Lacaze, French Minister of Marine, recently stated in the Chamber that by next October all French merchant ships will be armed each with two 4.7-in. guns. He said that officers of the French merchant marine were being trained as gunners, and that even armed trawlers had successfully shelled submarines.

The importance of effective armament arises from the consideration that it will place the enemy at a disadvantage. It may, and probably will, compel the attacking submarine to submerge, in which position she loses her speed, is less certain of her object, and can employ only torpedoes to attain her purpose. There is reason to believe that many of the enemy submarines serving as commerce destroyers are fitted for the use of smaller torpedoes than are employed in the large tubes of the boats built for the attack of warships. In such case they will carry a greater supply of torpedoes than would otherwise be possible, though German officers always use them with the utmost economy and only for surprise attack. They employ gunfire wherever they think it may be effective. A merchant vessel well armed can in most cases elude submerged attack when she becomes aware of the position of her enemy.

The very fine performance of an Ellerman steamship of 6122 tons (the Karroo '), in an action which lasted some three hours, so fully illustrates the conditions in which our merchantmen engage our enemies, and of the methods of the submarines, that an account of it will be instructive. The vessel was proceeding in April upon a certain track, and manoeuvring in a manner intended to preclude attack. No submarine or periscope had been seen, but a skilfully handled submarine was evidently lying in wait, and the captain of the ship, who was on the forecastle head at the time, observed the track of a torpedo approaching from abaft the port beam. He immediately hailed the bridge Hard-a-port!' and, the order being promptly carried out, the ship began to swing, causing the torpedo to pass wide astern. A second torpedo coming from the same direction missed the target by a distance of only 30 or 40 feet, owing to the fact that the ship was swinging on her helm as it approached. The German submarine, having thus failed in the use of her torpedoes, owing to the skill of her opponent, came to

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the surface, as the English captain had expected. Meanwhile he had altered course to bring her astern. Now, a submarine on emerging has to get her gun into position or condition for action, and remains helpless against attack by gun-fire, or, it may be, by ramming, for a period which may be estimated at from five to ten minutes.* When the assailant of the Karroo' broke surface, fire was opened upon her, and a number of rounds were got in before she could bring her own gun into action. The merchantman drew ahead, but the submarine had better speed, and soon gained upon her, keeping her under accurate fire at a range of 8000 to 9000 yards, which was greater than the range of the gun she carried. Thus was illustrated a situation which has occurred not a few times in naval history. In the battle of Tsushima Rear-Admiral Niebogatoff was placed in the fatal predicament of being in action with an enemy who had the speed of him, and could choose his own range outside the reach of the Russian guns; and this situation gave the unfortunate officer the alternatives of submitting to destruction or of surrender. He chose the latter; not so the captain of the British merchantman. Whenever the enemy submarine approached within range, deceived on occasions by a smoke screen, he opened deliberate fire, but the wary Germans would thereupon drop astern and continue to shell the Englishman with high explosive and shrapnel from a safe distance. The aim of the Germans was most accurate, and the ship was continuously straddled and frequently hit, though her commander watched the flash of the enemy's guns, and endeavoured to dodge their fire. A good deal of damage was done on

Before the war the Krupps had a 12-pr. gun for submarines on a disappearing hinged mounting, and another on a permanent mounting external to the hull. The outside gun, when the boat submerged, was closed at the muzzle with a tompion and at the breech by a water-proof covering; and the delicate appliances, sights and shoulder pieces were stowed below. With either gun there must be a notable interval between the emerging of the boat and the opening of her fire. The Krupps estimated that five minutes or less should suffice, but it is doubtful if that speed of operation has actually been attained at sea. That a bigger gun

than the 12-pr. is now mounted appears to be certain, and longer time will certainly be required to operate it. The Krupps had a gun firing a 21-lb. shell, designed for mounting in larger vessels, but possibly now used in submarines.

board by the shelling, and the ship was holed. The situation began to look serious, and the confidential documents were therefore thrown overboard; but S.O.S. signals soon brought two destroyers to the scene, and, as they approached, the submarine wisely submerged. The captain and officers of the British vessel had given proof, in this gallant action, of cool determination and consummate seamanship, and well deserved their reward.

Gallant as was the action described, it did not result in the destruction of an of an enemy submarine, as has happened in some other cases that might be cited. Not all German or Austrian submarine officers possess the same courage, resource or ability. A ship called the Bellorado' was attacked in March last by gunfire, whereby her master, chief officer and a seaman were killed, but her gunners put a shell into the submarine which, there is the best reason to believe, sent her to the bottom. Another ship (the 'Dunrobin') was attacked in the same way in September 1916. She turned her stern to the assailant, and carried on a lively action for some time, resulting in such injury to the enemy that his fire was silenced:

'At this point a T.N.T. high explosive shell was fired at him in the vicinity of his conning tower, causing, as it seemed, a vast internal explosion, smoke rising to a height of thirty feet. After the smoke had cleared we could see that his conning tower had been damaged, and now, having his exact range, we fired three common shell, each of which was seen to be also a direct hit. At this juncture his after end rose high out of the water, and he plunged very rapidly head first, disappearing at an angle of about 45 degrees.'

A recital of fighting episodes is not intended to be included in this article. Those which have been narrated are given in order to show what is the nature of the fighting service of our cargo vessels-our so-called 'tramp steamers'-in the course of the war, what are their requirements, and how high is the professional skill required for the successful handling of them in the presence of an enemy. We cannot think too highly of these trading mariners who have taken upon themselves, for the good of the country, in her high necessity, the weapons of the warrior, and have won, or lost, in

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many an unexpected and unequal fight with the enemy, who has lain stealthily in wait, in the ambush' of the sea, ready to destroy them. Admiral Mahan said that

'the harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all; it is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people.' Our merchant seamen will understand the truth of this penetrating judgment. It contains fundamental truth also for the Germans.

This survey of some of the elements of Sea Power might have gone much further. The Navy is so great an organisation, its agencies are so many and so various, it is so complete a world in itself, that a volume would not suffice for a description. Enough has, however, been said to show that the exercise of the high strategic functions of the Fleet is based, not only upon the operation of its battleships, battle-cruisers and cruisers of other classes, which filled such a large place in naval discussions and arguments before the war, but upon a wide array of lesser factors to assist, support and extend its action. We have also seen in how real a sense the two branches of the Sea Services, the Naval and the Mercantile, are working together and have become, for the period of the war, at least, parts of a single organisation.

JOHN LEYLAND.

Art. 8.-ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS.*

NEARLY forty years ago, on July 26, 1880, Mr G. J. (afterwards Lord) Goschen, then Ambassador at Constantinople, made himself the eloquent exponent of the cause of Albania in a telegram † sent to Lord Granville. This telegram contained the following remarks:

'As ancient and distinct a race as any by whom they are surrounded, they [the Albanians] have seen the nationality of these neighbouring races taken under the protection of various European Powers and gratified in their aspirations for a more independent existence. They have seen the Bulgarians completely emancipated in Bulgaria and made masters in Eastern Roumelia. They have seen the ardent desire of Europe to liberate territory inhabited by Greeks from Turkish rule. They have seen the Slavs in Montenegro protected by the great Slav Empire of the north with enthusiastic pertinacity. They have seen the Eastern Question being solved on the principle of nationality, and the Balkan peninsula being gradually divided, as it were, among various races on that principle. Meanwhile they see that they themselves do not receive similar treatment. Their nationality is ignored; and territory inhabited by Albanians is handed over in the north to the Montenegrins to satisfy Montenegro, the protégé of Russia, and in the south to Greece, the protégé of England and France.

...

'If a strong Albania should be formed, the excuse for occupation by a foreign Power in the case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would be greatly weakened. A united Albania would bar the remaining entrances to the north, and the Balkan Peninsula would remain in the hands and under the sway of the races who now inhabit it. Otherwise the Albanians might be an insuperable difficulty at a time when troubles should arise. A population in great part Mussulman would be a source of the greatest difficulty to the Slav or Greek countries round it. .. I consider that, in proportion as the Albanian nationality could be established, the probability

* The author of this article, his Excellency Ismail Kemal Bey, the chief of one of the oldest families of Albania, was a distinguished functionary of the Ottoman Empire for over fifty years and governor of various provinces. He became head of the Provisional Government in Albania when his people proclaimed their independence in 1912.-(EDITOR.)

† Accounts and Papers, 1880. Turkey, No. 15. Vol. LXXXI.