Art. 11.-THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.

1. Munitions of War Act, 1915. [5 & 6 Geo. 5, ch. 54.] 2. Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916. [5 & 6 Geo. 5, ch. 99.]

3. Schedule of Protected Occupations, M.M. 130. April 28, 1917.

4. Munitions of War Bill. [7 & 8 Geo. 5. Bill 43.] 5. Reconstruction Committee. Sub-Committee on Relations between Employers and Employed: Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils. [Cd. 8606.] 6. Board of Trade Labour Gazette, June, 1917.

THE engineers' strike and other recent manifestations of industrial discontent have had one result of supreme importance; they have compelled serious attention to the aims and conceptions of British workmen, to their doubts and fears, to the whole political, social and economic outlook of those on whom the country depends for the supply of war material and the maintenance of the food services. Hitherto, the policy pursued with regard to Labour unrest has been very much like trying to avert an eruption by proclaiming the volcano to be extinct. To-day, we have a public acknowledgment of the danger and a general recognition of the need for a broad, definite and constructive labour policy.

From time to time, during the last three years, indications of the disquieting elements masked by the industrial truce have risen to the surface; but in few cases has the magnitude of the trouble been generally understood, and in hardly a single case has it been publicly referred to until it had reached the stage of open conflict. Thus, each successive announcement has come with the shock of unpleasant surprise. On each occasion the Government, the press and the public have exhibited a pathetic eagerness to get the strike settled, to induce the men concerned, either by threats or by persuasion, to return to work; and a still more pathetic belief that, if this could be accomplished and a compromise arrived at on the specific points at issue, all would be well.

There are many excuses for this attitude. The general public have little knowledge of industrial affairs, but the requirements of a great war have been brought home to

them by the presence of friends and relatives at the front. It requires exceptional strength of mind and foresight for Ministers and officials staggering under the responsibilities of a world war, or employers beset by urgent War Office and Admiralty demands, to look beyond the immediate requirements of the moment. The flow of munitions, the construction of tonnage, have taken precedence of every other consideration; and, when a stoppage of work occurs which affects the output of ships or shells, there is a natural tendency to regard the resumption of work as the one thing needful.

Nevertheless, the real problem goes much deeper. Strikes are only symptoms of a disease whose effect upon the industrial organism is not confined to the periods of actual stoppage. A return to work brought about by invoking the extraordinary powers conferred upon the Executive for the period of the war, or by an appeal to the patriotism of the men's official representatives, will not necessarily afford any real security against a renewed outbreak. Unless the terms of the settlement are such as the rank and file of the workers accept as just, it may even accentuate the diminution of maximum energy by absenteeism, broken time, and that slackness of effort which arises from sullen and unwilling service. This point is vital and too often forgotten. A ten days' stoppage of work by ten thousand men is much easier to realise and much more likely to attract attention than the fact that fifty thousand men have been working at five per cent. below their maximum capacity for forty days; yet the effect on output is exactly the same. any ordinary year the time lost in strikes is very much less important than the loss of time, or its equivalent in limitation of effort, caused by discontent and friction which stop short of declared hostilities.

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These considerations apply with particular force in time of war. Labour has given ample proof of patriotism and self-sacrifice during the present conflict. Neither the raising of immense armies by voluntary enlistment nor the astounding increase in the output of war material would have been possible without the willing cooperation of the workers. The response made to the call of the nation revealed a spirit in which men will not strike readily or for trivial considerations. The series

of disturbances which have culminated in the events of the last few months indicate either the existence of deep and widespread grievances or a gradual change in the general attitude of Labour towards the national policy and the war. In either case it is certain that the effects of the unrest have not been confined to the men who have 'downed tools,' or to the days during which they ceased work.

The Prime Minister was, therefore, well advised in urging on the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the subject of industrial unrest, the importance of interpreting the terms of reference in the widest possible manner. The Commissioners' report will be valuable just in so far as they succeed in going behind the specific grievances of the moment and throwing light on that largely inarticulate and unformulated dissatisfaction from which these grievances themselves derive most of their significance. If the treatment is to be not merely palliative but remedial, the diagnosis must go to the root of the evil. It will be necessary, in considering the report, to remember the extreme difficulty of obtaining, before any Commission, evidence which reflects clearly what lies at the bottom of the workman's mind with reference to his employers, the Government, the constitution and conduct of industrial society, and the national policy in relation to the war. It is often a man's most profound convictions which he is most reluctant to discuss and least able to express, even to himself. The evidence obtained by the Commissioners should be invaluable; but the task of acting upon it will call for sympathetic knowledge of human nature and intimate acquaintance with industrial history before and during the war.

Of one thing we may be sure; the report of the Commissioners will dispose once for all of the idea, still prevalent in some quarters, that all Labour unrest springs from the influence of a small minority of extremists or irresponsible agitators. It is perfectly true that the Labour ranks include a number of firebrands whose activity in fomenting trouble is restrained by few considerations of prudence or principle. They include also a larger, but still comparatively small body of men who are definitely opposed to the war, either on pacifist grounds, or through their irreconcileable hostility to the

existing political and economic system. Among the leaders of this group are several men of great ability and high personal character; but neither the extremists nor the firebrands are numerous enough or powerful enough to bring about industrial unrest on the scale witnessed in recent months. Such influence as either group possesses, outside their own immediate following, must be traced in the main to the preparation of the soil for their propaganda by already existing causes of discontent and irritation.

In the case of the engineers' strike, there is no doubt that the specific grievances alleged-the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme and the extension of dilution to private work-were the immediate causes of the outbreak. Both these measures were forced upon the Government by the logic of circumstances, and neither could be reasonably objected to in principle; but the history of the strike and of the events which led up to it, throws valuable light not only on the action taken by the engineers, but on the general attitude of Labour.

The Trade Card Scheme, by which membership of the engineering Unions constituted, in itself, an absolute exemption from military service, was instituted in November 1916. Ever since the passing of the first Munitions Act there had been complaints by the engineers that men who had incurred the dislike of their employers or foremen were victimised by a declaration that they had ceased to be indispensable, leading to the withdrawal of their protective badge. Both the engineers and the employers complained that the Ministry of Munitions allowed the War Office to call up men whose skilled work formed an essential link in productive processes, thus throwing whole sections of workshop organisation suddenly out of gear. A big strike at a Sheffield munition factory was only settled by the personal intervention of the employer on the men's behalf; and finally, in order to avert a widespread stoppage, the Trade Card Scheme was hastily drafted and was accepted by the engineering Unions.

From the start it was clear that the Scheme was open to serious criticism. It was not satisfactory that a man's exemption should depend upon his membership of a

particular union rather than on the national utility of his work; and Labour critics, as well as others, have accused the engineering Unions of driving a selfish bargain for the protection of their own members at the expense of other workers. Thus, in discussing the recent strike, the London representative of the Workers' Union said plainly, This is not a strike against the Government or the employers. It is a strike to force all unskilled or semi-skilled men of military age into the Army before any members of the A.S.E., whether they are nineteen or forty, single or married, are called upon.'* The position was the more anomalous in that Unions such as the National Union of Railwaymen, which competed for members with the engineering Unions, were not protected under the scheme, which thus raised in an acute form the long-standing jealousy between the craft and industrial organisations.

There was thus a strong case for revision of the scheme, even apart from the increasing demands of the War Office for men; and, had the Government approached the Unions concerned with a statement of their requirements and an invitation to negotiate a fresh agreement, there should have been no difficulty in effecting the necessary readjustments. Unfortunately, what they did was simply to announce that the scheme which had been instituted in November 1916 would be cancelled as from May 1, 1917, and that its place would be taken by an extremely complicated Schedule of Protected Occupations, which it was not even suggested would be final. At the same time they introduced the Munitions of War Bill, 1917, 'to enable the Ministry of Munitions to carry into effect a scheme of dilution of skilled labour by the introduction of less skilled labour (either male or female) upon private work.'

This measure raised issues which were even more delicate than those connected with the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme. The skilled trade unionist regards the abolition of task demarcations as threatening, not merely a monopoly which forms his chief economic asset, but his pride in his craft and the whole basis upon which his union organisation is erected. No greater

* Mr George Dallas, in the 'Star,' May 14, 1917.