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THE CHANGING OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.

Future generations may see in the battle on the Ergene River one of the decisive battles of the world and in the war which is drawing to its end a milestone on the road of the world's history. The Turkish War has closed the European career of one of the most successful and most dreaded conquering nations. Only a comparatively short time ago during the rule of Charles the Second and Louis the Fourteenth and during the lifetime of Peter the Great, Prince Eugene, the great Duke of Marlborough, Sir Isaac Newton and William Penn-the Turks held the Continent of Europe in awe, and besieged Vienna. To-day their rule in Europe is a thing of the past, and it is doubtful whether they will be able to keep even their Asiatic possessions. Turkey's downfall is significant not only to those who reflect upon the past but also to those who look into the future; for it may completely alter the very foundation of modern statecraft and of modern political organization. In consequence of Turkey's defeat the balance of power in Europe, which is the very foundation of its political, social and economic life, has begun to change, and no one can foresee the ultimate consequences of that change to Europe and to the world.

The policy of maintaining an equilibrium among States is as old as is civilization. It was constantly practised by the civilized States of antiquity. The balance of power is a device for preserving peace among States. It is a device for restraining any single State from becoming so powerful that it can without great risk make war upon other States and destroy the independence of its neighbors. The security of Great Britain and the peace of Europe depends very

largely upon the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent. Its necessity was well summarized by Frederick the Great in his Anti-Machiavel in the following words:

The tranquillity of Europe rests principally upon the wise maintenance of the balance of power by which the superior strength of one State is made harmless by the countervailing weight of several States united among themselves. In case this equilibrium should disappear, it is to be feared that a universal revolution will be the result, and that an enormous new monarchy will be established upon the ruins of those States which were too weak for individual resistance and which lacked the necessary spirit to unite in time. If Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had combined against the Roman Power, they would not have been overthrown. A wisely framed alliance and an energetic war would have preserved the ancient world from the chains of a universal despotism.

It should be remembered that the greatest wars which Europe has witnessed were brought about by the attempts of ambitious rulers or nations to destroy the balance of power in order to establish their predominance in Europe. The attempts of Charles the Fifth, Philip the Second, Louis the Fourteenth, and Napoleon the First to obtain the mastery of Europe devastated the Continent and forced Great Britain to interfere for the sake of her own security.

Until a recent time only the five Continental Great Powers were firmly organized for mutual support. They formed two groups-the Triple Alliance composed of Germany, AustriaHungary and Italy, and the Dual Alliance composed of France and Russia. Great Britain held aloof from the nations of the Continent. The Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance formed

a very efficient balance of power. The late General Maurice showed in his book The Balance of Military Power in Europe that the two groups of Powers were approximately equally strong on land and on sea. Great Britain had no Continental policy, and she had no need for one. It was not necessary for her to labor for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe.

Germany put an end to England's policy of non-interference in Continental affairs. Her anti-British policy, which began with the Krüger telegram of 1896, the rapid increase of the German Navy, the anti-British agitation throughout Germany, and official pronouncements such as that contained in the preamble of the great German Navy Bill of 1900-"Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power"-were manifestations the significance of which could not possibly be misunderstood in this country. The keenness with which, since 1900, Germany began to compete with Great Britain on the seas will be seen from the following figures:

Money Voted for Naval Construction
In Great Britain In Germany

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Great Britain increased her expenditure only by 4,184,000l., or by 43 per cent. In 1900 Germany expended on naval construction only about onethird as much as was spent by Great Britain. During the last five years she spent on warship building nearly as much as did this country.

Germany's attitude and policy, the threatening language of her politicians, her professors and her Press, and the ominous increase of the German navy, which remained concentrated in the North Sea within striking distance of Great Britain's shores, compelled this country, as I was allowed to point out in this Review for the first time in August 1902,1 to seek support with Germany's opponents, and in the first instance with France. The AngloFrench Entente was concluded in 1904.

Russia's defeat in Manchuria destroyed the balance of power in Europe. It made the Triple Alliance supreme. In 1905, immediately after Russia's decisive defeat, Germany brought about the first Morocco crisis. It was well-timed. As crippled Russia could not assist France, Great Britain had to take her part; for in view of Germany's anti-British attitude she could not allow France to be humiliated or defeated. Furthermore, it became Great Britain's task, as I pointed out in this Review in March, May, and July 1905, in April 1906, and in September 1907, to support Russia against her Western neighbor until she had recovered from her defeats. An AngloRussian Entente was necessary, and it was concluded in 1907. The Triple Alliance was faced by a Triple Entente. The balance of power, which the Russo-Japanese War had destroyed, was thus re-established.

"The Anti-British Movement in Germany." 2 "The Renewal of the Japanese Alliance"; "The Balance of Power in Europe"; "The Collapse of Russia; "The Future of AngloGerman Relations: a reply to Lord Avebury"; The Anti-British Policy of Germany: a rejoinder to Lord Eversley."

Germany complained bitterly that Great Britain tried to isolate her and to crib and confine her by a network of hostile ententes. Her complaints were scarcely justified, for after the conclusion of the Triple Entente Germany was still supreme in Europe. The Triple Alliance was in reality a Quintuple Alliance in disguise. Up to the outbreak of the Balkan War Germany could, in case of a great European contest, count upon the support of Turkey and Roumania.

Roumania, after having saved Russia from defeat in the Russo-Turkish War, was despoiled by that country of Bessarabia. Henceforth Roumania became hostile to Russia and formed the intention of regaining her lost territories at the first opportunity. Roumania's foreign policy was directed chiefly by King Charles, a Prince of the House of Hohenzollern, and he became not unnaturally a determined supporter of the Triple Alliance. The fact that, with General Brialmont's assistance, he fortified very strongly the eastern frontier of Roumania facing Russia, and left unfortified the frontier facing Austria-Hungary, openly proclaimed Roumania's policy to the world. Roumania's support was bound to be extremely valuable to the Triple Alliance. Roumania has a well-armed and well-organized army of 500,000 men. Owing to her geographical position, she can, in the case of a war with Russia, create a very effective diversion by attacking that country in the south, her most vulnerable part. As that country's support in case of a war with Russia would have been extremely valuable, the Powers of the Triple Alliance endeavored to gain Roumania's good will. They sent to Roumania their most eminent diplomats. Germany sent as ambassadors Prince Bülow and Herr von Kiderlin-Wächter, AustriaHungary sent Count Goluchowski,

Count Aehrenthal, and the Marquis of Pallavicini, and Italy Count Tornielli. The Bucharest Embassy became perhaps the most important embassy of the Powers of the Triple Alliance.

During many years it has been Germany's policy to strengthen Turkey against Russia. Through the unceasing activity of her statesmen, Germany had acquired the rôle of Turkey's guide, friend, and protector. She had assisted the Turks by providing them with money, arms, railways, and expert advisers. She had lent them some of her most eminent officers from Moltke to Colmar von der Goltz. Baron Marschall, Germany's ablest diplomat, represented his country at Constantinople during nearly two decades. When, at the time of the Armenian massacres, the world recoiled from Abdul Hamid with horror, William the Second visited him at his capital, pressed his hand, publicly praised his ability, accepted his hospitality, and slept under his roof. On the 8th of November 1899, at a banquet at Damascus, he proclaimed himself the protector of Mahommedanism throughout the world in the words: "May the Sultan of Turkey, and may the 300,000,000 Mahommedans throughout the world who venerate in him their Caliph, be assured that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times." Germany cultivated Turkey's good will most assiduously. She attached the greatest value to Turkey's support not so much for economic as for strategical reasons, for Turkey was able not only to attack Russia in the south in conjunction with Roumania, but she was the only Power through which Germany was able to strike an effective blow at Great Britain. General von Bernhardi, a leading general and one of the most eminent strategists and military writers of Germany, wrote in his recently published book, Unsere Zukunft, which

ought to be translated into English:

Particularly important for Germany are her relations with Turkey and Roumania. Both States are capable of forming an effective counterpoise against Russia. Besides, Turkey is the only State which is able to threaten seriously England's position and to attack that country by land, because Turkey can strike at the Suez Canal, and so cut through the most sensitive nerve of England and hit at a point which is of vital importance to her. Furthermore, the existence of a powerful Turkey in Europe is of the utmost importance to Germany, because it provides the only neutral route over which she can obtain foreign food and raw materials for her industries in case of war. In the North, England would blockade our coasts. In the Mediterranean, England and France would cut us off from the ocean. Towards the east and west we should be cut off from the world's trade by Russia and France. Therefore we can never tolerate that European Turkey should fall under Russian, which means under hostile, influence. That would probably also be the case if the smaller Balkan States should be allowed to expand towards the Aegean Sea. Turkey's military power must be preserved. It must be preserved in order to be of use to Germany. A militarily weakened Turkey would not be able to resist Slavdom successfully, and it could not remain independent of Russian and British policy.

In his book Deutschland und der nächste Krieg, which has been translated into English, the same author wrote:

Turkey, the predominant Power of the Near East, is of paramount importance to Germany. She is Germany's natural ally. It is emphatically in our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest course would have been to have made her a member of the Triple Alliance and to have prevented the Turkish-Italian war, which threatens to change the political situation to our disadvantage. By making

her a member of the Triple Alliance, Turkey would have received a twofold gain. Her position would have been secured both against Russia and against England, two States with the hostility of which we Germans have to reckon. Besides, Turkey is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace her shortest sea route to India and her land communications with that dependency. Therefore we ought to

spare no sacrifice in order to secure Turkey as Germany's ally in preparation for a war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are our own.

The Turkish military forces would be a factor of great importance in the event of Turkey joining either the Triple Alliance or its opponents. The war strength of the Turkish Army comes to 700,000 men. Owing to the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the Turkish Army must be regarded as a very important factor in She is a very valuable ally to that Power, or combination of Powers, which she chooses to join.

war.

The Baghdad Railway was built by Germany, not only for the purpose of providing an outlet for German capital and of promoting the military and economic regeneration of Turkey, but also, and perhaps particularly, with the object of facilitating Turkish cooperation in case of an Anglo-German war. Dr. Paul Rohrbach, a leading German publicist and traveller, who has studied the Baghdad Railway in all its aspects, travelling through Asia Minor, wrote in his book Die Bagdadbahn, which was published in 1911:

One factor, and one alone, will determine the possibility of a successful issue for Germany in case of an AngloGerman conflict. A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question. England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land, and from Europe, only in one place in Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean to England not only the end of her control over the Suez Canal

and the destruction of her connection with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa as well. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power like Turkey would also jeopardize England's rule over her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India, and prejudice her relations with Afghanistan and Persia.

The Turkish Army must be increased and improved, and Turkey must be commercially and economically rehabilitated. The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous will she be for England. Egypt is a prize which would make it well worth Turkey's while to support Germany against England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object in view except the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war against England.

Another well-informed and very influential German writer, Dr. Paul Dehn, wrote in his book Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, of which more than 100,000 copies have been sold:

If the Baghdad Railway is pushed so far that it will reach Mecca and Haifa on the coast of Palestine, England would have to calculate with the possibility of a Turkish attack upon Egypt if she should attack either Turkey herself or a third Power which is interested in Turkey's existence. It is true that three hundred miles separate Haifa from El Kantara, where the old high-road from Syria to Egypt crosses the Suez Canal, and that the road runs in part through territory which is poor in food and water. However, the road is level and comfortable, and there are no natural obstacles to be overcome.

As long as the rails of the Baghdad Railway have not reached Aleppo, we cannot count upon Turkish co-operation in the direction of Egypt.

Many similar quotations could easily be given, but these should suffice to show that Germany reckons confidently

upon the assistance of Roumania and Turkey in case of a war with Russia, and particularly upon Turkey's cooperation in case of a war with Great Britain. The directors of Germany's foreign policy, like Napoleon the First, evidently saw in Egypt the key to the British Empire. Their aim was of truly Napoleonic boldness and grandeur. Germany's action in Turkey had revealed the object of her policy to attentive observers. Her activity had remained not unnoticed in England. Lord Kitchener, the Empire's greatest soldier, was sent to Egypt not merely on an administrative mission.

In view of the fact that Germany had driven Great Britain into the arms of France and Russia, and had exposed herself to the possibility of being simultaneously involved in a great war by land and sea, it was of course of the utmost importance to her that her position on land should be absolutely impregnable. In these circumstances it was clearly the first and most urgent duty of German statesmanship to take care that AustriaHungary and Italy should be as strong as possible, and that Roumania and Turkey-and especially Turkey, the support of which would be invaluable in case of complications with Great Britain-should be firmly attached to Germany or to the Triple Alliance. But with the same incredible shortsightedness and levity with which Germany had embarked upon an antiBritish course, she allowed Turkey to be attacked first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, and to be utterly defeated. If Germany had possessed a policy, if her diplomacy had been guided by a statesman, or merely by a man possessed of common sense, she would have known that the support of Turkey would be more valuable to her in the hour of need than that of Italy. She would, therefore, either have at

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