$5 or $6 they get for research and development. Research and development are costly.

Well, civil defense is an area which has been relatively neglected. Furthermore, it is more complicated than a fighter plane by quite a bit. We can afford to spend comparable funds on research and development

in this area.

CIVIL DEFENSE COSTS COMPARED WITH CANCELED WEAPONS

Mr. ROBACK. You say, Mr. Kahn, that the public evaluation of civil defense outlays rates them so much lower than military weapons. Let us observe, for example, that all the money spent by the Federal Government on civil defense in more than a decade is less than the investment in the Navaho, which never became a weapon, or the Snark, which is being phased out after one squadron ?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. So we don't hear anyone moaning and groaning loudly about the Snark. It is written off because of technological circumstances.

But everybody moans and groans about civil defense outlays, asking: "What do we have to show for $600 million expended in a decade?" What, in your opinion, does that attitude reflect?

Mr. KAHN. I think partly a lack of ability just to recognize that these big numbers are not so big. In other words, $600 million looks like a lot of money.

Mr. ROBACK. Does it also reflect the unwillingness of people to face the need for civil defense, the thing you are talking about?

Mr. KAHN. Well, I think that is correct. In other words, when you say you put $1 billion into a Navaho, and it was a good thing that you did, even though you never bought the Navaho, people are willing to believe this notion; they are familiar with the fact that military programs are useful even if expensive.

They think of civil defense as being neither expensive nor useful, so naturally they begrudge the money. There is a real hostility to civil defense on both the right and the left.

This means that any mistakes that are made get played up and exaggerated out of all proportion.

USE OF AVAILABLE DATA

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Kahn, we have had a great deal of work done by the Government in designing various types of shelters. There have been tests out in Nevada, as you know, and work has been done by a great many private engineering corporations.

Now, do you believe that an expensive program of research and development is necessary for the purpose of designing shelters before we start in constructing them, or do you believe there are many types of shelters and many known principles of adaptations in existing cavities which could be used, and a current program embarked upon which would bring into being these shelters for the benefit of the people without a tremendous lag time for additional research and development?

Mr. KAHN. I believe there is absolutely no justification for delaying current procurement because better possibilities may be created

by further research and development. I would say that of all the weapons systems I have ever studied or been familiar with, for example, BMEWS, or other air defense and warning systems, or even SAC offense systems, that we know, comparatively speaking, as much or more about civil defense today as we knew about these other systems when we went ahead with them.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The principles of protection from radioactivity by shielding have been pretty well developed now.

Mr. KAHN. I am sorry, let me go back. I stand corrected, and thank you. In terms of protecting from the weapons effects we know about, and I think, that for our immediate purposes we know much about the relevant ones—we know how to do it today. We can go ahead.

I still want to make the point that every military system today changes rapidly. We can never stop thinking. This thinking usually improves things. One is always sorry 5 years later that he did not think of his current ideas earlier and we have to be willing to live with this prospect.

We cannot in any of these systems say: "I will not go ahead now because I will know how to do it better later. That is always true." I would not like my testimony today to be quoted to the effect that I thought we should hold back because we are going to learn more later. I simply want to point out that we will learn more later— and the sooner the better.

COST OF SHELTER IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think this is a premise that anyone will agree to. We are somewhat concerned about the proposal of the administration to spend $93 million for the purpose of surveying and identifying and marking shelters.

Without going into a detailed study of it, it seems to some of us as if this is a program which might not cost as much as this, and also a program where criteria could be set up so that people at the local level could make their own surveys. This is the place where I think you could get a great deal of cooperation from civil defense organizations through volunteer help, providing they had the proper criteria to use in identifying shelter spaces and marking them and reporting them to a central point.

Mr. KAHN. I am willing to believe that if you spread the program over 2 or 3 years you could do it a lot cheaper. I think that is what your suggestion would really amount to, sir.

However, I believe that the identifying, counting, and labeling program is the kind of program that ought to be done in 1 year. We actually suggested such a program in late 1957 and early 1958, for implementation in 1959. We added that it ought to be in by 1960 because it might be partly obsolete by 1963 or 1964. While this last is perhaps too negative, the program is still of the kind one ought to do in a hurry. The fact that you would save $30 or $40 million by doing it more slowly does not impress me. I am a taxpayer, but I feel it is a very small sum compared to the benefits of rapid action.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In other words, you feel if such a program is embarked upon energetically, that in relation to the time, the circum

stances we are living in and the possible hazards, and the possible benefits, that we get out of it, that this expenditure would be justified?

Mr. KAHN. I think it is one of the most justified expenditures I have ever heard of. It should have been done in the mid-1950's.

The only objection one can have for this expenditure is that it will be used as a substitute for other things.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Used as what?

Mr. KAHN. A substitute for other things. In other words, this is a thing which is very much worth doing.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. But it is not the only thing worth doing.

Mr. KAHN. That is right, not the only thing worth doing. There is always a tendency to do things sequentially, and that should be resisted. I am myself not in favor of extremely large and by large I mean over $5 billion a year—

CIVIL DEFENSE COSTS AND THE ARMS RACE

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me understand you-you talk fast, and I have a little bit of difficulty because of the acoustics here.

You say you would not advocate a system that would be at a cost of over $5 billion a year?

Mr. KAHN. That is right.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me put it the other way: "Would you advocate a system that would cost $5 billion a year for a period of say, 4 or 5 years?

Mr. KAHN. I would recommend something between $1 to $5 billion a year, depending on the international situation, and I probably prefer something closer to $1 than to $5 billion. The reason for this is not because I could not justify more than $5 billion a year; as a military analyst, I think I could.

However, I take the arms race arguments very seriously. I think if we went into a big program we would find Soviet reactions which we would be sorry to have touched off.

In this sense I agree with the people who worry about civil defense accelerating the arms race. I just draw the line at a different place. Programs of $1, $2, or $3 billion a year, I would suggest, are not so startlingly different from what we have done in the past, and are not so scary that they would really accelerate the arms race unduly, while their effectiveness is really quite large. This is the kind of thing I would be in favor of.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Would you believe that, let us call it for want of something else, a 4- or 5-year plan should be given to the American people in order that they would know that a modest step at this time was the first of a series of steps, or do you think that this program should be presented on a very modest scale this year, and then another one the second year, and another one the third, and so forth?

Mr. KAHN. I think if you make the decision to go ahead with this 5-year program you should go ahead now, but I think the position of the administration, and I say this as an outsider, is that they have not made the decision.

They literally do not know today, if this $200 million program for fiscal 1962 is adopted, whether it will peter out into a $100 million a

year program or go to many billions a year. This uncertainty will continue until they have made their decisions.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. What type of studies do you feel the administration can make which will be of benefit?

Mr. KAHN. Basically they have to make up their own minds on how they wish to trade between deterrence of the normal sort, and the extent they wish to be able to alleviate the consequences if a war occurs. These are different things, and to some extent, but not completely, the money is competitive. In addition, many of the administration advisers are deeply concerned about the arms race.

By and large, the arms race issues are more important to these advisers than the money question. Some of these advisers, to put it mildly, are very dubious about doing anything which would tend to accelerate the arms race.

On the other hand, they have a responsibility for protecting the people of the United States if a war occurs.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Notwithstanding your feelings about extending the arms race, they have now been provided with $3.5 billion more which is an acceleration of roughly 7 percent.

Mr. KAHN. Yes. This is what I mean by the international situation. If the Berlin situation deteriorates into violence or a more extreme animosity than we have today, I would assume the administration would go ahead with an adequate civil defense program.

If the Berlin crisis were settled peacefully I would suggest there would be a good chance they would not. I think it would depend on this kind of thing.

RESPONSE TO CRISES

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Do you think we should look at these matters on the basis of periodic crises which are always in the hands of the other side? They can make one-Quemoy and Matsu at one time, and then make another one in Laos, make another one at Berlin, and make another one in South America next year-in other words, these periodic crises are in the hands of our opponents and shall we respond with a well-thought-out, long-range plan to strengthen our Nation, to put us in a position where we not only can take care of the Berlin crisis but we can take care of future hot spots which may be developed by our opponents?

Mr. KAHN. I think I would answer that yes and no; that is, to the extent that we get into modest programs, and I would call $1 or $2 billion a year modest, that should be independent of crises. Programs of this size are simply being competent about your military preparations.

To the extent that we go into larger programs, for example, at RAND we looked at a program where we spent $50 billion in 1 year, well this is done only in reaction to a crisis. Let me remind the Chair about the Korean situation.

In June 1950 there was a great debate in the United States as to whether the budget should be $14 billion, $15 billion or $16 billion. In that same month, the North Koreans marched into South Korea, and Congress authorized $60 billion. That authorization represented an enormous military defeat to the Communist bloc because even if they won in Korea the military balance had shifted against them. In addition, they were forced to increase their own budgets in response.

In that sense, Korea cost the Communists tens of billions of dollars. They probably learned a lesson. I hope that if the United States is ever humiliated, that even if we do not resist by going to all-out war, that we will, at least, mobilize, and that will be bad for them.

To that extent I think we should be willing to let our program react to their moves.

But I would like to repeat, when it gets down to a modest program, modest in the context of an overall $45 billion budget, for example, $1 or $2 billion a year for civil defense, this seems to me such an urgent need that it should be carried through irrespective of the international situation, arms control, friendliness or enmity. This is simply being competent about our military preparations. But this is a question of size.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It is also a question of setting up a well-defined plan and a goal for accomplishment.

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And taking orderly steps toward that goal. Mr. KAHN. Absolutely.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Rather than to respond in emotional ways to a crisis created by the other man at his will.

Mr. KAHN. I think that is right. We do not have to have an epidemic before we pay attention to our sewers. We do it as a public health measure. We also try to prevent epidemics. To a great extent our miltiary programs should be of that sort.

I also believe that we should be prepared to go into an accelerated mobilization if the Soviets ever do anything that makes that desirable. In other words, we should have two complementary military programs, a basis for mobilization and a normal competent, everyday establishment which is necessary for the security of the country, but is not so excessive as to put undue pressure on the Soviets. You want to put some pressure on them. They are not being very friendly to you, you have to retaliate.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Do you know of any studies contemplated by the administration at this time which seek to set up this type of thinking? Mr. KAHN. I have a little problem. As a member of the Hudson Institute I am trying to persuade the administration to give me a contract to do that study.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will withdraw the question. [Laughter.]
Mrs. Griffiths, do you have any questions?

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Chairman, the only thing that has ever-not the only thing, but the thing that bothers me most completely about this whole program is that if an attack ever occurs, in my opinion, there will be millions survive who will die shortly thereafter because there has been no information given on how to survive, and some of those people could have survived on their own if they had just been told what to do.

Mr. KAHN. I think this is right, and I think this will be corrected though as soon as they go into a program.

It is difficult to educate people to take civil defense seriously if the Government itself does not take it seriously. The most urgent thing the Government can do in the educational area is to do something in