French-speaking cantons, who joined the Confederacy in 1914, in analogous circumstances, have too keen a sense of the national interest to oppose a desire aiming at completing the historical development of Switzerland, and displaying anew its vitality. Switzerland has not taken the initiative-this has come entirely from the people of the Vorarlberg-but, full of enthusiasm as she has been, for five years past, on behalf of the Rights of Nations, she has not the moral right to reject without reason the hand held out to her. And she counts on her friends to help her. For England, which has no direct interest in maintaining the integrity of Austria as a sacred dogma, has on the contrary a great interest in placing on an unshakable foundation the domestic peace and the independence of Switzerland, as guardian of the Passes of the Alps, in other words, of the European equilibrium.

It seems to be feared that any alteration in the Treaty of Saint-Germain might be a step taken towards the further dissolution of Austria. But is there not still more danger in retaining artificially, within the Austrian frontiers, a people which has no sentiment of patriotism in common with the rest of Austria, and which therefore will constantly seek to detach itself from that State, to break up the Treaty of Saint-Germain from the inside, and thus to render a conflict between Switzerland and Austria a possible contingency? The least that one can demand from the Allied Statesmen is that they should study the question objectively and endeavour to find, in harmony with the League of Nations, a final and beneficent solution. Europe owes this to the principles it has proclaimed and to the people of the Vorarlberg, which demands only justice. It owes it to Switzerland, which desires to complete its historic development. It owes it finally to itself, for it has no greater need than that for peace and repose.

Art. 15.-A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL.

1. The History of Trade Unionism. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Revised edition, extended to 1920. Longmans, 1920.

2. The Cotton Trade Boom and Some Considerations for Promoting a Lasting Industrial Peace. By Sir C. W. Macara, Bart. Sherratt and Hughes, 1920.

3. The Industrial Council for the Building Industry. Harrison and Sons, for the Garton Foundation, [1919]. 4. Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, Ch. 69). Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1919.

5. Report of Provisional Joint Committee of the Industrial Conference [Cmd. 501]. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920.

THE sane and practical pacifism which is responsible for the idea of a League of Nations has wisely admitted the legitimacy, in the last resort, of a recourse to arms, and has concentrated on limiting, so far as possible, the occasions of conflict, and restricting the area of such conflicts as may occur. A sane and practical statesmanship will adopt the same attitude with regard to strikes. Our ultimate aim must be the substitution of the rule of reason for the rule of force in industrial as in international affairs; but our immediate task is not the abolition of the strike weapon, but the removal of outstanding causes of dispute, and the adoption of such measures as shall prevent an industrial struggle from becoming as ruinous to our national civilisation as international conflict has so nearly been to the civilisation of the world. Only, as the League of Nations has been led on from the bare prevention of wars to schemes for the better government of the world, we shall inevitably be led, by inquiry into the strike menace, to a consideration of the adequacy of our present industrial and political organisation.

To begin with the discussion of the narrower but more immediately pressing question; the extent of the perils which may be involved in industrial conflict under present conditions, was exemplified in the Railway Strike of September-October 1919. It was only by extreme good fortune and thanks to the moderation displayed by both sides, that the worst of those perils remained unrealised.

Nothing in connexion with the strike is more remarkable than the contrast between the gigantic forces actually or potentially arrayed on either side and those actually called into employment during its course. The strike had its origin in a dispute as to wages between the National Union of Railwaymen and the Railway Executive, but the relations which existed between the railways and the Government rendered it inevitable that the Government as a whole should, at an early period, be drawn in as a party. It was, indeed, a letter containing the "definitive offer" of the Government which the railwaymen interpreted as a challenge; and it was not until after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a modification of this offer from the Prime Minister that the N.U.R. and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen called out their members as from midnight on Sept. 26. Thus the issue lay directly between the strikers and the Government; and, in view of their expressed opinion that the strike was brought about by a conspiracy against the existing social order, the Government might have been expected to employ ruthlessly the whole resources of the State for the purpose of defeating the railwaymen. It is asserted by Mr and Mrs Webb, in the new edition of their History of Trade Unionism,’ that the Government at one time contemplated starving out the strikers by discriminatory issues of food supplies and by confiscation of the Trade Union Funds; but no such action was, in fact, taken. While the Government paraded, somewhat ostentatiously, their determination to preserve order, the measures adopted for this purpose were marked by considerable restraint; and, beyond taking the necessary steps to safeguard the food supplies of the country, the Government's activities were practically confined to a vigorous argumentative propaganda as to the merits of the dispute.

Against the Government was arrayed, actually or potentially, a large proportion of the organised labour of the country. The strikers themselves numbered some 500,000; and the conference held at Caxton Hall on Oct. 1 to consider the question of sympathetic action, represented unions comprising some 1,900,000 workers. The miners, though not represented, were already becoming restive; and, had the strike been prolonged, a further conference,

representing the whole trade-union organisation of the country, would have been held on Oct. 7. It was thus evident that a stoppage of work was imminent which would throw the whole economic life of the country into chaos, and on the surface the position of the strikers was very strong. Far, however, from requesting active support, the N.U.R. definitely refused, down to Sept. 30, all offers of sympathetic action; and, though Mr J. H. Thomas announced on that day that he would be unable to persist in this attitude, he was known to be strongly averse to an extension of the strike. In spite of strong pressure from the rank and file of the unions, who believed that the Government was attacking, through the railwaymen, the interests of the whole body of workers, the Caxton Hall Conference adopted a similar attitude. Not only did the Union Executives refrain from calling out their members, but their whole efforts were devoted to securing a settlement which would avoid the possibility of a general strike. On Oct. 5, two days before the date fixed for the special Trade Union Conference, a settlement was arranged at an interview with the Prime Minister; and, through the strenuous exertions of Mr Thomas and other leaders, this settlement was ratified by the rank and file of the railwaymen.

To some extent, the moderation displayed on the Labour side may be attributed to tactical motives. The majority of the unions had received very large accessions of membership during the war, but there had not yet been time for their fighting funds to be brought up to a corresponding point. The miners were suffering from the effects of the Yorkshire Coal Strike, and were, moreover, preoccupied with the development of their own nationalisation campaign. A prolonged struggle was likely to test sharply both the finances and the solidarity of the unions. But, in the main, the attitude of the leaders must be attributed to broader considerations. From the first, Mr Thomas insisted that the sole object of the strike was to obtain for the railwaymen the satisfaction of their wage demands. For this normal use of of the strike weapon, the N.U.R. had no need to seek assistance outside its own ranks and those of the Locomotive Engineers. In view of the paramount importance of railway transport to the food and coal supply, and to

the industries of the country, a general railway strike was in itself sufficient to extort any concessions which industrial pressure was capable of extorting. To bring out the members of all the unions represented at Caxton Hall would hardly have strengthened the hands of the railwaymen, for, if the Government were determined to resist to the end the pressure already applied, they could hardly fail to regard such an extension of the strike as a challenge to their authority which must be fought with all the resources at their command, and they would be able to rally to their support tens of thousands who might be expected to stand neutral in a railway strike pure and simple. On the other hand, the disturbance and dislocation of economic and social life would be so great and universal that the leaders could no longer hope to keep their people in hand, as they did with conspicuous success during the actual strike. Disorders would be inevitable, and the conflict would assume the aspect of an embittered class-war which might end either in the destruction of the Labour organisations, or in the complete overthrow of the existing social order.

These possibilities were very imperfectly apprehended by the majority of those who urged an extension of the strike. By the small minority of real revolutionaries they were consciously accepted. Many of them absurdly under-rate the powers of resistance inherent in the existing order; and, in any case, the fanatic of revolution is always prepared to take the risks of chaos, on the chance that his own particular form of Utopia may arise from the ashes. Yet even the serious revolutionary might well ask himself how far solid support could be depended on for an extended strike which should become avowedly revolutionary in its object. The proceedings at the Glasgow Trade Union Congress indicated a swing towards the extreme Left, which had, indeed, been manifest for some time in the growth of the rank-andfile movement' and the direct-action' agitation. But, while high prices, reaction from war-strain, and the disappointed hopes of a 'better world' after the war were responsible for much bitterness, the extent to which the majority even of the extreme Left would go was doubtful. It is one thing to pass abstract resolutions; it is quite another to decide on immediate action.