SIZE OF THE PROGRAM

The changes introduced in the defense program by the President have all been in the direction of increased flexibility in order to deal with a wider range of defense problems. As the size and range of strategic weapons are multiplied, civil defense becomes an essential element to round out our overall defense capabilities. The proper balance between active and passive defense is always open for discussion. By any standard, however, the present level of civil defense spending is not only inadequate but I believe extremely wasteful. It buys an organization, but it does not buy a program.

The program proposed by the President will not satisfy everyone. It is not large enough to guarantee survival for all our citizens in a large-scale nuclear attack. No program that is financially feasible can do so. What it does is to offer the greatest amount of protection against nuclear attack that can be made available to our civilian population in the near future, while actively exploring possibilities for practical achievement of great shelter capacity in the future.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS

The proposed program involves no future commitments, other than a commitment to stock the remaining 20 million shelter spaces expected to be identified and stocked in fiscal year 1963. The approximate cost of the additional stockage is $2 per space, or $40 million. Depending on the results of the pilot modification program and of the construction program for shelters in Federal buildings, decisions can be made and proposals advanced about the future shelter program. The present warning and communications systems will require continuing support at their present level. If the NEAR system is to be installed on a national basis, it will require an additional investment. over a 3- or 4-year period of some $50 to $60 million. On the other hand, by integrating the civil defense national warning and emergency communication systems with military systems, it may be possible to effect substantial economies while at the same time providing increased efficiency. The future of matching funds programs for State and local activities is difficult to predict. If the overall civil defense effort is to be effective, State and focal participation must increase substantially, but this increase may be offset by State and local governments assuming a larger share of the costs.

As you pointed out to me, Mr. Chairman, in your invitation, "The President's decision to revitalize this long-neglected program" makes these hearings particularly timely. Your subcommittee is now in a position to provide a valuable forum to interpret the new program to the Congress and the people of the United States. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and to enlist your support. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. We are honored this morning by having also before you Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And he also has a statement which I notice is quite short.

And with the forbearance of the committee, we will extend to you at this time an invitation to present your statement, and then the questioning can be conducted both of you and the Secretary.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, U.S. ARMY,
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General LEMNITZER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I have long been an advocate of a more viable national civil defense program. Therefore, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak in support of the program Secretary McNamara has outlined for you.

In my statement, I shall address three aspects of the civil defense problem:

First, the interrelationship between civil defense and military strength;

Second, the contribution of civil defense to deterrence; and
Third, the importance of both active and passive defense

measures.

RELATIONSHIP OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND MILITARY STRENGTH

In regard to the interrelationship between civil defense and military strength it is important to remember that the basic objective of any nation's security policy is to protect its people. Throughout history, nations have relied upon armed might as a primary means to attain such an objective. In warfare, nations almost invariably sought destruction of enemy armed forces for the purpose of forcing enemy capitulation. To facilitate defeat of enemy forces, those parts of an enemy's economy which provided the tools of war were also attacked. It was during World War II, for the first time, that populations, as an essential aspect of a nation's economy, were taken under attack. Today, with both range and destructiveness of weapons vastly increased, a deliberate attack on populations-or the threat of such an attack-might well become the primary means selected by an aggressor to force surrender of his victim. Even if civilian populations were not primary targets, the inadvertent or incidental loss of life among noncombatants in a general war as the result of fallout could achieve unprecedented proportions. Thus, today, all who are charged with national security responsibilities, must give close attention to one of the most elemental of our security objectives-preserving the lives of our people.

There is a very important way in which an effective civil defense program would support our military capabilities. Ultimate victory or defeat in general war would depend upon our ability to recover from the effect of nuclear attack and to conduct such operations as may be necessary to lead to a successful termination of hostilities.

CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO DETERRENCE

As regards the contribution of civil defense to deterrence: The extent to which we have the ability to defend against an attack, particularly the initial attack, or to minimize the effects of an attack, is an essential element of our overall deterrent. Any doubt in the mind of a potential enemy with respect to his capability to deal us a decisive blow makes less likely the possibility that he will initiate a nuclear attack against us. This, then, is the important way in which

civil defense contributes to deterrence. It provides further unmistakable evidence of serious determination on our part.

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSES

Finally, there is the matter of the importance of both active and passive defense measures. An active defense comprises weapon systems and allied communications and early warning systems which can, together, detect, engage, and destroy incoming enemy bombers or missiles.

By "passive measures," I mean civil defense, which is designed to reduce or minimize damage to our civilian population from enemy weapons which penetrate our active defenses. These passive measures, such as a trained population-and I wish to emphasize strongly the importance of such training-fallout shelters properly identified and stocked, identification and warning systems, plus an effective organization for assuring adequate control, are prudent steps to take in the light of the risks our population may be exposed to. Further, Government leadership as evidenced by this program will serve as incentive for an expanding future civil defense effort.

To summarize, civil defense bears an essential relationship to military strength in assuring continued national security.

Čivil defense should be considered an integral part of the overall deterrence.

Finally, the civil defense program presented to you today will serve effectively to complement our active military defense measures and thus provide additional protection to the American people against the dangers of nuclear attack upon this country.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, General Lemnitzer.

It is heartening to the chairman, and I know the members of this subcommittee, to have the assurances and the acknowledgement of many of the principles which we have given over the years in our civil defense reports. It is not gratifying from the standpoint of personal pleasure, but it is gratifying from the standpoint of the fact that it indicates that our studies and our recommendations have been serious ones and sound ones.

And for the Chief of Staff to say this morning that civil defense should be considered an integral part of the overall deterrence of our Nation, and that it has an essential relationship to military strength in assuring continued national security, is to advocate, or to accept the principle which our committee has now been sponsoring since our first major report in 1956.

Now, at this time, we will have questions of the witnesses.
Mr. Kilgore?

STATEMENT OF MR. KILGORE

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my appreciation to that expressed by the chairman and the ranking minority member to the Secretary and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for his statement, and to concur in what the chairman has said, that it is a great deal of satisfaction to this committee to hear this sort of a presentation on civil defense, a very forthright recognition of the interrelation between the operation of the Department of Defense

with respect to an active defense, and the problems relating to the preservation of the population in a passive defense.

It seems to me that these statements constitute a basis on which it could be expected that a very effective civil defense program could be begun and established for the American people. And it is genuinely appreciated to hear this sort of a presentation made. I will defer questions to the staff until a later time.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mrs. Griffiths?

DEFINITIONS OF “ADEQUATE" AND "MINIMUM” SHELTER

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Thank you very much.

I would like to ask you Mr. Secretary-on page 4 you point out "These spaces should be sufficient to give reasonably adequate protection." May I ask you what you consider reasonably adequate protection, under what set of circumstances?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. By "reasonably adequate protection" we mean protection sufficient to prevent loss of life or serious injury to the individuals resulting from fallout during an extensive thermonuclear attack on this Nation.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. On page 5 you point out, "will provide a minimum of shelter for approximately one-fourth of our population." Does that mean under a minimum attack, a maximum attack, a minimum number of people, or a maximum number of people?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The word "minimum" applies to shelter in the sense of a spartan environment. The shelters will be stocked with minimum materials and equipment to permit survival. They will not be stocked with materials and equipment to provide comfort during the period of life in the shelter. We don't plan, for example, auxiliary heating, we don't plan the type of supplies in the way of bedding and other equipment that would provide anything other than the opportunity to survive.

And the word "minimum" connotes that, rather than the size of the attack. The size of the attack that we are presuming here is a large attack.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Would you assume, then, that it will provide a sufficient shelter under a very heavy attack for any of those people who reach the shelter?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It depends on how much radiation they have absorbed prior to the time they have reached the shelter. But assuming that they have absorbed very little, yes.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Under the warning system, do you propose that the warning be given when you have knowledge that an attack is about to be made, or will the warning be given after the attack to take shelter from the fallout?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The warning very probably would be given just shortly before, and I mean within a matter of minutes before the attack, or after the attack.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Under the system that you have set up of marking out the shelters, would the inner city become the most protected place?

IDENTIFIED SHELTER LIKELY TO BE INSIDE CITIES

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can't specifically answer the question. It is probable that the highest percentage of the shelters to be identified and marked would lie within what you might term the inner city.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. So that if the attack occurred at night how many people would you save?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Approximately the same number as we have indicated. In contrast to damage from blast, which occurs simultaneously with detonation, the danger from fallout, as you know, occurs over a period of time, and even in the area immediately surrounding the area damaged by blast, there will be an opportunity to move to a shelter. Time will permit movement of at least 30 minutes duration. In the areas outside of that radius there may be as much as several hours available for movement to a shelter.

REVERSE EVACUATION TO INNER CITIES?

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. And in place of evacuating from a city there will be a rush back to the inner city, is that right?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that evacuation under the circumstances that we are hypothesizing would not be a practical alternative to use of the fallout shelters that we are providing.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. But if the attack occurred at night, in place of the evacuation you are going to have the reverse, they are going to have to rush back from the homes to the city?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They will be going to move back to the shelters, many of which, as you point out, will be in the city.

This program, as I have emphasized, is the first phase of a national program. It would be completed at a later date by other shelter dispersed beyond the limits of the shelter that we will identify and mark and stock in this phase of the program.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Do you think that the rush back to the city would be any more practical than the rush out?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. The rush out from the city is impractical simply because of the time available. The possibilities of obtaining sufficient warning time to permit evacuation are very low, in my opinion. But the possibilities of obtaining time to move into the marked shelters are high, and certainly warrant the very, very low expense of marking and stocking the shelters.

ACCESS TO SHELTERS

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. If the shelters are in a place where the building is not open at night, do you contemplate maintaining the buildings open at night?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We would expect to have access to the shelters. In cases where that is impractical because of lack of access to the shelter or to the building, we would not propose to mark, identify and stock the shelter.