the noneducational area. Then the people will educate themselves if, in addition, the Government makes the information available. While we do not believe in elaborate training of the mass of the population, we do believe that there should be a cadre of something between 50,000 and 100,000 trained civil defense people. We have not done enough work to pin the figure down any closer. This trained cadre of civil defense people might be volunteers and be treated much like reservists. For example, they might take a 2-week course. If this is done then every community will have trained and maybe uniformed people available, in addition to the full-time people. In addition, we might have 5 to 10 times as many people signed up as a volunteer unorganized reserve. These last would not take the formal 2-week course, but they would be assigned to tasks and responsibilities and in addition, presumably, have read the manuals. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. The greatest problem of the civil defense people is that they themselves do not have the information. They do not exactly understand what they are protecting against. Mr. KAHN. They cannot have all the information. If you were to ask me do I understand all of these problems, I would say "No," and I work on them very hard. But I would say the civil defense people have more information than they are usually given credit for. It is like anything else. Whenever you see the weaknesses you notice it very sharply. You do not notice the strength. It is harder to notice. But I agree with you there are serious weaknesses which must be corrected, and will be if the Government goes ahead. Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think most of the professional civil defense people have had access to the voluminous hearings and reports of this committee. Mr. KAHN. Yes. Mr. HOLIFIELD. And I think, without any undue immodesty we can say that in those hearings and in those reports there is a compilation of information for them to use if they want to use it, and if they want to study the problems, because we spent a great many hundred hours trying to bring reputable witnesses before us and their testimonies are all contained in these hearings and reports. CIVIL DEFENSE STUDIES Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kahn made a comment in his book about these hearings. The gist of it was that while the committee had developed information about immediate survival needs, with which they seemed to be concerned, they did not give sufficient attention to the long-range problems. Of course, there was not much of that type of information available, but I wonder if Mr. Kahn would comment about how he characterized our efforts. Mr. KAHN. Let me answer that frankly. Mr. ROBACK. Of course. Mr. KAHN. I think that this committee has really done a very impressive job in civil defense, not only for the laymen but for the experts. You have gathered together the information and stimulated the production of new information. However, one simply cannot do an overall study through a committee hearing. There is a role for organizations like the RAND Corp. Mr. ROBACK. You recognize, Mr. Kahn, when a committee gets interested, frequently the agencies or others get interested-even the RAND Corp. Mr. KAHN. I not only recognize it, I respond. [Laughter.] Mr. ROBACK. You also recognize that it would have been a kind of mistake to emphasize long-range recovery problems rather than the immediate survival problem as the first basis of study. Mr. KAHN. I want to apologize. I do not believe, if I remember the testimony, that you missed the long-range problems. I think this was often mentioned in your hearings. The problem was that in spite of your urging, the interest was not stimulated. I notice Sidney Winter just came in. He has been looking over the RAND Civil Defense Study. He recently gave a critique in which he said, "That was fine for 1957, but what have you done in the last 4 years?" He is right, we did not push it as hard as we should have. Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think this committee realized that the problems of postwar rehabilitation and recuperation were a tremendous field itself, and had to be looked at; but we put first things first. We did try to do as good a job as we could do with our limited facilities, our appropriations and the numbers we had on the staff, doing what we thought had to be done first, which really was to bring attention to this subject and get recognition at the top level that there was such a thing as a new type of hazard and a new type of war that could occur. I notice in your comments and in your book you did say that we did an impressive technical job of gathering together much valuable information, and that you did state we were preoccupied with the shortterm survival problem. I think this is true. I think we, of necessity, had to take the initial problem of immediate survival in case of attack first, and we did spend a great deal of time on that in order to get the first step, you might say, accepted at top level. Now, after some 5 or 6 years, that recognition has been given at the top level of our Government. Mr. KAHN. Yes. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Once those facts we were anxious to have accepted, have been accepted, it now becomes, I would think a responsibility of the Federal Government to direct enough research and study to all of the facets of survival in the case of nuclear war. This committee from time to time possibly can help the developing of some of the additional steps. But, first, we are still very much concerned with being sure that we are embarking upon a solid program under that new recognition that we have, and that it is an adequate program under the circumstances, and in the priority position in which it happens to be, along with the other needs for national defense and survival. Mr. KAHN. Well, I would like, in fact, to repeat what you have just said. Anybody who works in this field cannot ignore or underestimate the contribution that this committee made. These hearings are the bibles. When you want information you open up your committee hearings. I think we have ordered dozens of copies which we have given to our people, and they use it every day. However, it is the responsibility of the Federal Government, not this committee to initiate programs for civil defense. When they fall down you prod them, and what I am suggesting is that you continue to prod them. Mr. HOLIFIELID. We are going to have to adjourn pretty soon. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will start promptly at 10 a.m. in this room, and go into the question with these other witnesses. (Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, August 8, 1961.) CIVIL DEFENSE-1961 TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1961 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 1302, New House Office Building, Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Chet Holifield, Martha W. Griffiths, R. Walter Riehlman, and F. Bradford Morse. Also present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Earl J. Morgan, chief investigator; Paul Ridgley, and Robert McElroy, investigators; and Douglas Dahlin, staff attorney. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order. The subcommittee will continue its hearings this morning. Our first witness is Mr. Norman Hanunian, economist for the RAND Corp. Mr. Hanunian. STATEMENT OF NORMAN A. HANUNIAN, ECONOMIST, RAND CORP. Mr. HANUNIAN. My discussion today is based on work I have been doing for the RAND Corp. However, the views I shall express are personal ones, not necessarily those of the corporation. Some years ago, when I first began making estimates of the damage that might result from nuclear attacks, residual radiation-that is, fallout radiation-was no more than a worrisome side effect. It was, to be sure, even then a proper subject for concern in connection with weapons testing. By peacetime standards, even the small amounts of activity gen. erated when kiloton yield weapons are tested are of enough moment to justify the imposition of careful controls. But in the context of full-scale warfare, fallout from the weapons of that time was relatively insignificant. FALLOUT IS A MAJOR THREAT With the development of the H-bomb, however, it became clear that fallout had the potential of becoming the principal hazard from nuclear attacks. Not only did the H-bomb vastly increase the abso |