These data are still under analysis, but it can be said that the experi

ment was very successful in resolving problems of infant and child

care.

From the 3 experiments conducted, it is believed that enough shelter management experience has been obtained to form the basis for instruction and training. It is our opinion that properly trained leadership is only secondary to having an adequate shelter in the first place.

I would like to discuss briefly the protective experiments that have been accomplished.

"FIRESTORM" EXPERIMENT

One of the protective criteria imposed in the original design study was a capability for closure to the outside atmosphere for a period of 24 hours. This requirement was based on conflicting data from the mass fires set by air attack in World War II in which many people lost their lives in shelters in the fire areas. The greatest number of deaths occurred in basements or makeshift shelters. Since the shelter under consideration in this program is intended to be placed in open areas (school playgrounds, for example), it was not clear whether

closure was necessary. To study this problem, a large instrumented burn was created around the shelter in April 1960. The experiment was done in cooperation with the Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station of the U.S. Forest Service. For the burn, about 300 tons of fuel (waste from demolished buildings) were stacked in a 4-acre plot around this shelter, in an arrangement simulating fuel distribution in a densely populated area of single-story dwellings. A view of this burn is provided in figure S-11.

FIGURE S-11.-FIRESTORM-REPUTED TO BE THE LARGEST MAN-MADE FIRE EVER SET FOR A RESEARCH PROJECT. OPERATION FIRESTORM TOOK PLACE AT CAMP PARKS ON APRIL 15, 1960. THE FIRE COVERED AN AREA ABOVE AND SURROUNDING THE SHELTER TO FIND OUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO EXPOSED PORTIONS OF THE SHELTER AND HOW MUCH HEAT WOULD REGISTER INSIDE.

The shelter vents were open during this burn although the ventilation blower was not operated. One hundred simulated occupants were placed in the shelter to provide proper conditions for gravity ventilation; in other words, we were under natural ventilation during this experiment.

The results of the burn were that, although high temperatures and high concentrations of carbon-monoxide were observed outside the shelter, negligible changes in environment occurred within the shelter. The data suggest that whereas fire hazards would be very severe for shelters within combustible buildings, the separations anticipated for the USNRDL experimental shelter would make closure

unnecessary.

RADIATION SHIELDING EXPERIMENT

In September 1960, a radiation-source experiment was conducted by staff members of USNRDL at the experimental shelter for the purpose of prooftesting the adequacy of the shelter entrance and exhaust ventilator in shielding the interior of the shelter from radiation. from fallout on the ground outside. A hose-source device developed by Technical Operations, Inc., and mentioned in previous testimony by Mr. Corsbie, was used, in which a radiation source was pumped through a long hose layed in a pattern over the shelter to simulate the fallout radiation field. The experiment showed that the reduction factor at the interior shelter door was about 10,000. The data are being analyzed further by Technical Operations, Inc., under contract to USNRDL.

TESTS ON NEED FOR AIR FILTERS

Another uncertainty in the protective aspects of the shelter has to do with the question of whether it is necessary to filter the ventilation air to prevent fallout particles from entering the shelter. All weapons test data, including that obtained in a similar shelter at Operation Plumbbob, suggest that filtration is not necessary, but the conditions of test were not completely realistic. To get further information, the existence of a large-scale fallout-simulant production facility at Camp Parks is being exploited. This facility, developed by USNRDL for decontamination studies, produces large amounts of material incorporating a radioactive tracer and possessing all of the physical characteristics of fallout from large-yield weapons. An enclosing tower has been constructed over the shelter entrance, from the top of which simulated fallout will be dropped so as to arrive at the intake ventilators in a realistic way. The degree to which the fallout particles penetrate the ventilation system and arrive in the living area will be determined. This experiment is ongoing at the present time.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK

I would like to summarize our situation as follows: The costs of the USNRDL shelter research program, including the construction of the prototype shelter, have been about $150,000 over the past 22 years. The work has produced a fund of valuable information on shelter design and outfitting that is directly applicable not only to the construction of group shelters of the type considered but also to the stocking of protected spaces in existing buildings. The program has developed the only confirmed cost data available, to our knowledge, on group shelters in the United States today. These data have shown that single-purpose fallout shelters can be constructed for less than $100 per person sheltered. Human occupancy experiments in the shelter have established the management experience

necessary to develop shelter organization and training programs. Much of the data collected to date is still to be analyzed, evaluated, and applied to further improvements or cost reduction. At this point it is well to recognize that savings of a dollar per person sheltered would be multiplied by the total population sheltered in a national program. A number of areas where work is still to be done have been mentioned in previous sections. In addition, more work is needed in the application of alternative materials in construction of the shelter and its equipment, in the design of larger complexes of shelters and in the production engineering of many of the shelter components. Experience to date suggests that if a vigorous research and development effort were initiated, a standardized fallout shelter could be mass produced, completely stocked and outfitted, at a cost approaching $50 per person sheltered. The costs would, of course, depend on the protective and operational features incorporated.

That concludes my prepared testimony.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS (presiding). Thank you very much.

Would you like to ask some questions first, Mr. Riehlman, or would you, Mr. Roback?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Roback.

NATIONAL PROGRAM COST BASED ON NRDL SHELTER

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Strope, will you translate those figures into a national estimate, that is, some concept of what a total cost of the program would be?

Mr. STROPE. If we can reach $50 a person sheltered, which I regard as a reasonable objective of a research and development program in this area, and multiply this by 200 million shelter places-this assumes everybody gets this sort of shelter-the cost then is $10 billion.

But I recall to you that these costs are the base costs on which the costs of administration and profit and so forth must be placed so, perhaps, one might estimate $12 billion as something that is reasonable to expect.

To the extent that shelter in existing structure can contribute by cutting down the number of these shelters that would have to be built, the cost could be less.

COMMENT ON CURRENT PROGRAM

Mr. ROBACK. May we ask what your understanding is of the role of group shelters in the program announced by the administration and, secondly, your evaluation of that program generally?

Mr. STROPE. As I understand the program, I consider it quite reasonable. It is, I think, to be regarded as a first step and not as a single program for all time.

If I may recall my testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which held hearings on the 22d to 26th of June 1959, on page 695 of the record of those hearings you will find the following paragraph which I stated at that time:

Another course of action that has considerable merit would be to exploit only the best protected areas of existing structure, that is, better than a factor of a hundred, supplementing these with the necessary new construction to house the

total population. The cost of such action would lie between $5 and $20 billion depending upon the portion of the population that could be sheltered in existing structures.

Since that statement, having conducted enough research in the experimental shelter, I now believe that the costs that I stated at that time could be materially reduced.

I will now say that $12 billion may very well do it, particularly if a sensible research and development program accompanies this effort. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. But it is for $12 billion, which is about 25 percent of this year's defense budget, and you would buy a defense that positively worked as opposed to the defense that most probably will fail. Mr. STROPE. That is a broad statement. There are other programs that should be considered.

This program that we are talking about would protect against fallout. Well, it would also protect against 10-pounds-per-square-inch blast, but you may want to consider others, additionally.

But in the spirit of the way you said it, I agree.

Mr. ROBACK. Your discussion about blast value presupposes underground shelters in all cases.

Mr. STROPE. I consider that I am competent to discuss only the type of shelter I have been working with. That is the only one I have had time to consider seriously. I understand it well, and I do not feel that I understand the other possibilities well.

RESERVING EXPOSURE FOR POSTSHELTER PHASE

Mr. ROBACK. In your presentation you have emphasized that getting protection of people is only one phase, and not the end of an important job of recovery operations and survival.

Mr. STROPE. That is right. I have not covered recovery operations. I believe that a subsequent witness will talk about this.

The only place I considered the recovery problem was where I pointed out that I prefer to reserve any significant exposure of the people to radiation until after they come out of shelters because I regard that period as the critical phase in getting started.

I would not like to have them absorb considerable amounts of radiation while in the shelter.

Mr. ROBACK. In other words, if you stint on the protective phase, shelter-protective phase, you do not have any leverage for recovery operations.

Mr. STROPE. Well, obviously you cannot rob Peter to pay Paul continuously.

Mr. ROBACK. Now, Madam Chairman, in connection with Mr. Strope's testimony, which was given as an expert on his own rather than as an official of the Navy, it is a fact that his commanding officer is here, and Mr. Holifield wanted to say a few words and ask one or two questions of Capt. Eli B. Roth.

May I read this brief statement in Mr. Holifield's absence?
Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Yes, indeed.

Mr. ROBACK. Will you come forward, Captain Roth.

I am now speaking the chairman's words:

Captain Roth, we are happy to welcome you here today. I would like to say at this time that the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, of which you are presently the commanding officer, has rendered great service to this country in