CIVIL DEFENSE-1961

FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 1961

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 1302, New House Office building, Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommitte) presiding.

Present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Douglas Dahlin, staff attorney; Earl Morgan, chief investigator; and Paul Ridgely, investigator.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order.

Dr. Dunham, I understand that you have another engagement and would like to testify at this time.

Dr. DUNHAM. I can be here all morning, sir. But I would like to get away by 12:30 or 1 o'clock.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right, Doctor, I will let you put your statement on first. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES L. DUNHAM, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Dr. DUNHAM. Chairman Holifield, it is always a privilege to appear before this subcommittee. As you know, the Commissioners and the staff of the AEC have testified on a number of occasions before committees of the Congress holding hearings on civil defense. The AEC has supported civil defense and, principally in its role as a supplier of technical information, it has made contributions to civil defense. In cooperation with the Department of Defense, several special reports for civil defense purposes were prepared for distribution by the National Security Resources Board early in 1950 prior to the establishment of the FCDA. Another brief report, "The City of Washington_and an Atomic Bomb Attack," was prepared by the staff of the Division of Biology and Medicine and released by AEC in November 1949. So it may be said that we speak from a position of long acquaintance with and a long interest in civil defense.

During the nearly 12 years since the release of the 1949 report on "The City of Washington and an Atomic Bomb Attack," the dimensions of the civil defense problem have increased extensively. There are more people to protect now. There are more people in the metropolitan areas. Nuclear weapons in the stockpiles have grown rapidly in numbers and variety. We have witnessed the development of the megaton and multimegaton bombs, and we have been confronted with

the problems arising from the large amount of radioactive fission products which may be deposited in the fallout from surface burst nuclear weapons.

But the picture is not all black, for the 12 years have also seen many contributions to our understanding of the effects of nuclear explosions; and more is known about what is required to lessen the impact of these effects on man and his property. If as a nation we develop the will to proceed with the application of countermeasures, the path we must follow is well defined. Thus the major problem confronting us as a nation is not so much what can be done but whether and how it will be done.

To assume blithely, as many people do, that a nuclear war cannot or will not occur is totally unrealistic. This viewpoint has inherent in it an invitation to disaster no less than the equally prevalent attitude that nothing useful can be done by way of civilian defense measures.

The most cursory look at history, at man's propensity for war and at the utter ruthlessness of wars should be sufficient to assure endorsement of a strong civil defense effort as an indispensable part of our total defense effort. It would be a hollow military victory which left the country with no will to bind up its wounds and give meaning and leadership again to civilization. If there is no strong will to survive as a people before a war, there will surely be none after it is over. The mere willingness to spend billions of dollars on military defense in a country as rich as ours is not sufficient evidence of a will to survive as a people. A strong civil defense would be a true symbol of national vigor and one which any would-be aggressor would take full cognizance of.

FOREIGN ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE

In the past few years I have visited in Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and I have gained the distinct impression that large fractions of their populations are aware of the lessons of history and are doing their best to be prepared for what may come regardless of how much they abhor the thought of war. Few people in this country realize that in World War II 20 to 30 million civilians were killed. For nearly a century we have not suffered heavy losses on our own soil nor have we seen next door the scenes of ruthless invasions. Lacking first hand experience, it is hard for our people, even those who have fought in foreign wars, to realize that it could happen here.

WAR WITHOUT CIVIL DEFENSE UNTHINKABLE

At the expense of appearing trite, I cannot refrain from restating what you and your committee know full well-a nuclear war in the presence of a strong, well-developed civil defense would be terrible, but a nuclear war in its absence is truly unthinkable.

Mr. Corsbie will point out some of the characteristics of the gamut of nuclear weapons and protective measures which can usefully be taken against them-not, to be sure, for 100 percent protection for all the people but measures which would increase the chances for survival of millions of our people. I shall highlight what, in my personal opinion, are the more strictly medical problems likely to be encountered.

TREATMENT FOR RADIATION INJURY

The first problem I should like to mention is that of acute whole body radiation injury. This was relatively a minor one at Hiroshima and at Nagasaki. Only a small percentage of fatalities resulted solely from radiation exposure, perhaps 15 percent. Of the surviving casualties an even smaller percentage suffered the syndrome of whole body radiation injury. With large, megaton thermonuclear weapons and all their resulting fallout I would expect the ratio to be no higher for purely radiation casualties if shelters are prepared in advance-I repeat, if shelters are prepared in advance.

Treatment for whole body radiation injury is not specific in spite of much research by the AEC and Department of Defense. As much as we need it, there is today no satisfactory prophylactic medicine or antidote. We have made little progress in developing drugs which are both safe and which will optimize resistance to radiation over periods of weeks and months. Sometime in the not too far distant future it may be possible to increase temporarily a person's resistance to the immediate effects of radiation by administration of the proper combination of drugs. While such a "radiation pill" may have application to military operations and possibly to lifesaving rescue operations involving radiation accidents, we do not foresee that this will have widespread civil defense applications. This is because the drugs now under study must be given just before a short exposure to a heavy radiation dose.

It is clearly established, however, that antibiotics and other supportive treatment would be lifesaving for an appreciable fraction of those injured by radiation. Therefore, the stockpiling of antibiotics, which, I believe is already underway, is a must. They must be stockpiled in a way which makes them available to those who need them. Therapy need not commence immediately; in the instances where it would do the most good it can start 2 to 3 weeks after exposure to several hundred roentgens. In this connection, it is important to remember that there are many people living today who have survived, with minimal or no treatment, doses of radiation in the hundreds of roentgens. For example, some of those involved in radiation accidents, many of the survivors in Japan and medical patients who have received radiation therapy. Research in progress will improve our understanding of radiation effects. From this we expect that more information will be available to guide us in devising preventive agents and treatment.

SUPPLIES IN SHELTERS

Prevention is always more desirable than cure, and this applies to radiation injury just as it does to contagious diseases. Studies have shown that relatively simple shelters can be constructed in basements or adjacent to houses. Such simple shelters could reduce the radiation dose to persons inside by a factor of 100 to 200. With such protection, the exposure could be kept low enough in most places to produce no immediate symptoms in any reasonably normal individual. The problem, of course, is not that simple. Shelters must have adequate food and water to maintain a family for several weeks. In some parts of the Nation heat would be necessary during a winter war.

Sanitary facilities must be provided. Some means of communication such as a portable radio has been recommended. A radiation detection and measuring instrument would make the family more self-reliant. Certain basic medical supplies necessary for self-care will be important.

MORALE AND INDOCTRINATION

In the regions of heaviest fallout persons will have to stay more or less pinned down for several weeks. Here they would face the supplemental problem of keeping mind and spirit in good order. It is essential that continued attention be given to this aspect of protection for our civil defense planning, including indoctrination into when and for how long it is wise to leave the shelter for brief but increasing periods.

Dr. Gordon Dunning pointed out in 1959 that in areas of relatively heavy fallout, the ingestion of all the fallout on 1 square foot at 1 week after the fallout occurred might be sufficient to cause death to adults or children due to irradiation of the gastrointestinal tract. Fresh milk might be so heavily contaminated with radioiodine that a single pint would contain enough activity to destroy an infant's thyroid gland. This, too, poses a problem of indoctrination.

PEACETIME VERSUS POSTWAR RADIATION HAZARDS

On the other hand, in dealing with this situation we will have to give up for the time being and perhaps for a generation or so, the peactime radiation protection criteria geared to the proposition of reducing the probability of even delayed injury to close to zero. We would expect that the incidence of leukemia in the surviving population would be increased, probably by a factor of several for a few decades and then taper off. A similar increase in bone cancer, but a smaller number of cases, might appear later as a result of the unavoidable ingestion of strontium 90 in food over the ensuing years. Neither condition, I hasten to add, would be likely to become a principal cause of death. It is unlikely that even leukemia would become as common as fatal diphtheria was in 1900, or scarlet fever or whooping cough. It would also be possible that a relatively high incidence of thyroid cancer would occur in those who had been infants or small children at the time and who had inadvertently ingested appreciable quantities of radioiodine. When compared to the immediate deaths and injuries from blasts and fire which would wipe out tens of millions of people, these delayed effects, although they might involve several hundred thousand persons, over a number of years would be relatively small and could be tolerated. Even if the survivors had received an average radiation dose which would double the mutation rate in a single generation it would not be disastrous to the population though it would cause added suffering.

BLAST AND BURN INJURIES

Much has been written and said about the radiation hazards, and certainly this must be continued. However, we must not lose sight of the blast injuries and burns. Thousands of them have occurred in conventional war. In any nuclear war their numbers would be multi

plied manyfold. The medical procedures for their treatment, though well known, are not simple. Just as we would seek to prevent radiation injury and to limit radiation injury, we should endeavor to use knowledge and protective measures to hold down the number and severity of blast injuries and burns. Burn prevention is of special importance. As you will see later from one of Mr. Corsbie's charts, as the weapons yield increases into the megaton range the area covered by thermal radiation is quite large in relation to the area covered by prompt radiation and blast, and one must expect that there will be among the casualties a large number of burn cases among those in direct line of sight and in areas of conflagration, outside the range of the initial radiation and beyond the range of heavy blast damage. The same means taken to shield against fallout will greatly reduce the number of thermal burns, provided, of course, one is in the shelter at the time of the burst. Adequate warning of an attack will greatly assist in reducing casualties, provided the people take cover. Even if one does not receive any warning of a 10 megaton burst, it is possible for those at the greater distances, 20-30 miles, to reduce the danger from burns by seeking cover instantly upon seeing the awesome flash of light characteristic of a nuclear detonation. It takes 6 seconds to deliver 50 percent of the energy.

WEAPON EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT

There are problems in addition to those which directly involve human life. The damage to forests by fire and to pine forests in particular by radiation from fallout are examples. Many thousands of square miles of pine forests would receive lethal radiation. To prevent denuding of the land reforestation programs would have to be instituted within a year or two. Fortunately, deciduous trees and the grasses, especially the latter, are less sensitive to radiation than pine trees. The grasses would suffer little damage from fallout. The deciduous trees might be seriously damaged in the heaviest fallout areas, that is, in areas where heavy fallout patterns were superimposed. Definitive studies on this point are underway.

The matter of rehabilitation of surviving livestock and the redevelopment of farms in areas of relatively low fallout would also be great but not insurmountable.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION DISCUSSIONS

Whatever the problems, where they are associated with protection, health, food, or rehabilitation, it is certain that we are all in this together. We in the Division of Biology and Medicine expect to continue to devote attention and effort to nonmilitary defense subjects. Over the years we have made available to the civil defense agency a large number of technical and scientific reports, classified and unclassified. Additional information has been made available through AEC-Department of Defense cooperation. "The Effects of Atomic Weapons," published in 1950, and "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," published in 1957, represent the more significant contributions. Culminating a joint effort of the Department of Defense and the AEC, the revised edition of the book should be published before the end of this year.