strength the sentiment of kinship which has hitherto sufficed as an effective bond between the various sections of the Empire.

Since the anti-Japanese riots occurred in British Columbia, and the movement against this ambitious race gathered strength in Australasia, the British peoples under the Southern Cross have been rapidly reaching the conviction that the enemy which they have to fear is not Germany, or any other European Power, but Japan. They are ignorant of the political and strategic principles which govern the defences of a vast world-wide organization like the British Empire, and, brooding over their future, their fears increase in exact proportion as the intensity of their determination to maintain their "all-white" policy strengthThey are dominated to-day by the dread of Japan, and they believewrongly believe that they are defenceless.

ens.

The first indication of this movement as a definite formative influence in Imperial politics occurred four years ago, immediately after the crisis due to Germany's naval expansion. Realizing then-if only momentarily-that the primacy of the British Fleet involved the security of every section of the Empire, the people of New Zealand, in a splendid spirit of higher patriotism, offered to contribute a large armored ship so as to increase the main guard of the Empire on the frontiers of the Empire's potential enemy. The Governments of New South Wales and Victoria were animated by the same spirit of unity in face of a common danger, but they were checked by the action of the Commonwealth Cabinet, which decided to found a navy of its own. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, sitting his political saddle insecurely, and prompted by party motives, rejected both the policy of contribution and the policy of rapid local naval develop

ment. He decided upon equipping a few cruisers and torpedo craft for duty on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of Canada. His Government went out of office before a single keel had been laid down. This was the first chapter of events.

Towards the end of last year, Colonel James Allen, the Minister of Defence in a fresh New Zealand Government, left for England to consult with the British naval authorities. He stopped on his way to confer with the Commonwealth Ministers, and reached London determined to reverse the policy adopted by Sir Joseph Ward's administration, in 1909, when a Dreadnought was offered to the Royal Navy. He gave a clear indication of his view upon naval policy, and apparently that also of his colleagues, when Mr. Churchill announced this spring the intention of the Admiralty to utilize the New Zealand battlecruiser, the Malaya, now building, and the three Canadian ships as the nucleus of an Imperial Squadron, based on Gibraltar. Interviewed on the new proposal, Colonel Allen did not dispute Mr. Churchill's claim that these ships could reach any outlying part of the Empire more quickly than any other European force, but, he added, “we do not fear any European force; that is the crux of the matter." It has been reported that the New Zealand Government, having given its free consent to the battle-cruiser New Zealand being retained as part of the main guard of the Empire, the Minister of Defence bas since expressed a desire to revoke this decision.

Colonel Allen afterwards left London for home, travelling by way of Canada. He reached this Dominion when the naval controversy was at its height between Mr. Borden's Government, pledged to the presentation of three Dreadnought ships to the Royal Navy, and the Liberal Opposition led

by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, pledged to the creation of a local navy. This conjunction of events apparently had a significant influence on the policy of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Before Colonel Allen's arrival, this statesman had declared himself in favor of the formation of two "fleet-units," one to be stationed on the Pacific coast and the other on the Atlantic. Sir Wilfrid Laurier interpreted the term "fleet-unit" as meaning a single Dreadnought ship in association with two or three cruisers, and a few destroyers and submarines. He proposed that Canada should build, arm, man, and maintain two such "fleet-units." On May 6th, after the arrival of Colonel Allen in the Dominion, conveying the views of his own Government and the Commonwealth Administration, Sir Wilfrid Laurier addressed a mass meeting in Toronto. His speech indicated that his views had undergone considerable change; his mind by this time had become dominated by the racial problem of the Pacific. He did not reiterate his demand for a fleet-unit on the Atlantic coast of the Dominion, and his speech conveyed the impression that he had come to the conclusion that such a force was, after all, unnecessary. remarked:

He

The

"To the man who lives in Quebec or the Maritime Provinces the question of defence does not appeal very strongly. He lives securely. vicinity of the British Fleet is sufficient for him. But, if you go to British Columbia, Australia, or New Zealand in the Pacific Ocean, the question of defence is one of perpetual consideration. No British subject in British Columbia, Australia, or New Zealand lives with security. The British Fleet is too far away. Squadrons have been removed. He has no protection. At Wellington, Vancouver, or Victoria there is nothing to save the country from invasion. This it is which appeals to me."

In this speech Sir Wilfrid Laurier

appeared for the first time as the exponent of the Pacific Ocean—or antiJapanese-policy favored by the Commonwealth Government and more lately espoused by the Government of New Zealand.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier epitomized the policy of the white people of the Pacific Ocean. "Great Britain," he remarked, "in pursuance of her new naval strategy, has concentrated her fleets in home waters, whereas formerly she had vessels in every sea," and the leader of the Liberal Opposition in Canada furthermore added that it seemed to him that "defence, like charity, should begin at home." These statements apparently reflect the views held by a large proportion, if not the majority, of the peoples of the oversea Dominions. They have approached the naval problem late in the day, and are necessarily unfamiliar with the strategic basis of British naval policy. Throughout these Dominions the policy of the weak defensive-the individual local navy-is being preached, and it is generally believed by Colonial politicians that the White Ensign does not float in the outer seas in anything like the strength that it did in the past because the Royal Navy is weaker than it was, and that their territories are, therefore, in peril.

There is a general impression, which some British politicians in pursuit of different ends have consistently supported, that in the past the British Navy "commanded" every sea. This is ar entire misapprehension, the fallacy of which is completely exposed if we glance back to the last years of the nineteenth century, when the German Navy was a force of almost negligible importance. At that date every battleship except one small one-which was on the China station-was concentrated in European waters ready to

1 If this principle had been adopted in the past by the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, what would have been Canada's fate?

steam outward on the first indication

of trouble brewing. The main force was then stationed in the Mediterranean, that is, on the frontier of the second greatest naval Power of the world and the potential enemy of the British Empire, and a relatively small squadron of only half a dozen battleships cruised in the Channel and near the British Isles, though France was only separated from us by twenty miles. To-day the main force is contiguous to the North Sea-that is, on the frontier of what is now the second greatest naval Power of the world and the potential enemy of the British Empire, and a relatively small force is in the Mediterranean. The main guard of the Empire is not in "home waters" in order to prevent the invasion of the British Isles, but in order to be ready to defend the primary sea frontier of the British peoples. There is only one less battleship in the outer seas than there was. That single battleship was in the Far East for the simple reason that Russia and Germany were rapidly increasing their squadrons in the China Seas; no one could foretell what use Japan would make of her expanding fleet, and the horizon was becoming overcast. Today there is not only no British, but no European battleship outside European waters. Japan is the ally of the British peoples, bound to them by a treaty which will remain operative until 1921, and which before that date will almost certainly be renewed, because it reflects Japanese needs, and, lastly, Russia is a member of the Triple Entente.

In line with these developments, the number of small craft in the Pacific has been somewhat reduced. The Admiralty withdrew a few weak ships because they were no longer required for strategic reasons, and others because they were a delusion in peace and a danger in war. The latter were

recalled, not for duty in European waters, but to be broken up as useless. Every naval Power with any appreciation of the fundamental principles of naval warfare has abandoned the policy of keeping old ships of little or no fighting power-ships that could not fight and could not run away-doddering about the great ocean spaces of the world, "showing the flag" in discreditable fashion and offering it for insult. Indeed, the construction of cruisers by all other Powers except Great Britain and Germany has practically ceased, and Germany, the second greatest naval Power in the world, has not half as many pennants flying outside the North Sea to-day as the British Fleet.

The Admiralty have adopted no "new naval strategy." The principles which underlie their action in the disposition of British men-of-war are exactly the same as those set forth in the memorandum laid before the Dominion Ministers, including Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in 1902. It was then stated that "the primary object of the British Navy is not to defend anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy' and, by defeating them, to afford protection to the British Dominion's shipping and commerce." It is in accordance with this historical principle, by which the whole British Empire has been enabled to live in peace and security, that the main guard of the Empire is to-day on the frontier of the Empire's only potential enemy; instead of being in the Mediterranean it is in the North Sea. Because Canada may not so frequently see obsolescent little ships passing in and out of her Atlantic and Pacific ports, because there are fewer "bugtraps" cruising among the Pacific islands, the Dominions are not less,

2 The potential enemy changes with the International situation: to-day the potential enemy is in the North Sea, to-morrow he may be in the Mediterranean, and later in the Pacific, and the ships are moved as may be necessary.

but far better defended than they have ever been before. Against the potential enemy-thousands of miles away from them-there is arrayed a force overwhelmingly strong, containing its ships and preventing them obtaining that freedom of the seas which would enable them to interfere with any interests of the Dominions.

Ships do not directly defend territory; they defend water areas, and the British men-of-war are moved as the danger point varies. To-day the British Empire is on terms of friendship with all the nations with which formerly it was more or less at enmity, and the only difficulty of the Admiralty, after providing a fifty per cent. superiority against Germany in or near the North Sea-thus giving an assurance that no German ship will pass through the net of British defence and be able to attack the commerce or shipping or territory of any of the British peoples-is to obtain sufficient force for the secondary strategical theatres, and particularly for the Mediterranean. This sea is one of the arteries of the Empire, and is becoming increasingly dominated by the navies of Austria and Italy, Germany's two allies. The Mediterranean is a secondary frontier of the Empire-of the Dominions as of the Mother Country-as the North Sea is the primary frontier, and it must be defended. For this purpose the Admiralty regard Dominion assistance in the shape of firstclass armored ships as essential. Only a few weeks ago Mr. Churchill, in reponse to a telegram from Mr. Borden, cabled:

"I must repeat that the Canadian ships are absolutely necessary for the whole world defence of the Empire from the end of 1915 or the beginning of 1916 onwards."

Even with the aid of the Dominion ships, the margin of strength available for the, at present, secondary sea

frontiers of the Empire will remain extremely narrow, and yet, in face of these facts and despite the admitted truth that these frontiers of the British Empire are the ones which are definitely threatened, Dominion statesmen are showing an increasing disinclination to assist the Mother Country to maintain the effective defence of Imperial interests where they are imperilled, and are intent on developing local navies, consisting mainly of small cruisers and torpedo craft, which are intended to defend their territories." Coming fresh to defence problems, they do not realize that armies defend land and navies seas, and that the seas are one, as the land is not, and can never be. Hence the policy of military dispersion and naval concentration, practised by all the Great Powers, and to none more essential than to us, who are essentially maritime.

What is the root explanation of this negation of the fine Imperial spirit which found expression in some of the Dominions during the naval crisis of 1909? It is apparent that Colonel Allen reflected the predominant opinion in the great Dominions when he stated that "we do not fear any European force; that is the crux of the matter." In other words these Colonial statesmen are dominated by the "yellowperil." Probably not one of them has a thought of making war upon Japan, but they share a feeling that Japan may sooner or later decide to take up arms against the policy of exclusion adopted towards would-be Japanese emigrants to the Pacific countries inhabited, but inhabited very sparsely, by the white man.

Everyone who is of the white race and shares the white man's ideals must sympathize with these kinsmen who are face to face with the great

3 Against the navy of Japan, no combined force such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand could equip and "man" could have any chance of success in war.