invasion, which ultimately led to the settlement of the Norsemen in large numbers, was of a comparatively peaceful nature. The Northern new-comers apparently did not try to oust the original occupants of the land, but were satisfied to settle in the marshy, sandy, unattractive regions left vacant by the Anglo-Saxons.

If such results have accrued from the scientific survey of the names of a few English counties, then there is every hope that results of much greater historical importance may be attained when the survey is complete. Local interest will always attach itself to these books; but a rational summary of results when the series is complete will be of more general interest and much greater importance.

A study of the books which have been issued suggests a warning with regard to method of treatment. Mr Goodall's introduction is a model of what an introduction to such a work should be; for a reader of a book on place-names does not want merely a bald list of names and their etymology, but also a statement showing their general distribution and giving such general conclusions as the author has been led to form concerning them. Such introductions, together with the addition of archæological matter of the kind which Mr Duignan has inserted in his books, will take away from works on place-names that excessive dryness which creates an unsatisfied thirst for further knowledge. The subject after all is essentially a popular one, in the sense that it appeals to the interest of many people; and it is very desirable that it should continue to be so. But a series of visions of dry bones is only too suggestive of its death.

G. B. GRUNDY.

Art. 5.-THE FINAL SETTLEMENT IN THE BALKANS.

'We shall not pause or falter until we have secured for the smaller states of Europe their Charter of Independence, and for Europe itself and for the world at large their final emancipation from the reign of force.'

These memorable words were addressed urbi et orbi by the head of the British Government on Nov. 9, 1915, when the war had already lasted more than a year and three months. Other British statesmen have been equally emphatic in their declarations both in the earlier and later periods of the war. Especially noteworthy in regard to the Balkan Peninsula are the words spoken on Sept. 28, 1915, by the then Foreign Minister in the House of Commons.

'Our policy,' said Sir Edward Grey, 'has been to secure agreement between the Balkan States which would ensure to each of them not only independence but a brilliant future based as a general principle on the territorial and political union of kindred nationalities. To secure this agreement we have recognised that the legitimate aspirations of all the Balkan States must find satisfaction. . . . The policy of the Allies is to further the national aspirations of the Balkan States without sacrificing the independence of any of them.'

It is unnecessary to add to these quotations. The words which appear at the beginning of this article were spoken a few weeks after the rupture with Bulgaria, and show that the noble programme with which we undertook the war has not been modified, as indeed it could not be, by that unfortunate event. Whatever may have been the attitude of the Kings and Governments of Bulgaria, Greece and the other Balkan States in the course of the war, we are absolutely pledged to maintain the independence of all these states at its close and to ensure to each and all a just settlement based on the territorial and political union of kindred nationalities.' In other words, we are solemnly bound to carry out a complete readjustment of frontiers which will assign to each of these states the regions which rightly belong to them, in accordance with the sacred principle which we inscribed on our banner when drawing the sword.

Such is our duty if we win the war. We need not speculate on what will happen in the Balkans if we lose it. We must save the Balkan States from the dangers which await them under German domination, and assure to each of them a prosperous development within their respective racial limits. This is not a Utopian or altruistic policy. Our honour is engaged by our formal declarations; and, apart from this, it is our interest as well as our duty to remedy a state of affairs which has set Europe in flames, and to establish in the Balkans, the gateway of the East, a firm and enduring peace, the only sure guarantee for our own tranquillity in the future. This can only be attained by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Balkan nationalities. The settlement must be just, and free from any taint of vindictiveness; it must be imposed from above and maintained under penalties, perhaps even manu militari, for a certain time, until the military and chauvinistic elements have been brought to reason, which have so often stifled the voice of good sense and overborne the wishes of the majority in these states. With a just delimitation of frontiers the irredentist agitations in the various countries will cease to exist; and with their disappearance the chauvinists and militarists will lose much of the leverage with which they have hitherto worked on the various courts, governments and populations.

The animosities of the Balkan States, which Mr Asquith described in the House of Commons (Nov. 2, 1915) as an unhappy and still unliquidated legacy of two Balkan wars and especially of the Treaty of Bucarest,' must have time to subside under the working of a new and equitable arrangement. The doctrine of 'equilibrium,' the hypocritical hypocritical theory advanced in 1913 in order to cover a series of lawless annexations, must be completely set aside. The populations of the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian kingdoms were almost equalised under the treaty, but the disparity already existing between Rumania and each of these states was increased, not diminished. With the incorporation of Transylvania, the Banat and Bukovina in Rumania, the disproportion would be farther increased, even if the other states should attain their rightful limits; that, of course, is no reason why the annexation of these

Rumanian regions should not be carried out, but the doctrine of equilibrium stands in the way. It has accordingly been discarded sans phrase by its former champions, who now once more invoke the principle of nationalities. Their repentance is welcome. Arithmetical parity will never bring happiness or peace to the Balkan countries, while whole populations are left to groan under the yoke of their bitterest enemies.

What arrangement shall we substitute for the faulty provisions of the Treaty of Bucarest? Before endeavouring to answer this question we may state the principles which should guide us in the delimitation of territories. The first and fundamental principle is that of nationality, which should never be abandoned in the case of large populations and as seldom as possible in the case of minor groups. On the observance of this rule depends the future peace of the Peninsula. Economic and commercial considerations take the second place. Each of the countries must possess a sufficient seaboard and an adequate number of ports. Fortunately this condition can be fulfilled without any serious infringement of the law of nationality, since most of the maritime towns are inhabited by mixed and more or less cosmopolitan populations. The needs of the back-country must, therefore, be the main consideration in the allocation of seaports. Care should also be taken not to separate the towns of the interior from the neighbourhoods to which they form distributing centres and from which they derive their supplies.

Thirdly, respect should be shown for the more recent decisions of Europe, which, except for the strongest reasons, should not be allowed to remain a dead letter. The Treaty of London, the protocol of Petrograd, and the decisions of the Conference of London regarding the frontiers of Albania, should all be respected, and only modified at points where specific local alterations are urgently needed. We hope to arrive at an epoch where international contracts and decisions will no longer be regarded as 'scraps of paper.' The treaties of Berlin and Bucarest are of course defunct; the former is obsolete by universal consent, the latter in reality was nothing more than a drum-head truce, drawn up in a few days

by a group of Balkan politicians aided by military officers fresh from the battlefield.

Fourthly, natural features, such as large rivers and mountain-chains, may be taken into account even when they do not precisely tally with racial limits. In such cases exchanges of villages in the corresponding riverain districts or mountain-slopes may sometimes be possible. Strategical requirements come last on the list, and need hardly be considered at all if a delimitation providing for the just satisfaction of national claims is arrived at. 'Equilibrium' and the vicious principle of 'compensation,' so dear to diplomatists, may be left aside altogether. History may be rejected; the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian empires of the past, all based on conquest, count for nothing; we do not propose to revive imperialism and the rule of force. Les Etats du moyen âge n'étaient pas constitués,' writes M. Cvijić, suivant le principe des nationalités. Leurs frontières ne correspondaient pas aux divisions nationales. . . . Les frontières de jadis n'ont ainsi aucune valeur ethnographique.' The political dreamers who tell us of Tsar Dushan's empire may ponder these words. That Michael the Brave united the Rumanian race under his sway for a little more than a year, that Scanderbeg rallied the Albanian tribes for a longer time to his standard-these are more interesting historical facts because the rulers were akin to the ruled and all belonged to the same nation, but they add no further validity to the just Rumanian and Albanian demands for national unity.

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Proceeding generally on these lines, we may venture to sketch the main features of a possible Balkan settlement. In making this attempt it is best to discard statistics; on the one hand, the relative dimensions of the several states matter nothing; on the other, no trustworthy statistical data exist in regard to the populations of the regions under dispute. The old Turkish nufuz-tefteri and salnamés are worthless; the figures adduced in the controversial literature on the subject are as little deserving of notice as the data provided by the propagandist publications which have appeared in London and Paris since the beginning of the war. The best sources of information are the works of impartial and conscientious travellers who have spent some time