation. There is, further, the fear-to which bellicose German writers are constantly giving expression-that in a few years, especially if Vienna adopts an irreconcilable attitude towards the Croats, Slavism and the Slav element in Europe will be too strong to be subdued, and that therefore, if the conflict is, sooner or later, inevitable, it had better come at once. Moreover, neither Germany nor Austria is likely to overlook the present exhaustion of Servia and Bulgaria, and may prefer to strike now

rather than wait until those States have had time to recuperate.

The position of England at the present moment is one of extreme delicacy. An influential section of the British public is avowedly antagonistic to Russia, and always ready to assert, not without reason, that the interests of Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East, if not elsewhere, are in reality irreconcilable. Simultaneously there appears a growing tendency to dislike the obligations which may be forced upon us owing to our position in what is known as the Triple Entente. It is also possible to trace a marked improvement in the relations between Great Britain and Germany-an improvement which has been cordially welcomed on all sides. Everything, so far, points to an understanding between London and Berlin regarding the difficulties caused by the Balkan crisis; and the pacific tendency of British policy during this crisis should convince the most Anglophobe of German publicists, even General von Bernhardi, that their suspicions of British intentions are groundless. On the other hand, it is not to be forgotten that Germany has announced in the most explicit fashion her intention to support her allies; and, though the 'Concert of Europe' has apparently been revived, and an agreement upon one, and that perhaps the most knotty, point has been reached, we are still by no means out of the wood. If at this crisis we occupied our old position of 'splendid isolation,' the balance of power, and with it the peace of Europe, might be more easily maintained. In some measure

it may almost be said that Britain, at least temporarily, has re-occupied that position. That her hands, so far as possible, should be free is much to be desired. We look for no radical alteration in the map of Europe, no fundamental dislocation of its component parts. A crushing defeat of Germany and Austria on the one hand or of France and Russia on the other would be equally opposed to our interests and, we may add, to those of the world at large. Either result would necessarily entail the complete domination of Europe by the victors, and would constitute an appalling menace to the British Empire. The interests of that Empire are based on peace; and by the prosecution of a definite and independent policy the Government may be able to Vol. 218.-No. 434.

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exercise a weighty and beneficent influence in that direction on the councils of Europe.

The next few weeks will indeed be full of anxiety; and, although the Balkan Allies are to be congratulated on the determination which they have shown and on the results they have achieved through their ungrudging sacrifices on behalf of their Christian co-nationalists in European Turkey, they will have accomplished an even greater feat if they can manage to moderate some of their respective demands and lay the foundations of a lasting peace. Unfortunately past experience has given them little reason to show much gratitude to Europe, whose unceasing jealousies have delayed the Macedonian reforms promised more than thirty years ago. So far as the Macedonian question is concerned, it is true, they have cleaned the slate; but, in the place of that which has been wiped away, new and ominous signs are visible on its surface.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

IN regard to certain remarks made on p. 301 of the previous number of the Quarterly Review,' in an article on the Panama Canal, touching the often alleged intervention of the United States Government in the affairs of Panama, it is only fair to say that such intervention has been distinctly repudiated by no less an authority than Mr John Hay, who, writing as Secretary of State to General Reyes, January 5, 1904, speaks as follows:

'Any charge that this Government, or any responsible member of it, held intercourse, whether official or unofficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia, is utterly without justification. Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this Government prior to the revolution in Panama was the result of complicity with the plans of the revolutionists. The Department sees fit to make these denials, and it makes them finally.' (Moore, Digest, iii, 91.)

The words but little foreign competition,' in the first line of p. 305 (same number), should read 'no foreign competition.'