settled normal tendencies of the nation. A twelve, fifteen, or even twenty-one years' tenure of seats would secure independence. Proportional Representation in large constituencies would facilitate the election of men of standing and reputation. By allowing one-third of the House to retire at a time, violent fluctuations in composition would be avoided, while the House as a whole would be kept steadily in touch with the normal will of the nation. And with a view to giving that normal will a conservative basis-using the word in a non-party sense-it might be possible to confine the electorate to voters over thirty years of age. Lastly, it is at any rate conceivable that the vote for a chamber whose functions are essentially deliberative and reflective might be more easily conceded to women than the vote for the Lower House, which is, essentially, under modern conditions, a vote controlling the executive and initiative power in the State. The essential weakness of any scheme for an elective House of Lords is the breach of continuity, and the doubt whether men of the right quality will be found to come forward and strengthen the presumptive authority, which the elective principle already possesses in the minds of the great mass of the people, by the moral authority of high personal character and a judicial temper. It is a weakness that can be overcome. But only on two conditions. One is that the change is made with the consent and moral support of the nation as a whole, and not as a mere party measure. The other is that the existing Peerage should not merely accept it, but should boldly throw themselves into the task of making it a success. If they are resolved to maintain the tradition of public service in their own class and the continuity of political life in the House of Lords by themselves standing for election under the new conditions, they can achieve their end.

Whatever solution may be adopted with regard to the composition of the Second Chamber, there still remains one difficulty, arising from the possibility of conflict between the two Houses, which is not solved by the mere repeal of the Parliament Act and the restoration of the status quo ante. It, undoubtedly, was a real defect of our system, as it was worked before the Parliament Act, and constituted, indeed, the one really legitimate grievance of

the Liberal party against that system, that a Government, interested in an important measure with which the House of Lords disagreed, had no alternatives other than those of either submitting forthwith to the inconvenience and risk of a general election on that measure, or else of letting that measure wait to take its chance at a later election when subsequent events might have fatally compromised the popularity of its introducers. The introduction, in some form or other, of the principle of the Referendum, or direct appeal to the electors on a particular issue, has really become inevitable. What is desirable, however, is that the Referendum should be introduced with due safeguards. To make it too accessible a solution would destroy the stability of government and the sense of responsibility in Parliament. It should be an instrument mainly kept in reserve, and only available on those occasions where the difference between the two Houses is so strong, and the issue so important, that the alternative would be recourse to a general election. The introduction of the Referendum would, indeed, have an indirect advantage even greater than that of diminishing the probability of deadlock between the two Houses. The mere possibility of a direct appeal to the electorate on a single issue would cut the ground away from any purely log-rolling' parliamentary compact, by depriving the parties to such a compact of the power to carry out their bargain. The value of such an influence, unobtrusive though it might be, in regenerating the life of the House of Commons, restoring reality to its discussions, and removing the deadening influence of an excessive mechanical discipline, might well prove almost incalculable.

One other reform aiming at the restoration of the individual independence of members of the House of Commons and the relaxation of the grip of the party 'machine,' deserves serious consideration. Proportional Representation has long been advocated as a means of securing a fairer representation of the true balance of opinion in the country as a whole, as well as giving a better chance to local minorities, and on those grounds has much to commend it. But its real value and importance from the point of view of the regeneration of Parliament lie in the fact that it would tend to strengthen the independence

of the individual member as against the machine.' The power of the 'machine' over the voter is far greater when it confronts him with the simple alternative of voting for or against the man of its choice than if it has to leave him free to vote for three or more candidates in the order of his individual preference. Strong men, of definite views, and with a good record of public service, would, under Proportional Representation, tend to retain their place in Parliament in spite of sudden fluctuations in the mood of the electorate, or of occasional divergencies of view between themselves and the official policy of their party. On the other hand, the power of a mere handful of cranks, which is sufficient under the existing electoral system to turn the scale of any close-fought election, would be diminished, to the great advantage of sincerity and effectiveness in political life.

The reconstitution of the House of Lords, the introduction of the Referendum under strictly limited conditions, and the application of Proportional Representation to parliamentary elections, probably represent as much as it is possible to do in the way of a deliberate remodelling of our constitutional machinery. The rest must be left in the main to that change of heart' which, one may hope, will be brought about before long by the realisation of all the disastrous consequences of the aggravation of the present state of Parliament, and which the reforms indicated above are only intended to foster and encourage. There may, and indeed must be, remodelling in certain other directions. Apart from any settlement of the Irish question which may be mooted after the final defeat of the present unworkable measure of Home Rule, the problems of local government and local taxation may well lead to the consideration of some general scheme of provincial government, diminishing to some slight extent the pressure of work upon the national legislature. Far more important is the solution of the problem of securing for the Empire, as a whole, an effective organ of government free from the wholly incongruous task of carrying on the local government of the United Kingdom. But such an organ of government-an Imperial Parliament in the fullest sense-must come into being as a new growth outside the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom. When it does come

it will relieve that Parliament of many responsibilities which, at present, it is only very inadequately fulfilling, and so lighten the strain upon upon the constitutional mechanism at home. More than that, by eliminating Imperial issues from our domestic controversies, it will help to get rid of the entirely false antithesis between Imperial and social questions which underlies so much of our party controversies at the present day. But, however important—and no question can really compare with it in importance-the solution of the Imperial problem does not bear directly upon the immediate issue of constitutional reform in this country. That issue has to be decided here and on its merits, and any attempt to confuse the two, such, for instance, as is implied in the well-meant suggestion to convert the House of Lords into an Imperial Senate by the inclusion of colonial representatives, can only end in futility. To succeed we must recognise clearly that there are two great tasks we must take in hand. The one-the rebuilding of our domestic constitution to suit our domestic needs—is a task for this nation alone. The other-the creation of a new and yet more splendid fabric of an Imperial constitution to suit the needs of a world-wide Empirecan only be carried out by a common Imperial effort.

Art. 14.-BRITISH POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST. To the future historian the Balkan War with its necessary corollaries will stand out as one of the memorable features in the panorama of European evolution. It marks the watershed of two epochs, the cleavage line between the old international order and a new one, the nature of which is as yet undefined. One of its ultimate effects will be the collapse of the artificial in the groundwork of international politics and the substitution of homogeneous peoples for mixed States in the balance of nations. In the light of such data as are at present available, one may sum up the more striking cosmopolitan effects of the campaign just ended by saying that it has transferred the Oriental question from South-Eastern Europe to Asia Minor; has pitted the Slav against the Teuton, not only there but all over Eastern Europe; and has by overlapping interests detracted enormously from the value of hard and fast alliances. And now that hostilities are at last terminated, the Powers of Europe may be congratulated upon a provisional settlement and a temporary lull, and condoled with on the increased burdens of blood and money which they are doomed to bear until the next storm bursts.

The Near Eastern problem having altered its aspect, the parts ascribed to the various Powers occupied in working it out to an issue must undergo a corresponding change. The spectacle with which Europe will be confronted during the present and the coming generations is a struggle, diplomatic and, it may be, military, between Slav and Teuton for the lion's share of territory in Asia Minor and in Eastern Europe-a struggle which may easily develop into what Germans term a 'might-contest." At this early stage it may be difficult for the untrained eye of the average observer to discern the connecting link which unites the expulsion of the Turks from Europe with the sharpening of the antagonism between the Slav and Teutonic peoples. He will be more deeply struck by the seemingly felicitous readjustment of the equipoise of forces which was upset by the downfall of the Osmanli. The creation of a new independent State which secular traditions as well as material interests render