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the scruples of Father Acosta will not be a serious obstacle to the construction of this canal, which, in the opinion of many well-informed people, would much improve on the Panama in cheapness and efficiency.

French genius seems to appear for the first time in connection with canal projects in 1785, when a certain M. de la Naüerre submitted a paper to the Academy of Sciences in Paris with a complete plan for the construction of the canal across Panama, at an estimated cost of one million francs. Count Florida Blanca, Minister of Charles the Third of Spain, "did not consider the report as deserving of serious consideration," which, in view of the smallness of the cost, is to be lamented; it is also to be regretted that later French canal creators and their technical progeny should not have profited by their compatriot's wisdom and example at least in the direction of pecuniary demands.

The "creation" and the "destruction" make an interesting narrative from the formation of the Panama Company in 1881 to the offer to sell the works and the concession to the United States in 1898. In 1884 M. BunauVarilla "finally resolved to consecrate his life to the Panama Canal;" he assumed "entire management when he was twenty-six;" he "discovered the secret of the Straits," and his discovery "freed the future of the canal." The history of the great undertaking becomes inseparable from his own personal history; he solves the technical problems, he smooths the furrows of administration, he fights the battles of Panama against Nicaragua and the battles of the company against political intrigue in France; he writes a book, another trilogy, "Le Passé, Le Présent et L'Avenir," to inflame anew the waning ardour of French investors; he seeks the aid of Russia, and when the destruction is achieved

by "judicial machinery" and by "parliamentary machinery," and the Canal Company, so to speak, throws up the sponge and offers to sell, he stands undaunted on the desolate stage amidst the crumbling ruins of his mighty dream.

Whatever may have been the company's mistakes, the technical errors of engineers and of managers, and the real facts which led to the accusation that eventually brought about the downfall of the company, the pluck and the devotion of the men at the Isthmus, the work which they actually achieved, and their indomitable energy in the presence of the insidious and murderous scourge of yellow fever stand as a testimony to the best traditions of France. M. Bunau-Varilla shares the full honor thus acquired for his country.

The issues of these days have none but an historical interest now. Later events have brought fundamental changes, not only in the ownership of the canal but in its status as a factor of incalculable possibilities in the immediate development of international life both in the New World and in the Old.

Panama, it should be remembered, formed part of Colombia. In 1846 Colombia, then New Granada, fearing British inroads, concluded a treaty with the United States by which the States guaranteed Colombia's sovereignty on the Isthmus. In 1850 the clashing rivalries of Great Britain and the United States culminated in a compromise embodied in the ClaytonBulwer Treaty, by which, whilst neither nation became supreme, equality of position and of rights for both was maintained. This arrangement was never popular in the United States. The American mind-official and otherwise was early made up that no canal should be built but an American canal.

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The concession by Colombia to a Frenchman, the formation of a French company, the starting of the work, received unfavorably in the United States. The collapse of the French company offered a golden opportunity to acquire the concession and the works. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, however, stood in the way; Colombia's rights mattered nothing; no sane nation hesitates where there are no big battalions.

The "resurrection" tells how the United States Government under M. Bunau-Varilla's guidance and inspiration "did the needful" for the success of a bloodless revolution in Panama, the formation of a new Republic and its recognition by the Powers; it also tells of the signing by M. BunauVarilla, turned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, of the treaty granting the transfer of the canal concession to the United States, as well as the required political jurisdiction over the canal zone and enabling them to pay the stipulated price of forty million dollars to the Canal Company and to prepare the ground for an abundant crop of surprises, some of them "shockers" which have begun to crystallize, such Panama Act regulating the tolls, against which Great Britain has protested, and the construction of fortifications-forbidden in the ClaytonBulwer Treaty-for which the first few millions have been voted by the American Congress.

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One incident out of many should suffice to show the supple and irresistible action of M. Bunau-Varilla, verging on hypnotism, in furtherance of his plans. He had "conceived the complete plan for the Panama revolution"; the plan had to be carried out by the United States. M. BunauVarilla trained his mental artillery upon Secretary of State Hay; from the moment that the interview was

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"When all counsels of prudence and friendship have been made in vain," I said, "there comes a moment when one has to stand still and await events." "These events," he asked, "what do you think they will be?"

"I expressed my sentiments on the subject some days ago to Mr. Roosevelt," I replied. "The whole thing will end in a revolution. You must take your measures, if you do not want to be taken yourself by surprise."

"Yes," said Mr. Hay. "That is unfortunately the most probable hypothesis, but we shall not be 'caught napping.'

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Before closing the interview illuminating and touching incident occurred:

"I have just finished reading," said Mr. Hay, "a charming novel, 'Captain Macklin.' It is the history of a West Point cadet who leaves the Military Academy to become a soldier of fortune in Central America. He enlists under the orders of a General, a former officer of the French Army, who commands a revolutionary army in Honduras. The young ambitious American and the old French officer are both charming types of searchers after the ideal. Read this volume; take it with you," concluded Mr. Hay. "It will interest you."

"I read 'Captain Macklin' with an interest which may be easily imagined.

I could not help thinking that Mr. Hay, in giving me this volume, had meant to make subtle allusion to my own efforts in the cause of justice and progress. Did he not wish to tell me symbolically that he had understood

that the revolution in preparation for the victory of the Idea was taking shape under my direction?"

And so on and so on. Thus did Secretary Hay take his orders, which achieved the revolution under the direction of M. Bunau-Varilla, who in his turn was serving Justice, Progress, the Idea, and, naturally, Truth and France. All this involved, from the point of view of Mr. Hay's Government, the flagrant violation of the nation's solemnly pledged word.

It is said that Renan, lecturing once on Nero at the College de France, before closing, added, as in mitigation of any undue severity of judgment: "Mais ce pauvre jeune homme était nourri d'une si mauvaise littérature." In the case of Secretary Hay, and perhaps of M. Bunau-Varilla, mercy should temper the judgment of history. A diet of penny dreadfuls (or dime novels, as they are called in America) and Presidential messages, such as flourished at that time, cannot but engender disaster and confusion.

M. Bunau-Varilla set to work; he wrote minute instructions for the immediate outburst of the revolution; he prepared the cables to be sent announcing the glorious birth of the new nation; he wrote the stirring proclamation of independence and the constitution of the new Republic; having labelled and numbered all these documents to avoid mistakes, he despatched his emissary to the Isthmus. That was not all. He tells us "Madame Bunau-Varilla remained in her room in the greatest secrecy the whole day, making the flag of liberation."

Even so, in olden days the flags and pennants of the Norsemen in their piratical expeditions were embroidered by matrons and golden-haired maidens, in the seclusion of their castles; they listened whilst they worked to the songs which told of the exploits of

their men-folk who were not vicariously heroic nor indulged in cant of search for Truth or of the Ideal, but in pillage pure and simple.

Mr. Roosevelt claims that Colombia's rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty forced him to "take the Isthmus." The treaty expressly stated that it required congressional approval in Colombia, which naturally meant that the possibility of rejection had been accepted. To argue that the rejection justified violence is to proclaim the doctrine of "heads I win and tails you lose," immoral and dishonest, whether practised by individuals or by nations.

Both Mr. Roosevelt and M. BunauVarilla maintain that without the "taking of Panama" by the United States the canal would have been lost. Idle excuse. What really was in danger was the combination by which the forty million dollars could find their way into certain hands.

In his eager search for truth, in the service of France, M. Bunau-Varilla may have overlooked this fact. His own testimony, however, establishes beyond doubt the pecuniary signification of the revolution at Panama; surely neither he nor Mr. Roosevelt held any shares in the enterprise-for that would qualify adversely the single-mindedness of their purpose. On page 325 of his book M. BunauVarilla writes: "A revolutionary movement ending successfully would necessarily about treble the quotation in these securities" (the Panama securities).

The canal is not yet made; ugly rumors of landslides and fears of volcanic disturbances are frequently circulated. The disinterested dreamers and idealists like Mr. Roosevelt and M. Bunau-Varilla are still waiting for the advent of reality; but the three hundred per cent was pocketed long ago, and doubtless ere this has flour

ished and fructified in similar enterprises, perhaps in Madagascar, in Tripoli or in Morocco.

The blunder of Great Britain in consenting to the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is taking a sinister The Saturday Review.

appearance now that the Panama Act has been ratified by the American Congress and the money for the fortifications has been voted. Lord Lansdowne's pusillanimity is coming home to roost.

M. POINCARE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

The State visit of M. Poincaré to England happened at a time when it was doubly significant. His election as President of the French Republic was the result of a remarkable revival in French feeling. That this revival has not taken as complete possession of the Legislature as it has of the country has been shown by the enforced resignation of a Minister of War who possessed exceptional qualifications for the office, and by the defeat of M. Briand's Ministry. But that the nation as a whole is resolved to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to maintain the position it once more holds in Europe is plain from the general goodwill in which M. Poincaré is held, and from the visible desire to invest the office he holds with powers which his predecessors have allowed to lie unused. Nor is the special significance of this visit confined to the President's personality. The circumstances in which he paid it give it an equal title to distinction. The Triple Entente, in which our good relations with our nearest neighbor are at this moment so conspicuous an element, has recently given striking evidence of its value as a factor in the European peace. It is one of the merits which go some way to redeem the many sins of the present Government that at a very critical moment they intervened to proclaim their determination to make the Triple Entente the cornerstone of their foreign policy. We do not believe that there had ever been

any reason to doubt this. But the incident at Agadir had given birth to some suspicions that Great Britain was growing careless of the great interests which the Entente exists to maintain. That suspicion was completely dispelled by a certain speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and since 1911 no one has questioned the determination of Great Britain to make common cause with France and Russia in guarding Europe against the calamity of a great war. This is one of the things which give M. Poincaré's visit to England an importance beyond those of M. Loubet or M. Fallières. Another is that the value of the Triple Entente has been confirmed in a very remarkable way by the recent conflict in the Balkans. We do not underrate the part that Germany has played in limiting the area of the war. But without the Entente the Powers might have found it even more difficult than it has actually been to protect the interests threatened by the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the rise of a new power in the Balkans without an appeal to arms. M. Poincart came among us, therefore, at a most opportune moment. The strength of the Triple Entente has been tested afresh, and its value to Europe, and not merely to its own members, has been established with singular clear

ness.

There is yet a third reason why the President of the French Republic should be specially welcomed in Eng

land at this time. One of the strangest characteristics of the Liberal Party at present is the indifference, if not positive hostility, which some of them display to the great instrument of European peace. To all appearance a certain section of them would view with real satisfaction a decided coolness in our attitude towards France and Russia if it were accompanied by a corresponding change in our attitude towards Germany. How they explain this feeling to themselves we are unable to conceive. They must have forgotten-it is true they are mostly young men-the constant irritation which marked our relations with France and Russia before the understandings arrived at with both countries. For nearly a decade there has been tranquillity-external tranquillity -in India and in Egypt. The opponents, or, if they like the title better, the critics, of the Triple Entente would seemingly prefer to have back the constant alarms on the Afghan frontier and constant suspicions of the relations between the Tsar and the Amir which once existed. They would be content to see France reasserting her claim to a share in the administration of Egypt and reviving the policy which so nearly brought us into conflict at Fashoda. Indeed, this is but a very imperfect description of our position if we were to retire from the Triple Entente. It is not the old unsatisfactory state of things that would be reproduced, but the old state of things embittered and worsened by the resentment naturally aroused by our wilful desertion of two honest allies. We must suppose that the politicians of whom we are speaking hope that we should be compensated for the estrangement of France and Russia by the closer friendship of Germany. It is by no means certain that Germany might not see in fresh offers to the Powers with whom we had ended

an understanding a more promising policy than would be found in a separate understanding with England. But putting this possibility aside, what would be the value to England of an alliance with Germany? Its value to Germany would be plain enough. It would lie in our co-operation with her in the development of that future on the sea which the Emperor has so often proclaimed as the main object of German ambition. If there be any Englishmen who hope that our part in such an arrangement would be to reduce our naval expenditure and contentedly watch the growth of the German fleet, they have curiously mistaken the reasons which ordinarily lead to the conclusion of treaties between great Powers. Germany would work on Bismarck's old principle of do ut des, and we should probably be told that since very little is to be expected from us in the way of military aid we must be prepared to relieve Germany of some part of her naval estimates. The command of the British fleet would enable our ally to make for a time a very convenient diversion of expenditure from her sea to her land forces. It may be said, by way of reply, that the Triple Entente has also its burdens. But there is this great difference between what we are liable to now and what we should be liable to if we listened to some of our advisers and retired from the Triple Entente. As things are, all that we have to bear is borne for the single end of keeping the peace. It is as certain as anything in human affairs can be that so long as England, France, and Russia adhere to their present policy of joint action for this common purpose that purpose will be assured. It will not be assured without costwhat great purpose is? But the cost of the naval and military preparations needed for the maintenance of peace is infinitely less than the losses which

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