the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare should be more expert in medical stockpile responsibilities, and that sort of thing. Now, in the delegation of these functions, are they going to be closely supervised and coordinated, and are they going to be under the direct power of the President?

Secretary MCNAMARA. To the extent that the functions that are delegated are closely related to the items for which we bear responsibility, we propose to coordinate them and review them and monitor them ourselves.

To the extent that the functions that are delegated are not associated with our responsibility, I presume that the Office of Emergency Planning will wish to review the delegations, monitor them, and coordinate them.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Someone is going to have to look over the whole program of delegated functions and supervise and coordinate that. It would seem likely to me that the Office of Emergency Planning would not only be looking at what you are doing, but would look at what the Department of Agriculture is doing under their assigned delegation, and present the overall picture to the President, and then if the picture needed changing the President by order to his line of authority could see that it was changed.

Is that your general concept of it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes; with this qualification, that insofar as the delegated functions relate to the specific functions assigned to the Department of Defense, we in the Department of Defense would assume the responsibility to monitor the delegation to assure that, under the terms of the delegation, action was being taken which would complement and support the programs that we are responsible for. To the extent that the delegations to the other departments are not related to our responsibilities, I believe that the Office of Emergency Planning would carry out that function.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right. What if the other Departments say the same thing? And that is exactly what they said before. They said, "we are performing our functions all right, leave us alone." Don't you think that the Office of Emergency Planning should stand as the evaluator of the overall program, including the discharge of your responsibilities, and as the

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And as the one agency that would report to the President on the way the program is moving?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I think that section 2, paragraph (a), sub (1) provides specifically for that in the President's Executive order.

FUNDING OF DELEGATED FUNCTIONS

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Who will fund the delegation when a function is delegated to one of the departments, who will furnish the funds? Will there be a transfer of funds from your Department?

Secretary MCNAMARA. If it is a delegation of an action that relates specifically to one of the programs that we are carrying out, I believe that we would fund it.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Riehlman.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF MR. YARMOLINSKY

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Along that line, Mr. Secretary, could I ask this question?

You will have a civilian in your office to whom you will delegate this authority. And today you have spoken about Mr. Yarmolinsky. Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. And in turn he will have the responsibility of carrying out this delegation through these different departments, am I correct in that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Now, what type of a staff will he be furnished with? Secretary MCNAMARA. He will have the staff that will be made up of several hundred people. I mentioned approximately 1,000 that would be transferred from OCDM.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. And he will have the responsibility of screening those people as they come over?

Secretary MCNAMARA. He will have the responsibility of accepting them and operating with them, and as time permits, appraising their abilities just as we appraise the abilities of others in the Department in making changes that appear necessary.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. And do you anticipate that you are going to have, did I understand, a thousand people coming in?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Approximately 1,000, I believe.

Mr. RIEHLMAN, And they will be under his jurisdiction?
Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. And I repeat, he will be responsible with this staff to follow out the delegation to the other departments which are listed in your statement here this morning.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, insofar as they relate to the assignment of responsibility to the Defense Department, yes.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I wonder if it would be well to have the background and the experience of the Secretary's assistant for the record here.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be happy to insert that for the record, please.

(The information referred to is as follows :)

Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky, the special assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, was born in New York City in 1922 and received his A.B. degree from Harvard in 1943. Following service in the Army Air Force from 1943 to 1946, Mr. Yarmolinsky received his LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1948. He served as law clerk for Judge Charles E. Clark, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1948-49, and was in law practice with Root, Ballentine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer in 1949-50; was law clerk for Justice Stanley F. Reed, U.S. Supreme Court, in 1950-51 and in law practice with Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Ball from 1951 to 1955. Mr. Yarmolinsky was director of the Washington office and later secretary of the Fund for the Republic between 1955 and 1957, following which he was public affairs editor for Doubleday & Co. until 1959. From 1959 to his appointment in the Department of Defense on January 24, 1961, Mr. Yarmolinsky served as lawyer and consultant to philanthropic foundations.

Mr. Yarmolinsky is the author of articles which have appeared in various periodicals. He is a trustee of the American Foundation for Continuing Education. Mr. Yarmolinsky was staff counsel for the President's Committee on Business and Government Relations in 1950. He has also been in recent years a lecturer at the Yale Law School and American University Law School. Mr. Yarmolinsky is a member of the American Bar Association and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; and the American Law Institute.

LINE AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. MORSE. Do I understand that Mr. Yarmolinsky will have line authority?

Secretary MCNAMARA. He will have line authority over the people transferred to us from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Mr. MORSE. But his relation to you will be as a staff liaison and not as a line subordinate?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, as a line subordinate.

Mr. MORSE. And from what will the authority extend in the Department of Defense beyond the 1,000 people that are coming over from the OCDM?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It extends over to the 1,000 people that come out from OCDM.

Mr. MORSE. Are there any directions that come from the Department of the Army, say, with respect to the exclusion of a civil defense function that will not come from Mr. Yarmolinsky?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They must come from me, that is correct. Mr. MORSE. And it will be on his advice that the

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't wish to draw a distinction between a staff adviser and a line operator here. For example, a request to a department in the Army for something desired by the Department of the Navy comes to me from the Secretary of the Navy, who is a line officer.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I asked these questions is the fear that I have, and I have just stated it to you that there is a possibility that we are going to again find ourselves where we are going to have several lines of authority drawn, with no one appearing to be responsible for carrying out this program. And this is something, Mr. Chairman, that I hope we will keep a close eye on as far as the committee is concerned, and follow the program as it is being instituted from here on.

Secretary MCNAMARA. So far as the program is assigned to the Department of Defense under section 1 of the Executive order, there is only one person responsible for it, and that is me.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. You are going to be responsible, but, Mr. Secretary, you are delegating a lot of this authority, and there are going to be a lot of people under your assistant, and, of course, you are going to have another department more or less following your activities, too. And somewhere, I am sure we want to be sure that the responsibility is established, and that we are not going to have a lot of duplication in activity and lack of coordination and decision in the manner in which the program is being carried out.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that it is entirely appropriate that your committee should hold me personally responsible for the actions of the Defense Department in civil defense. I propose to assume that responsibility, and to insist that it be carried out properly within the Department.

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FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS OF MARTIAL LAW

Mr. HOLIFIELD. This problem of martial law which was explored somewhat by our member, Mr. Morse, is a very wide field. We have had testimony on this over the years. We had one of the foremost authorities, Dr. Charles Fairman of Harvard, who has written books on this and has studied it very much. The preplanning for the utilization of all civilian organizations in particular lines of expertise, of course, should be done in advance. The lines of authority for the utilization of forest rangers, firemen, policemen, sanitary workers, all of the civilian structure should be planned in advance.

The concept of martial law as we have had it in the past, it seems to me, is not only alarming to a great many people, but I think the effect which has been obtained in the past by summary martial law can be obtained by preplanning of the utilization of civilian organizations under their respective civilian superiors, such as the Governors of the various States.

I would strongly urge, Mr. Secretary, that a very close study be given to this subject. I believe the alarm that is in the minds of a great many people about the transfer of civil defense to the Department of Defense can be allayed if they know in advance the extent of authority which the Defense Department intends to take over in an emergency.

Now, I am not convinced that the shock of a nuclear attack would not bring about martial law. I can conceive of chaos in our cities to the extent where the ordinary guardians of order would be absent.

However, if in advance, emergency planning was made and the necessary laws passed on the State level to place emergency powers in the hands of the Governors or their successors, and if that line of authority extended from the President down through the Governors to these organizations which we have functioning at the present time on all levels in our society, and a preplan made to utilize these organizations, and they would know what they were going to do at the time of an emergency, I think you could allay a great deal of this fear which I think in many instances is unnecessary.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would certainly agree with you.

The necessity for martial law bears an inverse relationship to the amount and effectiveness of preplanning.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is right. We have had the experience in the last war, which may be brought to your attention, in Hawaii, where martial law was established in Hawaii, and it had to be lifted by Federal court action. And in the lifting of that martial law the military people were condemned for maintaining it long after it was necessary.

This is the thing that the American people have an instinctive fear of, that once the military takes over, that they will be from that time on in the hands of a military authority of some kind. I don't think that is very likely. Nevertheless it has happened in many countries of the world. And I think that in a society that is dedicated to the predominance of civilian authority, the necessary preliminary planning can obviate the necessity of the rigid, harsh continuous type of martial law which has obtained in other countries, let's say. With such assurance the people would cooperate more in local organizations,

knowing full well that their rights would be preserved during an emergency, and such rights as were necessary to take away from them during the emergency would be restored to them after the emergency was over through some planned method of restoration, perhaps by petition of the Governor or his successor that martial law was no longer needed in his area, that the emergency no longer existed.

And I hope that you will assign someone to give deep study to this problem, because I believe it will be important in the psychological acceptance by the people of this Nation of an effective program for civil affairs.

Mr. Roback, our staff director, has some questions, Mr. Secretary.

CURRENT ARMY DOCTRINE ON MARTIAL LAW

Mr. ROBACK. General Lemnitzer, along the lines of the chairman's remarks, prevailing military doctrine specifies that in the event of emergency there will be martial law in the conventional or traditional sense; is that not true?

General LEMNITZER. I did not hear the last part of your question. Mr. ROBACK. Let me restate it.

You are the signatory of an Army regulation dealing with civilian defense which recently was revised. Are you familiar with that regulation?

General LEMNITZER. Yes, I am.

Mr. ROBACK. That regulation states certain policies and procedures and responsibilities. Is it not the case today that if there were an emergency situation, there would be a declaration of martial law for such areas as required it?

General LEMNITZER. Well, that would depend entirely upon the ability of other branches of the Government to function. It is generally regarded that the need for martial law arises only when all civil authority has ceased to function and there is no other means of exercising control.

Mr. ROBACK. And there is nothing new about that, that is an accepted idea, and that is embodied in the prevailing doctrine as of now, is that not the case?

General LEMNITZER. I am not clear as to the point you are trying to make.

Mr. ROBACK. The chairman has asked you to consider, and has asked the Secretary to consider, some type of arrangement which would eliminate the necessity for martial law. But as the doctrine now stands in written regulations of the Department of Defense, there is no new policy in that field?

General LEMNITZER. None that I know of. But I heartily agree with the statements that have been made here to the effect that much can be accomplished by detailed preplanning.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I want to make the record clear that the chairman did not advocate abolishment of martial law. I recognize that there will be martial law almost inevitably. The thing that I am recommending is preplanning to soften the effect of martial law insofar as it is possible through the Governors and other State officials which ordinarily would perform the function instead of having men with bayonets come in to do the job of policing and fire protection and sanitation, and that sort of thing, where it is possible to utilize the civilians