FIGURE NH-5.-TOTAL DEATHS RESULTING FROM ATTACKS ON CONUS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS The various attacks are arrayed along the base here. Notice that all the attacks are alike in that they involve delivery of 3,000 megatons total yield. The two clusters of bars at the right represent the outcome to be expected if the attacker uses surface bursts exclusively, that is, this cluster of bars, and this one. The two clusters of bars-I am sorry; I mean to say that one of the two clusters in each pair relates to an attack allocated principally to missile sites. The other principally to other military installations. Within each cluster the four bars capped in different colors show how the population fares under the four different civil defense assumptions that I have described. The shaded сар, the colored cap, on each bar reflects the extent of uncertainty in outcome deriving from those same two weapons characteristics I have referred to before: the fission fraction, and the radioactivity level. It is when the attacker uses surface bursts exclusively (the two clusters of bars at the right of fig. NH-5) but especially when he directs his attack mainly to military installations other than missile sites-it is in these cases that we find maximum fatalities, and this is true whichever civil defense assumption we use. Notice how a shift of the attack to/from missile sites other than military installations reduces the level of the fatalities. Turning our attention now to the other clusters, the other pair of clusters, we see that fatalities are lower still if airbursts are used against some of the targets. Shelters are, however, nonetheless very helpful in further reducing population loss; there is a substantial falloff, as you see. Now, with some weapons being airburst, it is when the brunt of the attack is delivered to ICBM sites that fatalities are heavier. When surface bursts are used universally, it is the other way around. The explanation is not hard to uncover. Other things being equal, we should expect that an attack directed mainly at our missile sites would produce relatively few deaths. These sites are mostly in sparsely populated areas, so there are fewer people nearby to be affected, especially by fallout. And this is what the chart, the righthand half of figure NH-5, shows. It is the opposite half, the left-hand half, that needs explaining. Here the shift in the direction of attack is accompanied by another shift; other things are not equal. I have assumed (plausibly, I think) that the Soviets would use surface bursts against sites that are hard, and missile sites are virtually the only hard targets. Thus this pair of clusters at the left reflects more extensive use of surface bursts, along with the shift to heavier emphasis on attacking ICBM sites. The result is that much more radioactive material has been deposited in the United States, and the fatality levels are consequently higher. ESTIMATES FOR 10,000 AND 30,000 MEGATON ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES The final charts, identically arranged, reveal that a similar variability and similar progression of results obtain in the face of much larger attacks in attacks delivering 10,000 megatons and higher. Fatalities, of course, are naturally higher with the higher yield. (See figs. NH-6 and NH-7.) DECISIONS CAN SOFTEN APPALLING EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR Well, to sum up, it is evident, I think, that the outcomes of future attacks are anything but precisely predictable. Fallout could create overwhelming disaster, but it might not. Whether it would depends to some extent on factors we have not examined today-on wind, for example. But it depends most importantly on the kind of war that the potential combatants may be prepared to fight. We have noted, in particular, how it depends on certain Soviet decisions: on whether they would attack cities; on whether they would use surface bursts exclusively; on whether the yields (particularly the fission yields) of the weapons of their stockpile are high or low; and on the extent to which they expand their stockpile of weapons. We have also noted the dependence on certain decisions of ours: on the defenses we chose to prepare, both active defenses and passive ones; and on our basing posture. The outcome of a nuclear war would undoubtedly be appalling in any case, but it is possible to meliorate the anticipated effects in some degree. That is all I meant to say. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you. Mr. Roback. WITNESS' VIEW OF MISSILE SITING POLICIES Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Hanunian, do I understand your chart analysis to support the proposition that the missile siting, in effect, draws off hazards from heavily concentrated areas? Mr. HANUNIAN. On a regional basis it does this, yes. Mr. ROBACK. On a regional basis. In any given area there might be a problem as to base siting, but from a national standpoint the siting actually is a magnet which draws hazards away from other areas, assuming Mr. HANUNIAN. Assuming the Soviets would want to attack them. Mr. ROBACK. Yes. Mr. HANUNIAN. As a matter of fact, if you consider the population densities of the country, you find that they are much lower in the vicinity of our ICBM sites than they are elsewhere. Now, it would not be fair to consider the average population density of the United States-this is 60 persons a square mile or thereabouts because, after all, no one could consider putting any missile sites in the middle of large cities; certainly, there has not been any emphasis on placing missile sites in the most densely populated locales. But even if we consider abstracting from the metropolitan populations, if we consider the average density of that part of the population that does not live in the large urbanized areas (say 200, 220, something like that, of the largest urbanized areas) you find that the rest of the population-the population outside of those areas-is more densely settled on the average than is the population located very close to the missile sites. The average population density outside those urbanized areas is less than 30 persons per square mile-28, actually, in 1960. But the average population density within 18 miles let me give you the figure |