SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. ROBACK. Do you have any comments on Mr. Gouré's statement? Dr. KAHN. Yes. I would emphasize more than Leon did the curious old-fashioned appearance that much of the Soviet civil defense program has. It looks very much like they had a very successful civil defense program in World War II and then they sort of continued it, gradually modifying it but at a slower rate than we did. I would suggest that what they need is a Committee on Government Operations to prod them, not so much into greater efforts, but into some changes of emphasis and in some cases direction, but they have no such congressional committee. I think that is rather a startling statement about their program.

Mr. ROBACK. They probably get a lot of ideas reading these hearings. Dr. KAHN. I hope not.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Many of us who lived in farming areas when we were younger remember the so-called root-cellars that all farmers had. These were practically underground cellars. If not in the houses there was always somewhere nearby the root cellar dugout, half dugout, half in the ground possibly and half out, covered with earth, in which all types of vegetables were placed with layers of hay between them to preserve them. In those days they didn't have the canning facilities or access to the frozen vegetable bin that they now have in the local grocery store. Families not only put up their own meat and smoked it in the smokehouse but also preserved their root crops, potatoes, and other things like that.

Now, those types of structures undoubtedly exist in the Soviet Union, and out in the country areas where the radioactive fallout might be, relatively small at least, and would decay quickly, those types of shelters might be very effective.

Mr. KAHN. They seem to have many assets of that type. Let me give the Soviet Union some free advice. They have, for example, these refrigeration cellars. In addition, the Soviet builder usually used local material in the older buildings. There are no forests in large areas of the Soviet Union and in these areas these older houses (and some of the modern ones, too) were often built of clay or sod. I have seen a recent standard Soviet manual on housing which suggests that the walls should be 70 cm. thick and the windows were so small that one could easily sandbag them up. They would still have a roof problem, but they could just cover it over with sandbags and they would have a fine fallout shelter. The Soviets seem to worry a great deal about inhalation hazards and they sometimes say these improvised shelters aren't any good because they don't have filters, but again I think this kind of misconception is disappearing or has already disappeared. I would say that the current manuals of the Soviets will probably look at least as good if not better than anything we have.

They are getting better every year, and I would assume that they are now conscious of all these assets, but it has been peculiar how long it has taken them to recognize these assets.

In other words, their program looks vigorous but bureaucratic to But even misdirected programs can create enormous assets so long as the goals are roughly in the right direction.

me.

SURVIVAL OF LAW AND ORDER

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. How much research has been done on the maintenance of order? How would you maintain order?

Mr. KAHN. The usual statement that is made is

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Martial law.

Mr. KAHN. The problem is probably exaggerated. People tend to act very well in disaster situations. The average person has a picture of law and order being completely dropped in a disaster situation, of humans turning to beasts and looting, rape, and violence being the

norm.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. I wasn't thinking particularly of that but how are you going to maintain order afterward?

Mr. KAHN. Afterward? A long time afterward?

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. You have your normal government system. In some areas, martial law. In most areas, normal police service, with perhaps some added deputies. I don't assume the Government will disappear. This is particularly unlikely if the military puts in the kind of command and control systems which they need to fight the war.

These are systems that will survive the war. That means countrywide we will have communications. We will have the ability to transport troops if necessary. In most areas where there are survivors, they won't even be directly affected by the war except by the fallout from the bombs that happened to drop upwind.

We may have serious problems because there has been a breakdown of the economy, but the police are still there. People are still there. There will be refugees coming in and we will probably have to deputize and draft additional people to handle the problems, but I don't think these problems will be ferocious. By and large, people will behave peacefully and cooperatively.

I am assuming that the National Government has not broken down, but if it has reasonable precautions, it will not break down.

Mr. ROBACK. If there are no more questions, I think we can release the witness. The chairman wants to have an executive session.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Thank you very much. We are pleased with your presentation.

Mr. KAHN. Thank you.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will have an executive session now.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned and went into executive session.)

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1A.-EXCERPT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, MAY 25, 1961, ON "URGENT NATIONAL NEEDS" (H. Doc. 174, 87TH CONG., 18T SESS.)

CIVIL DEFENSE

One major element of the national security program which this Nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends but from past inaction. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference, and skepticism; while, at the same time, many of the civil defense plans proposed have been so far reaching or unrealistic that they have not gained essential support.

This administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack. We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.

But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that civil defense can readily be justified-as insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed-but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

Once the validity of this concept is recognized, there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack. To assure effective use of these shelters, additional measures will be required for warning, training, and radiological monitoring, and stockpiling of food and medicines. And effective performance of the entire program requires not only new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrangements.

(1) Therefore, under the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, I am assigning responsibility for this program to the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of Defense. It is important that this function remain civilian in nature and leadership; and this feature will not be changed. Responsibilities for preparedness programs in connection with health, food, manpower, transportation, and other needs in the event of an attack will be assigned to the appropriate department and agency heads, all of whom will work with State and local agencies. For their role remains an essential one.

(2) The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will be reconstituted as a small staff agency to assist me in the coordination of these functions. To more accurately describe its role, its title should be changed to the "Office of Emergency Planning.

(3) As soon as those newly charged with these responsibilities have prepared new authorization and appropriation requests, such requests will be transmitted to the Congress for a much strengthened Federal-State civil defense program.

Such a program will provide Federal funds for identifying fallout shelter capacity in existing structures, and it will include, where appropriate, incorporation of shelter in Federal buildings, new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with Federal financial assistance, and matching grants and other incentives for constructing shelter in State and local government and private buildings.

Federal appropriations for civil defense in fiscal 1962 under the program will in all likelihood be more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years. Financial participation will also be re quired from State and local governments and from private citizens. But no insurance is cost free; and every American citizen and his community must decide for themselves whether this form of survival insurance justifies the expenditure of effort, time, and money. For myself, I am convinced that it does.

APPENDIX 1B.-EXCERPT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S TELEVISED ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, JULY 25, 1961

We have another sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do or where they should go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility.

In May, I pledged a new start on civil defense. Last week, I assigned, on the recommendation of my civil defense director, basic responsibility in this program to the Secretary of Defense, to make certain it is administered and coordinated with our continental defense efforts at the highest civilian level.

Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structurespublic and private that could be used for fallout shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits, tools, sanitation facilities, and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air-raid warning and fallout detection systems, including a new household warning system now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed. In addition, new Federal buildings will include space suitable for fallout shelters, as well as normal use.

In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families, and to our country.

In contrast to our friends in Europe, the need for this kind of protection is new to our shores. But the time to start is now. In the coming months, I hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect his family in case of attack. I know you would not want to do less. The addition of $207 million in Civil Defense appropriations brings our total new defense budget requests to $3.454 billion, and a total of $47.5 billion for the year. This is an increase in the defense budget of $6 billion since January, and has resulted in official estimates of a budget deficit of over $5 billion. The Secretary of the Treasury and other economic advisers assure me, however, that our economy has the capacity to bear this new request.

APPENDIX 2.-TEXT OF MEMORANDUM FROM FRANK B. ELLIS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION, TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JULY 7, 1961 As you pointed out in your message to the Congress of May 25, civil defense is a vital but long-neglected element of our total national security program. In these troubled times, it is essential that our national dedication to the cause of liberty and freedom for all mankind be buttressed by a realistic measure of protection for our people against the possibility of nuclear attack. A vigorous and well-supported civil defense program offers a level of protection that could make the difference between our national survival and defeat if a nuclear war were forced upon us by irrational men.

We have discussed on several occasions the inadequacy of our past efforts. I have made an intensive study of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization— its weaknesses and its strengths. Now, in accordance with our discussion on July 6, I offer the following comments and recommendations with respect to our civil defense and defense mobilization programs:

I. Presidential leadership and responsibility

The basic premise of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 is sound. Federal leadership in, and responsibility for, nonmilitary defense is inescapably yours. Specific assignments of responsibility for the several elements of the total program should be made to those departments and agencies of the Federal Government best able to give them strong and vigorous support, as suggested below. All elements of the Federal Government should so order their programs and activities as to support the unified policy to be laid down by you.

As you suggested in your message of May 25, you require for this purpose the assistance of a small staff element in your Executive Office the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, largely freed of operating responsibilities and reconstituted as the Office of Emergency Planning.

II. The role of the Office of Emergency Planning

The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) would furnish staff assistance to you in connection with your responsibilities to plan, determine policy for, direct, coordinate, and exercise continuing surveillance over the total nonmilitary defense program.

Specifically, it would—

A. Represent you in your dealings with State Governors to stimulate vigorous State and local participation in civil defense and resource management planning and to make adequate preparations for the continuity of State and local civilian political authority in the event of nuclear attack. B. Assist you in achieving a coordinated and harmonious impact on the States and localities on the part of the several Federal departments and agencies to which specific nonmilitary defense program responsibilities have been assigned.

C. Assist you in determining the appropriate non-military defense roles of Federal departments and agencies, enlisting State, local, and private participation, mobilizing national support, evaluating progress of the program, and preparing reports to the Congress.

D. Assist you in planning for the management of national resources in an emergency, including but not limited to the postattack period.

E. Assist you in making plans to deal with the overall effects of enemy strikes on human and material resources.

F. Assist you in the development of policies concerning the strategic use of national resources during the cold war or in the event of limited war, and appropriate economic warfare matters such as restrictions of imports threatening the national security.

G. Advise you on the need for Presidential declaration of major natural disasters and coordinating on your behalf Federal operation in connection therewith.

H. Develop plans for the continuity of Federal operations in the event of nuclear attack, and for the performance, as necessary, of such emergency activities as the evaluation of remaining resources after an attack, their allocation, the control of transportation, the maintenance of economic stabilization, and censorship.

I. Serve as telecommunications coordinator for the executive branch. J. Assist you in determining policy for and supervising the maintenance of the strategic stockpile.

In carrying out these functions, the Office of Emergency Planning would make fullest use of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, in order to maintain a minimum staff both centrally and in the field.

III. Assignment to the Department of Defense of responsibilities for civil defense In order that we may as a nation enlist the vigorous support of the many talents and resources of the Department of Defense, I recommend that your first specific assignment under the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 be that of responsibility for the total civil defense program to the Secretary of Defense.