autonomy in a single complex industry. But it was always recognised by advocates of this and similar schemes that no such machinery would suffice without the formation of some central body charged with coordinating the work of the Councils and considering the interests of industry as a whole. This proposal was made by the Industrial Conference, composed of representatives of the leading Employers' Associations and Trade Unions, which sat for a brief period in 1919. The failure to establish the permanent National Council proposed by this Conference has reacted most unfavourably on the development of the Whitley Scheme. It has also deprived us of precisely the kind of organisation which we need to avert the dangers and difficulties which arise from allowing the Government to become entangled in industrial controversy.

As Sir Charles Macara reminds us, the idea was not altogether a new one. A small Industrial Council, composed of representatives of Capital and Labour from leading industries, with Sir George (now Lord) Askwith in the chair, was appointed in 1911. That Council did valuable work in connexion with an inquiry into industrial agreements, and received a large measure of support and approval both from the workers and the employers. Had it been kept in being, if only as an advisory body, it might have rendered invaluable service during the war.

It is suggested, therefore, that the idea of a National Industrial Council should be revived; but even since 1919 much water has flowed under the bridges, and the first step appears to be the calling of the Industrial Conference in a more fully representative form, to act as a Constituent Assembly. It is obvious that the National Industrial Council can represent only industries which are already highly organised in themselves; and the natural electoral groups would appear to be, as suggested by the Conference, the existing Employers' Associations and Trade Unions. In industries where a Joint Industrial Council has been set up with success, the organisations represented might prefer to leave to the Joint Council the election of representatives of the industry in the National Council. It would probably be

wise to follow the Builders' example, and, having allotted to each industry or group its quota of members, leave the organisations concerned to decide upon the method of election.

With this Council should be linked up also as much as possible of the existing machinery of industrial control. Thus, it should have the power to demand the appointments of Courts of Inquiry under the Industrial Courts Act; and, should it succeed in establishing its position and authority, the whole administration of the scheme of Industrial Courts might well be placed under its ægis, together with the proposed tribunal for the settlement of industrial disputes in which Government departments are concerned. In such case, this tribunal might well be erected into a final Court of Appeal for industrial disputes in general.

It is of the first importance that the deliberations of the Council should, so far as possible, be public, like those of Parliament itself; for its object should be, in large measure, the education of public opinion on industrial matters, and the spread of a steadying sense of responsibility amongst the employers' and workers' organisations. It would be for the Council itself to decide how far the proceedings of investigational or other Committees could be conducted publicly, but their Reports should, at all events, be published.

It is obvious that the scope and powers of the National Industrial Council would require to be most carefully defined both in relation to the existing Joint Councils in the various industries and in relation to Parliament. It was never suggested that the National Council should interfere with, the hardly-won autonomy of particular industries in matters domestic to those industries themselves. It should deal rather with questions common to all industries-the fixing of national minima in wages and working conditions, the consideration of such matters as decasualisation and dilution in their general aspects, the conduct of inquiries into such problems as a scientific basis for wage-systems and piece-rates, the degree of publicity which can be given to costings (both for this purpose and as a check on profiteering), the elimination of the gambling element in industrial finance, the avoidance and relief of unemployment. To it also would

be referred disputes or difficulties arising between the Industrial Councils on questions of demarcation, or decisions arrived at by any Council and alleged to have injurious reactions in other industries.

The relations of the National Council with Parliament require still more careful consideration. While there is an obvious advantage in leaving purely industrial questions to a specialist body, it is equally obvious that the decisions of such a body may have far-reaching results on society at large; and nothing can relieve Parliament of its final responsibility as trustee of the public welfare. It is obviously desirable that the liaison between the Council and the Ministry of Labour should be close and constant. Power should be given to the Minister to appoint on the Council representatives of the unorganised trades, and to appoint, on committees of inquiry into such questions as the effect of wages or profits on prices, representatives of Consumers' Councils or other bodies representing the general public.

It is, however, the question of sanctions which is perhaps the most important. It is obvious that the hands of the Council will be greatly strengthened if the suggestion made by the Industrial Council of 1911 be adopted, viz. that, where the Trade Unions and Employers' Associations include three-fourths of the workers or employers in an industry, any agreement between them should be held binding on the minority. The experience of the Whitley Councils has abundantly endorsed the opinions expressed by leaders of Labour and by such employers as Sir Charles Macara, concerning the disadvantage and danger of the non-unionist worker and the non-federated employer in an organised industry. With so great an increase in the development of industrial organisation as is here suggested, the enforcement of agreements could in large measure be left to the industrial organisations themselves; but in such matters as the fixing of national minima of wages, hours, or safety devices, a legal sanction would be necessary. To invest the Council itself with the power of making orders legally enforceable would derogate from the final responsibility of Parliament in matters affecting social as well as economic interests; and, in the event of legal sanction being required, recourse to Parliament, or to a Minister empowered by

Parliament to make orders, would be essential. In like manner, the sanction of Parliament would be required for any scheme involving the expenditure of public money. Such a question as the nationalisation of any industry, for instance, is a matter for the nation as a whole, and not merely for a bargain between Labour and Capital.

It may be suggested that the National Industrial Council would still have in its power, by pressure upon Parliament, or by agreements requiring no legislative sanction, to hold the community to ransom for the joint benefit of employers and workers. This possibility, however, already exists. We have seen to what pressure Parliament is at present subject; and the suggestion of collusion between the great industrial combines and their employees is by no means unknown. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that a National Council for all industries would to a great extent be free from the characteristic defects of the ordinary organisation of producers, since the majority both of the employers' and the workers' representatives would be in the position of consumers in respect of questions not directly affecting their own industry. The National Council would, in fact, form an invaluable safeguard against possible attempts to bleed the consumer on the part of the Joint Councils in individual industries. At the same time, both its fully representative character and the publicity of its proceedings would render it rather less than more effective for putting improper pressure on Parliament and the Executive than are individual organisations under the present regime.

The right of Parliament to pass industrial legislation, independent of any recommendations of the National Council, would remain unimpaired; and the regulation of wages and conditions in the unorganised or incompletely organised trades would remain in the hands of the Trade Boards. It is probable that, if the National Council were once established and proved its utility, Parliament would thankfully throw on to its shoulders as much as possible of the industrial burden; and that trades possessing no sufficient degree of organisation to receive representation on the Council would hasten to acquire it. But the transfer of power would be gradual, and ample opportunity would be given for interposing

such checks as experience might suggest. It is, indeed, essential that the original organisation should be sufficiently elastic to allow of gradual development, and that no attempt should be made to erect at one stroke a complete industrial organisation corresponding to the political constitution. The extent of the powers which might ultimately be bestowed on the National Council would depend upon the degree of prestige and authority which it acquired; and, if it were attempted to create for it at the outset a fixed, rigid constitution, large sections of industry would almost certainly stand aloof.

It is indeed a deliberative rather than an executive body which, at the moment, is needed. A Council representing the whole of the organised industries of the country is in no danger of becoming a mere debating society. Its conclusions would carry far too much weight to be lightly disregarded; and its influence would react upon both the authority and sense of responsibility of the various bodies represented on it. The educative effect of its work, both on those taking part in its discussions and on the formation of public opinion, would be invaluable. Its possibilities of development would be great, and even from the first it should do much to relieve Parliament from the burden of purely industrial questions and the pressure of sectional interests; for no individual organisation either of employers or workers acting in opposition to the declared opinion of industry as a whole could hope for public support. Whatever course the development of society may follow in the future, it is essential, if this development is to be accomplished without the certainty of perpetual friction and the possibility of devastating conflict, that we should proceed without delay to lay the foundations of an industrial constitution.

ERNEST C. FAYLE.