Mr. YARMOLINSKY. For three reasons, Mr. Roback. In the first place, we are convinced that this is the fastest way to get the greatest number of bases for immediate protection for perhaps 40 or 50 or 60 million people, using a very considerable range of estimates, giving these people a reasonable degree of protection against fallout. Our second reason is that our best estimates indicate that the shelter which would be provided would be very substantially lower in unit cost than any other kind of shelter that we know of or have been able to find out about. And the third reason is that it seems to us, as the Secretary said in his testimony the day before yesterday, that you have got to find out what you have before you decide what you need. And we feel that we don't know what we have, that one cannot extrapolate sufficiently on the basis of the very limited sample surveys that had been conducted by OCDM in the past-not that we are critical of these surveys, but the coverage is just insufficient. We don't propose to complete the survey before we make decisions on the subsequent program to be proposed to the Congress. COMPETITIVE COST OF BLAST SHELTERS Mr. ROBACK. Suppose that you find out what you have, and you find out it isn't very good, and you then have to set for yourself the policy, of, let us say, constructing blast shelters in certain areas, according to the findings and priorities that targeting and population and industrial concentrations suggest. Now, suppose you come to such a conclusion as that. Do you think it is even possible or plausible that you might come to such a conclusion? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I think the conclusion that a substantial blast shelter program is needed, is, from what I have been able to learn in the very brief time that I have been involved in this subject, highly unlikely. Mr. ROBACK. Highly unlikely from what standpoint, technical or cost? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I assume that a degree of blast protection is technically achievable. But the relationship of cost to protection is so high that it seems to me we need to know more than we know now, just for example, about the relationship between the cost of active defense and the cost of passive blast defense. In this connection, I might Mr. HOLIFIELD. How are you using the words "blast defense"? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I am using the words "blast defense" only when we are talking about protection against the direct effects of blasts. I am well aware of the point you made the day before yesterday that fallout shelters of any kind at all afford not insubstantial protection against missiles, projectiles, pushed out by the blasts, and against secondary effects. I am thinking of the primary blast effects, sir. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let's use those words "primary blast," because we can get fouled up on the use of the word "blast" without modification. Any kind of shelter provides some kind of blast protection, along with the radioactive protection. And the degree of that blast protection, of course, is determined by the size of the blast and by the type of protection, the type of underground protection. So let's not divide blast and radiation protection into two completely separated compartments, because they are mingled. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Chairman? Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mrs. Griffiths. STANDARD SHIELDING FACTOR FOR SHELTERS Mrs. GRIFFITHS. What is the standard, or what are the specifications that you will accept now for a shelter? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. În terms of shielding? Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Yes. Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Well, I should say first that we have not determined specifically numerical specifications for the survey. The first part of the job that has got to be done and which we are just beginning, is to make the specifications on which the survey will be conducted. I would suppose that a factor of 50 to 150 would be the factor that we would be looking for in the shelter survey. Now, I would suppose that we would find a good deal of space that had, let's say, protection factors between 10 and 50 which would be valuable in large areas well away from the ground zero, the source of the fallout. And the decision as to what number, what percentage of those areas, to mark is one that we haven't made yet. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Will the standard vary from city to city? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I would suppose that the standard might vary from area to area, depending on what our predictions are as to the range of likelihood of fallout intensity, given a reasonable or probable range of target patterns. But, again, this is a matter that we don't have any answers on yet. We will have them in a few weeks. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. It will not bear, though, on the consideration of what is available? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. In consideration of what is available? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I hadn't thought of it as bearing on that basis, because if a shelter space is not going to offer an attenuation factor high enough to save the lives of people who are exposed to whatever the expected dose, based on the attack, might be, there is no point in marking and stocking the shelter. We don't want to have a program that looks good when you walk around before the attack but afterward all you find are the victims of radiation. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Thank you. OCDM STUDIES OF NEED FOR BLAST SHELTERS Mr. ROBACK. Is Mr. Devaney in the room? Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Devaney, will you come up? You are Director of Systems Analyses, whatever it is called, in the OCDM? Mr. DEVANEY. Yes, sir. Mr. ROBACK. From a systems study or operations analysis standpoint, does it make sense to consider the possibility of a blast pro tection system if your identification program comes up with certain kinds of data? Mr. DEVANEY. It makes sense to consider it, sir, but only in relation to the other defenses. Mr. ROBACK. Of course, you always consider things in relation. But if somebody said we ought to study this matter, would that be wise or an unwise thing? Mr. DEVANEY. I have said myself that we ought to study it more. Mr. ROBACK. Have you made studies along that line? Mr. DEVANEY. No, sir. Mr. ROBACK. You have made no studies? Mr. DEVANEy. No. Mr. ROBACK. The OCDM has made no studies of the possibility or the need for blast shelter? Mr. DEVANEY. We have made studies of the possibilities in blast shelter, and to some small degree of the need, but we have not compared it, say, with the effectiveness of a possible anti-ICBM defense. And I think that this kind of a study must be made before you can make a firm decision as to the necessity for blast shelter. Mr. BREWER. Mr. Chairman, may I say that the OCDM has done a great deal of technical work in considering alternatives; all this material has been made available to the Department of Defense, and the decisions in this area would be program decisions that would fall within that delegation. COST OF NATIONAL PROGRAM IS NOT ABSURD Mr. ROBACK. Mr. McNamara testified before the Armed Services Committee a week or so ago, and some of the members were interested in shelter costs. Mr. McNamara related to the committee that someone called him on the telephone and said what we ought to have is a program—which I assume includes blast shelters on the order of $10 billion. are Mr. McNamara's words: Here I am strongly opposed to any civil defense program that runs into the figures: of the type you have mentioned. A man called me on the telephone proposing $10 billion for structures of this kind. It is perfectly absurd. Is it absurd from an operations analysis point of view? Mr. DEVANEY. I don't know. That is a policy matter, something I do not study. Mr. ROBACK. From the standpoint of need it isn't absurd, is it? Mr. DEVANEY. I can't say, sir. Mr. HOLIFIELD. I was unaware of this statement when Mr. McNamara was before us. Mr. ROBACK. It was called to my attention by a column in the New York Times. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The testimony, I note now, was in the hearings before the Armed Services Committee on July 28, 1961, and appears on page 2477 of the hearing print. Now, I would say that the Secretary was misinformed if he made that statement. It is not absurd to spend $100 per person to save 50 million people's lives. And it was undoubtedly made, if made as reported in this official document, without adequate information as to the background of the studies that had been made on civil defense. If the Secretary of Defense maintains this attitude in the face of the reams of testimony and the scientific evidence which has been presented to our committee, then I say that the Secretary of Defense is absurd, and not the proposition to save the people of the United States from nuclear attack. Mr. CANNELL. Sir, the Secretary might have had in his mind consideration of alternative means of protecting his people that didn't show up or didn't come across in the document you have. For example, if we can save people with Nike-Zeus you save not only people but hardware. So to the extent that you can use active defense systems to intercept missiles rather than protect against weapons effects when the missile detonates, there is merit in that approach. What Mr. Devaney has alluded to is that the studies comparing these techniques to find the proper proportion between active and passive defense aren't available at this time. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Neither is Nike-Zeus available to knock down incoming ICBM's. Mr. CANNELL. That is the point. To decide which direction to go, there is not quite enough data to make these comparisons, that is to see whether to go in the active defense direction or in the hardening direction. It is not a question of whether we should go-clearly we should protect by one means or the other, but which? Mr. HOLIFIELD. In the meantime, you are embarking upon a technological study for an antimissile missile which may take 10 years time to develop, if we put it on the basis of experience with other weapon systems; and you ignore the means at hand, the means of evasion through underground shelters which we know exists and which we know can be made available to the people of the United States. So, I don't take the position that we should wait to defend the people of the United States when we know how to defend them from radiation, from a nuclear attack, until we get some pie in the sky antimissile missile. I know how long it takes to bring these systems into being, and I know what some of the technical problems are in an antimissile missile. And there is not a reputable scientist today that will stand before this committee and tell us that he will have a perfect antimissile missile or any ways near a perfect antimissile missile defense within the next 5, 6, 7, or 8 years. (The following additional comments subsequently were received from the Department of Defense :) The absurdity referred to is a proposal to spend so large a sum before there is a reasonable indication that the proposal will be the most effective and efficient way to allocate our resources to protect our people. In testimony before this committee, the Secretary has made it clear that the planned shelter survey must be aimed at discovering what there is in the way of available fallout shelter before there can be intelligent planning of a program to supplement existing shelter. On the basis of the sparse information available at present, the Secretary believes it would not be wise to spend very substantial sums, whether tax dollars or private investment, to construct shelters which may duplicate existing facilities. USE OF COMPLETED CITY SHELTER SURVEYS Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, in respect to the studies that have been made throughout the United States of America, in many of our larger cities, I wonder how much of that information is now available, and how much of the space has been marked as available for shelter and for protection of the people? Does anyone have any idea of that? Mr. CANNELL. Virtually none of it has been marked, and only a few sample cities have been surveyed. So, very little has actually been accomplished in terms of making this shelter useful in saving lives. Mr. RIEHLMAN. Let's go back just a moment. Last year when we held hearings here we had people from OCDM before us we were told that in several cities-I think the hearings will prove this-that surveys had been made, and definite information was available to how many people could be sheltered and what could be done to reinforce that area for the protection of people. What has happened to this survey and the information that was available? Mr. CANNELL. This is on the order of five completed cities. These surveys did not include marking the shelter after it was found, so there is a step that remains to make that shelter useful to people in saving their lives in the event of an attack. The sample surveys were used as a statistical base to make the estimates for the program explained to you here. That was the only statistical basis for extrapolating to the whole Nation in order to estimate how much shelter of various quality would be available through the technique of survey and marking. So these surveys were the first step toward this next phase of the program-you do it in sequence to be sure you are going in the proper direction in providing protection. Mr. RIEHLMAN. Can you use this information that is now available to expedite in some degrees the planning Mr. CANNELL. We already have, through these studies we devise the methods and techniques for conducting these surveys so that the manuals and training courses to show local architects and engineers how to conduct these studies are available. OCDM through those surveys gathered the information to broaden this base of knowledge so we can take the next step. The preliminary survey had to be done first, or we would not be in a position now to do a national survey. We wouldn't even know whether it was the proper thing to do without those preliminary surveys, those pilot studies they completed. It is clear that it is the proper thing to do now because they did those studies. Mr. RIEHLMAN. And your program will tie into where they left off? Mr. CANNELL. Yes. If you were to compare it to something easier to visualize like building a road, first you would survey the ground. The next step is to run through the survey and see where to have the cuts and the fills and the capacity. That is one we are proposing now. After you have that information so you can design your road from one point to another, then you go into the construction and the ultimate |