Air Force site selection criteria applicable to ICBM systems include, but are not limited to

(a) Operational area requirements (classified).

(b) Acceptable geology; sufficient area for dispersal.

(c) Consideration of potential danger to civilian population.

(d) Support and facilities within economic investment.

(e) Support maximum missiles each support base.

(f) At least 18 nautical miles from city, 25,000 population.

(g) Separation (classified).

(h) Ability adjacent community to support personnel.
(i) Avoid areas adjacent to other prime targets.

(k) Commuting distance, support base to site.

(1) Climatology as it affects supportability.

(m) Explosive quantity distance criteria to roads and buildings will be met. Compatibility of area utilization.

(n) Cost comparison; secure maximum firepower for funds available to attain most effective posture.

On July 31, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated his policy on the placement of missile sites, in the following memorandum to the Secretaries of the military departments:

It is the policy of the Department of Defense that missile sites shall not be located in such a relationship to populated areas that an enemy attack on the sites would subject the population to an avoidable fallout hazard.

Any exceptions to this policy must be approved in writing by both the Secretary of the service involved and either the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Mr. ROBACK. The Department of Defense has under study a report which was sent to it, I know, from Prof. James McDonald, of the University of Arizona, who has made a rather technical analysis of the problem of the fallout hazard associated with missile siting.

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes, this material is currently under study in the Department of the Air Force.

Mr. ROBACK. In the Department of the Air Force?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. In the Air Force; yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Will you undertake to submit to us any relevant studies or findings on the subject?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Do you have any other observations on the matter? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Only to reiterate the fact that it seems to me the placing of these responsibilities in the Department will make it that much more likely that we will be able to that much more certain, I should say that we will be able to give the fullest possible consideration to these factors.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. This subcommittee found that these missile bases were being located without regard to the populations around the bases, that they were being located in some instances upwind from nearby cities, and in some instances they completely encircled cities, in our country. This is, in my opinion, a very regrettable policy. It appears to the chairman that the selection of these areas was done without any regard at all to the resulting effect of multimegaton attack on these hardened bases.

The sole consideration seemed to be to harden the bases against attack. And no consideration was given to the fact that, as testimony showed before our committee, whereas a one-megaton explosion could destroy a soft base, it would take 30 megatons to destroy a hardened base of the type under consideration.

The resultant radioactivity that would be spread by 30 megatons of explosives, and the location of the base upwind from the center of

population, apparently were not considered at all. Possibly it was more convenient for the officers and personnel of these bases to be close to the cities, as well as to shows and restaurants and that sort of thing, but the basic problem of protection for the people of the United States was not given the proper consideration.

Of course, this is not your fault. We recognize that you are a latecomer to the scene.

But, nevertheless, the Department of Defense bears the stigma, in my opinion, of irresponsibility in locating these bases. And I would strongly urge that if there are more bases to be considered, that they be located in thinly populated areas, and at least on the downwind side of great populated areas.

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Chairman, James E. McDonald, who is a professor at the Institute of Atmospheric Physics, University of Arizona, Tucson, has submitted to us and the Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government, papers analyzing the problem. He says in "An Analysis of Civil Defense Hazards Being Created by Emplacement of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Near Tucson," among other things:

It is the thesis of this paper that failure to locate all of these 18 Titan sites well downwind of (east and southeast of) Tucson's 225,000 residents will reduce survival chances of this entire unprotected population essentially to zero.

If unchallenged on scientific grounds, this analysis will fill a serious information-gap for Tucson citizens who have never been given by the Air Force or other agencies any inkling of the magnitude of the hazards they will confront when these sites become operational a few years from now.

We discussed this matter in our report last year, but what we are requesting now from the Department of Defense is a specific response to the statement by Professor McDonald, and any relevant information you may have on the subject.

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. We will supply information in response to that material, Mr. Roback.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We not only have the city of Tucson, but there are other cities that are in a similar position.

(The following information subsequently was received:)

AIR FORCE ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER, "AN ANALYSIS OF FALLOUT HAZARDS FROM ICBM SITES LOCATED UPWIND OF CITIES," BY DR. JAMES E. McDONALD, THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

This paper was presented at the joint meeting of the American Meteorological Society and American Geophysical Union, Washington, D.C., April 20-22, 1961. The basic thesis of the paper was that civil defense hazards have been created by emplacement of ICBM launching sites upwind of population centers rather than downwind. The siting of Titan missiles upwind of Tucson, Ariz., was cited as a case in point. The Air Force has analyzed Dr. McDonald's paper and submits the following comments:

The major shortcoming of this paper is that it treats only with a narrow aspect of the ICBM siting problem, within only one community area and with only one factor of the many site selection criteria, to the exclusion of other important considerations.

In addition to the fallout criteria in ICBM site selection, other important criteria were utilized. The most important of these criteria is that of operational effectiveness; it is important that our ICBM's have the capability to strike desired enemy targets with required payloads. This criteria leads to siting of our ICBM squadrons in areas of our country that will permit such target coverage in accordance with our missile range and payload capabilities. A second portion of this criteria, as utilized in the past, was the urgency of deploying our force in-being and operationally ready to meet the estimated enemy threat. 73266-61-8

Leadtimes of construction led, in many cases, to the necessity to utilize not only existing support bases, but also suitable existing access roads.

Basically, support bases were selected in the western portion of the United States to avoid heavily populated and industrialized eastern areas. Selecting existing bases not only saved urgently needed time, but provided continued utilization of the heavy dollar investments therein. Certain northern tier bases were selected on the basis of design maximum range and payload with respect to deeper enemy target coverage required. Certain Air Force bases. for example, provided deep target coverage of a previously uncovered set of targets requiring heavy payload.

Having selected the desired area and the support base therein, geology be came an important factor. Areas with favorable geological shock attenuation characteristics were selected to permit hardening and thus provide for force survival. Geological formations requiring heavy and difficult construction with associated cost runups and extensive leadtimes were rejected. Water table requirements were applied so that areas favorable to construction, maintenance, and onsite water requirements were selected. Geological fault areas were rejected. Areas best suited for relatively cheap access were selected.

In this process, access roads became important. Site preparation distances between the support base and the individual launch emplacements, one to the other, were necessary for survivability. In order to save needed time and provide the most direct and immediate access to the missile sites for logistical support reasons, it became necessary in most instances to utilize exiting road networks. Logistical consideration resulted in Atlas and Titan site locations not exceeding 60 road miles from the support base, and Minuteman sites not more than 120 road miles from the support base. With logistical support costs increasing sharply, in direct proportion with the distance of a missile site from the support base, stringing missile sites in one direction along existing roads became economically undesirable.

With respect to the fallout criteria, the westerly siting of the ICBM bases generally avoided the heavily populated eastern portion of the country. In most cases, ICBM sites were located at least 18 nautical miles from communities of 25,000 population or more. Whenever practicable, in consideration of other important criteria, individual launchers were located downwind of communities. However, in certain instances, other factors mentioned required upwind sitings. Dr. McDonald's paper has been reviewed from a technical viewpoint within the scope of his study. There are no important technical errors with respect to his presentation. The basic oversight of this paper is that it ignores the overall military problems and factors of national importance, which dictate the requirement for an ICBM force in this country. To take one possible enemy target out of this context ignores the larger and more important problem.

ADEQUACY OF CIVIL DEFENSE LEGISLATION

Mr. ROBACK. We reviewed with the legal counsel for OCDM yesterday the legislative situation with regard to the President's civil defense program.

Has the Department of Defense studied the legislative background of the civil defense program?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. If I may, Mr. Roback, I would like to refer that question to Mr. Vance, the General Counsel of the Department, who is sitting at my right.

Mr. VANCE. I am sorry, Mr. Roback, I couldn't hear your question. Has the Department of Defense done what?

Mr. ROBACK. Has the Department of Defense studied the legislative requirements and relationships of existing legislation?

Mr. VANCE. We have made a very brief review in the limited time available to us.

Mr. ROBACK. And what conclusion, if any, have you come to?

Mr. VANCE. Our principal conclusion is that it requires further study on our part before we could come up with any recommenda

Mr. ROBACK. You have no recommendations as to whether the legislation is adequate or inadequate or needs to be recommended in any respect?

Mr. VANCE. No; I do not.

Mr. ROBACK. Does this brief review evoke any possibilities?

Did you notice anything that might pose a problem or interfere with any program that you propose to put forth?

Mr. VANCE. I noted one thing, that the emergency powers under title III expire, I believe, in June of 1962. So that some action would have to be taken in the next session of Congress with respect to that.

Mr. ROBACK. So that one of the real responsibilities of the Department of Defense would be to put to the President the problem of extending the emergency authority and possibly revising it if it were thought necessary?

Mr. VANCE. The President reserved the emergency powers to himself, as you know, Mr. Roback. Certainly, I think urgent consideration should be given to extending those powers.

BASIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHELTER PROGRAM

Mr. ROBACK. Now, we will discuss for a few moments the shelter responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

What is the basis for this program? Was this an independent study of the Department or is this a derived study from the OCDM?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The program that we offer to the Congress was based on a number of studies running back, some of them a number of years, including studies conducted by OCDM, a number of pilot or sample surveys which have been made, and a larger number which are currently underway, and also studies that have been conducted within the National Security Council and other studies prepared for the President. The work that we examined by other agencies was supplemented by work done by a task force established in the Department of Defense which drew on elements of the Department, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and outside consultants from Stanford Research Institute, the Operations Research Office, and other consultant organizations, and also, of course, extensively, with the help and cooperation of Mr. Ellis from OCDM itself.

COST OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHELTER IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM

Mr. ROBACK. There was some testimony yesterday which suggested that the cost of marking, of identification and marking shelters, as put forth by the OCDM, was $50 million; and as put forth by the Department of Defense was twice that amount. The question then came up, or the explanation was offered by Mr. Devaney of OCDM, that the Department of Defense was interested in a more refined technical inquiry, so that it could set itself the needed task of upgrading.

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I believe Mr. Devaney's answer was quite correct, Mr. Roback. The $50 million figure which we examined in the course of our task force study covered a survey which would be adequate for the purposes of identifying these shelter spaces but which wouldn't provide the necessary facts to determine what kind of modification program should be undertaken.

In fact, I believe the study which contained the $50 million figure had an additional figure, the amount which I do not recall, which covered a partial resurvey to obtain this additional information. Mr. ROBACK. In making these estimates—

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. May I add just one point here?

In the interests of economy we considered the possibility of an immediate identification survey and a later modification survey. And we found that the total cost of the combined survey was substantially less than the cost of the two separate surveys, and therefore we proposed the combined survey.

Mr. ROBACK. By "combined" do you also contemplate that as you identify you will improve shelters?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. No; we do not, because we believe that it is necessary to obtain a good deal of the information out of the survey before decisions are made on modification. It is for that reason that we included only a pilot program of modification in this year's program.

BEGINNING OF SHELTER MODIFICATIONS PROGRAM

Mr. ROBACK. The figures given in the testimony were that December 1962 would see the end of the identification program, and improvement, if any, would follow after that time. Is that right?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Not precisely. I think, in addition to the $10 million pilot program of modification which could begin, I suppose, in January or February of 1962, depending on the results of the survey, to the extent they were available at the time of the formulation of the fiscal year 1963 budget, we might propose additional funds for additional modification to begin in July of 1962, before the survey and the identification process was completed. Our notion here was to achieve as much concurrency as is consistent with reasonable longrange planning and reasonable economy.

Mr. ROBACK. If that is the case, why don't you select the most prom-ising spaces first and then improve those?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The most promising spaces?

Mr. ROBACK. Spaces, that is, occupancy potential. You have a program, as I understand it, to conduct a technical census of all the shelters, all the buildings, all the structures in the United States. Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Now, it is obvious that if you wait until you count every nose, so to speak, that takes a long time

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. We are not proposing, as I tried to indicate, we are not proposing to wait until we have counted every nose or even a majority of the noses, we are proposing to go ahead with a pilot program of modification very shortly after the survey has begun and then, depending on the results of the first part of the survey we will be able to decide whether or not to request additional funds perhaps more substantial for modification beginning, say, in June of 1962.

NEED FOR STARTING WITH SURVEY AND MARKING

Mr. ROBACK. So that the committee can understand the rationale of this program, just let me ask you simply, why is the survey and marking of existing structures the most important way of achieving