Mr. HOLIFIELD. So the development of backyard shelters buried 3 feet underground, which we oridinarily term "radioactive fallout shelters", would indeed give a great deal of blast protection? Mr. STROPE. There is an extensive history of testing of these types against blast, which is in the literature, and if attention is given to the proper design of these types of structure, your statement is entirely correct. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask how far away from the blast would you have to be for a basement, for the ordinary basement, to protect you? Mr. STROPE. That is a difficult question to answer. I think that for the ordinary home, the problem of fires is more serious than blast, and this occurs at very long range. The fire problem of a shelter in the basement of a burning building is very serious. I would have to consult the data to answer that question directly. I do not recall it. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. And from blast, fire, and fallout. Mr. STROPE. Yes, I will give you that information. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Thank you. (The information referred to follows:) BASEMENT SHELTER PROTECTION According to "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," a normal well-built basement offers a considerable amount of protection against the effects of thermal radiation, blast, and fallout. Protection against the initial thermal radiation is of course complete, outside the fireball. However, should a fire storm occur, or should the house itself be ignited by thermal radiation, such a retreat would have to be evacuated immediately. (Newly painted white framehouses with no incendiary litter have withstood thermal exposures of up to 25 cal/cm2. Such exposures would occur from a 1-megaton airburst at ranges up to 5 miles, and from a 1-megaton surface burst at ranges up to 3 miles. If homes are not wellkept or if incendiary litter such as newspapers, and other trash are exposed, fires may be expected 5 or more miles away from a 1-megaton surface detonation.) For single-family houses of light construction, a well-built basement is likely to remain unpenetrated, even if the house is completely destroyed. For buildings of heavier construction (e.g., steel and concrete), the basement of a building lying beyond the crater radius offers very nearly complete protection against blast, even in regions where the building itself may be destroyed. The basement of a framehouse will attenuate fallout radiation by about a factor of 10 (and the initial radiation somewhat less than this). In summary, a normal basement provides good protection against the immediate effects of a 1-megaton surface burst beyond about 5 miles. The protection afforded against fallout, however, is not sufficient if the basement is in the heavy fallout area downwind of the detonation. Mr. STROPE. Both protective and operational criteria were developed as a basis for design and costing, and were considered as subject to test and possible modification upon availability of the prototype, and this is exactly what happened. That is, we tested whether this 24-hour closure against fire was necessary, and I will recount the results in a moment, but these were our considerations at the beginning of the program. BASIC NRDL SHELTER DESIGN The design study evolved a shelter that is, I think, familiar to this committee from previous testimony, but I have included in the document a sketch of the shelter. (See fig. S-1.) The basic concept employs a buried, flexible-steel-arch structure, 25 feet wide by 48 feet long, that is furnished and equipped to maintain the life and basic health of 100 people for a period of 14 days. It is designed to provide protection against initial radiation, radioactive fallout, air blast and mass fires from nuclear attack. DETAILED COST STUDIES In the main, the protective features of the shelter were based on experiments conducted at Operation Plumbbob at the Nevada Proving Ground in 1957. An important aspect of the design concept was the inclusion of alternative characteristics within the basic performance criteria to establish marginal costs of providing various degrees of protection or creature comforts. What I mean by marginal costs is the incremental cost of making some particular improvement. To accomplish this aspect, the design was divided into eight groups, called packages, each having to do with a major component of the shelter or its construction. Within each group, a number of alternative packages were designed, each having certain performance characteristics and an associated cost. These packages are summarized in table S-1. (See p. 241.) I prepared them also on a chart. I do not expect you to study it carefully, but there was a basic shelter package, an entrance package, a ventilation package, a hotel package, a control package, auxiliary power package, a fire protection package, and an installation package. The installation package, for example, was the cost of digging the hole, building the shelter in the hole, and covering it back up. Within each one of these packages were alternative packages, each giving certain performance characteristics. If I can take the ventilation package as an example, there are eight possibilities. You may choose any one you wish in making up a shelter out of these packages. The first four that I have listed are protected against a 10-poundper-square-inch blast; and the second four are identical except they are protected against 35 pounds per square inch. By comparing two comparable ones you can see the cost in the ventilation package of achieving this protection. Within the first four, there are two that have low capacity ventilation, that is, just enough to meet the basic criteria. There are also those with high capacity ventilation which offers a comfortable environment rather than a minimal, habitable environment, and by comparing the costs you can see what the cost of being comfortable is in a shelter. In the same way, there are alternatives of either no filter or filtered air, so that one can see the cost of providing filtration of air; so that you can pick either the degree of blast protection, the capacity of the system, and whether you want filtered or unfiltered air in the packages. Other packages were of a similar nature, in exploring a range of choices, which all fell within the basic criteria but would permit a little better understanding of the costs associated with doing it in various ways. There were nine hotel packages, for example, which offered a choice of either one- two- or three-shift sleeping accommodations, at three levels of austerity in lighting, food-serving, sanitation, and the like. The inclusion of a fire protection package would provide 24-hour closure capability, and thus by proper choice of individual packages a large number of shelters, each having somewhat different performance characteristics and associated costs, could be considered. All would, of course, have the same general appearance of the shelter in figure S-1. To a lay observer, they would look alike. Now, as to costs, which is an important point, the cost estimated in the design study are given in table S-1. TABLE S-1.-Summary of packages and costs V-1A. V-1B. V-1C. V-1D V-2A. V-2B. V-2C. V-2D H-1A. 10 pounds per square inch (buried or semiburied). VENTILATION PACKAGES 10 pounds per square inch; low-capacity; no filter. HOTEL PACKAGES Most austere 1-shift sleeper.. 1, 193 1,105 1,229 1,408 1, 135 1,294 H-2B. H-2C. H-3C. It will be noted that we attempted to estimate costs both for a single prototype and for the construction of large numbers of shelters. There are single and mass-purchased columns of figures. The costs we use here are not the total costs. It does not include costs of administration, profit and overhead, contingency reserves and the like and, hence, it is meant in the way that the term "costs" is used in the cost-plus-fixed-fee type of contract. So you have to look at these costs and then add on an amount that would be determined by the way you organize the program. This is a matter over which I have no control, so I can just estimate things that I understand. RANGE OF $103 TO $163 COST PER PERSON Also, land costs are not included. Otherwise the costs given represent estimated 1958 costs in the San Francisco area. The lowest cost shelter that you can contrive from these various packages was estimated to cost $103 per person sheltered if large numbers of such shelters were built. This shelter provides adequate fallout protection (a reduction factor of 10,000). It has no special fire storm protection and no auxiliary power. It has 10 pounds per square inch blast protection, incidentally. It also has no ability to house for a full 2 weeks more than the rated capacity of 100 people since the ventiliation and hotel arrangements are minimal. The highest cost shelter produced by the study was estimated to cost about $163 per person sheltered if a large program were undertaken. This shelter would offer adequate fallout protection, fire storm protection, and 35 pounds per square inch blast protection. Adequate auxiliary power and complete control and communications equipment are provided. The high-capacity ventilation system and the least austere hotel package would permit the shelter to house 200 people, if overloading the shelter were necessary. In other words, there is a capability here for 100-percent overload, if needed; and with some minor changes it was this shelter, the big shelter, so to speak, that was subsequently built. In February 1959, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization provided funds for construction of a prototype shelter with the objective of checking the costs given in the design study. A contract was let in June 1959 and construction commenced at Camp Parks, Calif., in July 1959. The shelter was completed in mid-August 1959. Typical views of the prototype shelter are shown in figures S-2, S−3, and S-4. A more complete description of this shelter was included in the record of hearings before this subcommittee in March 1960. |