tached Turkey to the Triple Alliance by treaty, as General von Bernhardi had suggested, or she would have replied to Italy's ultimatum to Turkey by an ultimatum of her own addressed to Italy, which very likely would have prevented the war.

Italy's victory over Turkey, and Turkey's internal difficulties which had been created by the Italian attack, encouraged the Balkan States to make war upon that country, and again Germany remained a passive looker-on while her valuable supporter was being assailed. The Balkan States would not have dared to attack Turkey had they been informed by Germany and Austria-Hungary that they would not tolerate such an attack. AustriaHungary, backed by Germany, might have told Servia that an attack upon Turkey would immediately be followed by the occupation of Belgrade, which lies on the Austrian frontier, and Roumania could in conjunction have taken equally suitable and effective action at Sofia. But the General Staffs, the statesmen, and the public of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Roumania believed that Turkey would defeat the Balkan Allies. Germany and Austria-Hungary allowed the Turkish War to break out in the expectation that it would result in the, triumph of Turkey to the great advantage of the Triple Alliance.

The Turkish War has had an unexpected issue. It has led to the downfall and the disappearance of European Turkey and to the rise of the Balkan nations. The Bulgarians, Servians, and Montenegrins are Slavs. They incline towards Russia, which has worked and fought for their deliverance, and they dislike, distrust, and hate Austria-Hungary, which has fomented disorder in the Balkan Peninsula and which has endeavored to keep the Balkan Slavs under the Turkish yoke. In case of a war be

tween Russia and Austria-Hungary the Balkan States, or at least Servia and Montenegro, may be expected to aid Russia, and it should not be forgotten that Austria-Hungary contains 25,000,000 Slavs, of whom no fewer than 5,500,000 are Servians, who live close to the borders of the Servian State.

It is clear, therefore, that the Turkish War has very seriously weakened the position of the Triple Alliance. It has deprived Germany and the Triple Alliance of the invaluable support of Turkey, which could, with a very large army, have attacked Russia in the south, or Great Britain in Egypt. Moreover, it has set free the Balkan States which hitherto were kept in check by Turkey, and it has very greatly strengthened their military power. In a few years they will probably be able to support Russia with almost a million men. Servia alone will before long be able to mobilize almost 500,000. The hostility of Servia is particularly dangerous to Austria-Hungary, because that country occupies a most valuable strategical position. Austria-Hungary is surrounded by vast mountain-chains, which have a large gap, the Danube Valley, facing Servia. In case of an Austro-Russian war the Austrian armies will be assembled in the northeast of the country, in Galicia. A Servian attack in the extreme south of the Dual Monarchy would, therefore, simultaneously threaten the flank and rear of the Austrian defences and the two capitals on the Danube.

The Balkan War has not only caused to Germany and to the Triple Alliance the loss of Turkey, which would have been an exceedingly valuable ally, and the rise of a very dangerous potential enemy on the weakest and most exposed frontier of Austria-Hungary, but it has also made Roumania's attitude uncertain. Rou

was

mania has hitherto supported AustriaHungary and Germany against Russia, not only because she had a grievance against Russia, but also because she could not afford to stand alone between Russia and Austria-Hungary. For her security she had to lean on one of her great neighbors, and she believed that she would be safest in relying upon Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance, because she thought that the Triple Alliance the stronger of the two groups. The changes which have taken place in the Balkan Peninsula have caused Roumania to reconsider her position. The issue of the war has so seriously changed the balance of power to the disadvantage of the Triple Alliance, that Roumania seems inclined to support Russia and the Triple Entente. This is all the more likely, as Roumania could benefit very materially from a defeat of Austria-Hungary. Roumania wishes to expand. There is a strong irredentist movement in that country. In those districts of Austria-Hungary which are nearest to Roumania there dwell no less than 3,500,000 Roumanians. They complain bitterly about the ill-treatment which they receive. They wish to be reunited with Roumania, and they are encouraged by their kinsmen in Roumania to resist their alien rulers who try to denationalize them by force. Roumania can expand most easily towards the north and west, towards Austria-Hungary.

Many judicious observers consider that in consequence of the Balkan War Germany and the Triple Alliance have lost not only the support of Turkey but also that of Roumania, and have gained instead the hostility of the powerful Balkan States. General von Bernhardi wrote in Unsere Zukunft:

There was reason to hope that Austria and Roumania would actively inter

fere either in order to prevent the outbreak of the Balkan War or at least in order to protect Turkey against a complete defeat. . . . It. was evidently in the interest of the Triple Alliance to delay the expulsion of the Turks from Europe until the time when the great European war has been fought which will decide the fate of the States of Central Europe. Now the Triple Alliance will have to fight the great war of the future under far Before more unfavorable conditions.

the decisive battle on the Ergene River one could calculate on the fact that Turkey and Roumania would fight on the side of the Triple Alliance in case of a European war. The advantages of the co-operation of these States is clear. These advantages have been lost through Turkey's defeat, and a condition of affairs has been created which threatens Germany and its allies with the most serious dangers.

To all appearances Roumania also can no longer be counted upon as a possible supporter of the Triple Alliance. At present Roumania remains in touch with the Triple Alliance in order to obtain with its assistance an increase of territory at Bulgaria's cost. Wedged in between a powerful Russia and a greatly enlarged Bulgaria, Roumania will no longer be able to pursue an independent policy. In all probability it will either fall under Russia's influence or join the Balkan Federation. In either case Roumania has nothing more to hope for from the Triple Alliance. Necessity will compel that country more or less energetically to take the part of Germany's enemies.

The Balkan States and Roumania, lying between Slavs and Teutons, between hammer and anvil, occupy a very exposed position. They are too weak to stand alone. They have suffered from Austria's ill-will, intrigue, and oppression, and they can most easily grow at Austria's expense, which contains 5,500,000 Servians and 3,500,000 Roumanians. During the

settlement of the Balkan War Servia and Montenegro have suffered severely through Austria's interference, which has prevented their expansion in the direction of Albania. The Balkan democracies are drawn towards Russia through racial affinity and towards France through affection and democratic sentiment. Sentiment and self-interest will very likely prompt them to join the Triple Entente.

The mistakes of Germany's diplomacy have not only changed the grouping of the European Powers to Germany's disadvantage, but they have also weakened the power of her two Allies. Italy has, with Germany's consent and approval, tied up 100,000 soldiers in Tripoli, and as they are dependent upon Italian supplies Italy has not only greatly weakened her home army, but has given invaluable hostages to that country which rules the Mediterranean. Whilst Turkey was strong, Austria-Hungary need not have feared the enmity of the Balkan Slavs, and she could easily have used her entire army against Russia. In consequence of the Balkan War she has to place about 300,000 men on her southern frontier in case of a war with Russia. German diplomacy directs the Triple Alliance. It has speculated rashly on a Turkish victory over the Balkan States, a victory which would have increased Turkey's strength and which would have been to the advantage of the Triple Alliance. Turkey has collapsed like a house of cards, and with it has fallen the predominance of the Triple Alliance on the Continent of Europe.

The Balkan War has been a grave defeat of Germany and of the Triple Alliance, and a great victory of Slavdom. That is clearly recognized in Germany. On the same day when the German Chancellor placed before the party leaders of the Reichstag confi

dential information regarding the necessity of strengthening the German army very greatly, the Germania, the leading organ of the Centre Party, which previously had been singularly well supplied with confidential advance information regarding the Government's intentions, wrote:

We have repeatedly stated that a victory of the Balkan Allies is in reality a Russian victory. When the great European War breaks out, the Triple Alliance will be opposed by the Triple Entente and the Balkan States, and the latter will be found more ready to fight the Triple Alliance than England. Until lately it was thought in Germany that we should have to prepare for the inevitable war with England. The events of the last few months have shown that a greater and more immediate danger threatens Germany from the direction of Russia. The Oriental question has assumed a new form. It may be summed up in the words, Germanism versus Slavdom.

When the diplomats of the Triple Alliance saw how seriously the balance of power was changing to their disadvantage, they thought of entering into more intimate relations with Spain, who might have aided the Central European group by attacking France in the rear, and compelling that country to leave several army corps on the Pyrenees. But recent events seem to show that Spain has entered upon very close relations with France, and it appears not impossible that some of the smaller nations of Europe will by and by follow Spain's example. The Triple Entente promises to become a Multiple Entente.

On the 22nd of September 1898 the German Emperor proclaimed at Stettin: "Germany's future lies upon the water." As he chose for Chancellors not able men of strong character but pliable and obedient men, that phrase became the watchword of German

statesmanship.

Bismarck recognized that Germany's principal interest lay on land. He had pursued with great success a sober and practical continental policy, and we learn from his letters and speeches that he attached the greatest value to England's good will and support. His successorsperhaps one ought to say his successor -although they were devoid not only of striking ability but even of stability of purpose, deliberately discarded Bismarck's continental policy and proclaimed proudly their intention to embark upon a world-policy, and their policy became, perhaps involuntarily, anti-British one. General von Bernhardi wrote with justified bitterness in his book Unsere Zukunft:

an

The

The insufficient capacity of the leading statesmen of Germany has only too often become apparent, and it can easily be accounted for. men who are called into the Government and administration of the German Empire are not always the greatest, the most intelligent, and the soundest men obtainable, nor are they always men possessed of great strength of character. play mostly a decisive role in their selection and appointment.

Favor and chance

In feverish haste Germany began to build up a colossal fleet. In 1900 Gerof many occupied with her fleet battleships only the sixth place among the nations. To-day she occupies the second place, having overtaken Italy, Russia, France, and the United States. Never in the history of the world since the time when Rome embarked upon her struggle with Carthage has a great fleet been built up so rapidly. But Rome was able to challenge the seapower of Carthage because she was safe on land, because her land frontiers were not threatened by powerful military neighbors. The unwisdom and the danger of Germany's policy was obvious. In June 1912, exactly a year ago, I was allowed to contribute to

this Review an article entitled "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," in which I ventured to state: By pursuing an anti-British policy Germany has not only driven Great Britain from Germany's side and has driven her into the arms of France and Russia, but she has at the same time gravely weakened the formerly reliable Triple Alliance. . . A nation can safely embark upon a bold and costly trans-maritime policy only if it is secure on land, if it either occupies an island, like Great Britain and Japan, or if it occupies an isolated position and cannot be invaded by its neighbors, like the United States. Germany has three great land Powers for neighbors. Two of them, France and Russia, are not friendly to Germany, and she cannot rely with absolute certainty upan the support of her third neighbor, Austria-Hungary a fact of which Bismarck warned her in his Memoirs. Under these circumstances it is obvious that Germany's greatest need is not expansion oversea, but defence on land; that her greatest interests lie not on the sea, but on terra firma.

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Guided by the maxim "Germany's future lies upon the water," the leaders of the "New Course" have been SO anxious to strengthen the Navy that the German Army has been neglected both quantitatively and qualitatively. Germany's expenditure upon the Navy has been comparatively extravagant and that on her Army scarcely sufficient. cording to the German Constitution, every German citizen able to bear arms has to bear arms. Germany's population came in 1900 to 56,367,178 people. In 1910 it was 64,896,881 people, having increased by a little more than 8,500,000. It used to be the rule in Germany that a fixed proportion of the population, about 1.1 per cent., belonged to the standing army. Between 1901 and 1910 the German Army ought to have increased in the normal course by about 93,000 men, which is equal to about 1.1 per cent. on the 8,500,000 people by whom the

population was increased. But in stead of adding 93,000 men to the standing army, Germany has added to it only 18,000, or but one-fifth of the normal number.

These statements met with incredulity in Great Britain and with derision and ridicule in Germany, where the article was widely quoted, but time meanwhile has proved their correctness. The fact that Germany has neglected both her diplomatic position on the Continent of Europe and her army became clear to all when the German Government suddenly demanded a truly gigantic increase of the army, an increase which in the course of the next five years will cost approximately 100,000,000l. The German Army Bill was prefaced by an exposé des motifs, in which the Government stated:

In consequence of the events which are taking place in the Balkans the balance of power in Europe has been shifted. If a war should be forced upon Germany, she would have to protect, possibly against several enemies, frontiers which are extended, and which are devoid of natural protection. In consequence of the political changes which have taken place it is to-day more than ever our supreme duty to make our military defence as strong as our population allows.

The strength of our army has not altogether kept pace with the growth of our population. A considerable portion of the people who are able to bear arms remains at present untrained. Universal service has proved the best basis of Germany's strength. Only if universal service remains a reality can we look to the future with firm confidence and the feeling that we have done our duty. The main idea of the Bill is the development of universal service in proportion with our population.

Nations, like individuals, have to pay for their mistakes. As Germany has lost the support of Turkey, and

perhaps that of Roumania as well, which together could aid the Triple Alliance with 1,200,000 men, and as she has acquired at the same time in the Balkan States a possible enemy able to place a very large army into the field, she had to replace the Turkish and Roumanian auxiliaries whom she had lost by German soldiers. The new German Army Bill increases the number of recruits by 63,000 men per year, and as nineteen yearly levies are liable to be called out in case of war, the Bill proposes to increase the war strength of the German Army by about one million men.

Modern wars are made by armed nations. As the population statistics determine the ultimate strength of armies, Germany's enormous and unprecedented military effort will probably not suffice to re-establish her in military predominance Europe. Germany has 67,000,000 inhabitants, and her population grows by 800,000 per year; Austria-Hungary has 50,000,000 inhabitants, and her population increases by 400,000 per year; Italy has 35,000,000 inhabitants, and her population grows by 200,000 per year. While the States of the Triple Alliance have together 152,000,000 inhabitants, who increased by 1,400,000 per year, Russia alone has 170,000,000 inhabitants who increase by approximately 3,000,000 per year. On the basis of the population and natural increase the position of the Triple Alliance is less favorable than that of the FrancoRussian Alliance, and it is, of course, still less favorable than is that of the Triple Entente. If we look at the position of the Triple Alliance from the military point of view we find that the Russian Army is now in every respect in a far better condition than it was before the outbreak of the RussoJapanese War. The armies of France and Russia combined are approximately as strong as those of the Triple