Bistritza to the Pantyr Pass. * The Russians held Brody, Stanislau, and the heights about the Pantyr Pass; while the Austro-German armies were in possession of Brzezany and Halicz. This situation was unchanged when, on July 1, our Allies took the offensive on a front extending from the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway to the heights south of Brzezany. In the course of six days' fighting, the 11th Army, on the right, made some progress in the region of the head-waters of the Strypa; but the 7th Army, on the left, was unable to make any permanent impression on the formidable positions covering Brzezany. South of the Dniester General Korniloff advanced with the 8th Army, on July 6, from the line of the Bistritza, and, by the 12th, had occupied the heights north of the Lomnitza from Halicz to Kalusz, including these towns, while his left wing had reached the river at many points above Kalusz. At this stage General Terstyansky, commanding the 3rd Austrian Army, having been reinforced by German troops, took the offensive, recaptured Kalusz, and pushed the Russians back across the Lomnitza.

The subsequent movements of Korniloff's army were governed mainly by the course of events north of the Dniester, where Böhm Ermolli (who had succeeded Count Bothmer in command of the Austro-German army-group), having also been reinforced, proceeded to take the offensive. The course of the operations was, however, determined less by the enemy's action than by the state of the Russian troops, who, permeated by revolutionary theories, and corrupted by German agents, refused to obey orders, and, in many instances, abandoned positions without even waiting to be attacked. The 11th Army fled incontinently towards Tarnopol, uncovering the flank of the 7th, which was obliged to conform to the movement. At this juncture Korniloff superseded Gutor in the command of the Russian armygroup; and it was probably owing to his exertions that a temporary stand was made on the line of the Sereth.

* Maps which cover the theatre of operations were published in the 'Quarterly Review' for Oct. 1916 and Jan. 1917. The Lomnitza (shown, but not named on the map) rises near the Pantyr Pass, and falls into the Dniester at Halicz,

By the end of July, however, the Russians had retreated behind the frontier-river Zbrutz, where, after a few desultory actions, the hostile offensive came to an end.

The retreat of the 7th Army made it useless and dangerous for the 8th Army to attempt to maintain its isolated position south of the Dniester; and General Tcheremisoff, who succeeded Korniloff in the command, fell back rapidly, and in comparatively good order, towards the Bessarabian frontier, which he reached, after fighting two unsuccessful engagements in front of Czernowitz, about Aug. 4, thus coming into line with the armies north of the river. The effects of the débâcle in Galicia were still more far-reaching, for the Russians, to avoid being taken in flank, were forced to retire from the line of the Carpathians as far south as the Tolgyes Pass, and to abandon the whole of Bukowina.

In the meantime, presumably as part of the general plan of operations, General Scherbatcheff had attacked von Rohr's 1st Austrian Army (formerly commanded by General von Gerok) in Moldavia. Here, also, the Russian troops behaved badly on various occasions; but the Rumanian armies, now reorganised and well supplied with munitions, fought with great gallantry in spite of the instability of their allies. The 2nd Army, under Avaresco, taking the offensive on July 24, defeated the Austrians in a series of engagements between the Trotus and Putna valleys, and drove them back nearly to the frontier, capturing some 5000 prisoners and 90 guns. Then Mackensen came to the assistance of his colleague, and, concentrating in the neighbourhood of Focsani, advanced against the passages of the (Moldavian) Sereth, which he failed to force, and up the valley towards Aguidu, the junction of the Trotus and Sereth valley railway lines, the capture of which would have cut Avaresco from his source of supplies. The situation was critical. The Russian General Staff, alarmed at the enemy's progress in Galicia, had ordered the transfer to that theatre of the 4th Army, which, posted north of Focsani, formed a link between the 1st and 2nd Rumanian armies; and when Mackensen, who mustered ten German and two Austrian divisions, with a powerful artillery, began his attack on Aug. 6, the movement had already

commenced. The Russians gave way; but the 2nd Rumanian Army arrived on the scene in time to retrieve the situation by a spirited onset. Baffled in his first attempt, the German Marshal concentrated more to his left, and, after again defeating the Russians, occupied Panciu, within fifteen miles of Aguidu; but his further advance was stopped by Avaresco, who, throwing back his left wing, barred the way.

The German General Staff, unwilling to accept defeat, ordered a third attempt, on a more formidable scale. Mackensen was again to advance, in conjunction with von Rohr, who was reinforced by two German divisions. The Russians being out of action, Avaresco, with his ten divisions, had to sustain the attack of twenty AustroGerman divisions, with only such support as his colleague of the 1st Army, Christesco, could afford to give without endangering the line of the Sereth. Yet, after fierce fighting, which lasted nearly a fortnight, the enemy had to confess a complete failure. The limit of their advance was less than five miles, and the Rumanian front maintained its cohesion. Exhaustion, coupled, no doubt, with alarm at the Italian successes on the Isonzo, prevented the enemy from continuing the struggle. During the operations at least two hostile divisions had been removed from the Galician front, to the detriment of the enemy's position in that region.*

The operations in Moldavia have been noticed in some detail because the gallant bearing of the Rumanian troops provides a bright spot in the otherwise gloomy panorama of events on the eastern front; and because they afford the only instance, in that theatre, of what can correctly be described as military operations. In no other quarter were the forces opposed to the enemy in a state admitting of strategical plans being carried into effect, or even of a tactical defence being maintained. There can be no doubt that it was Hindenburg's design to put the finishing touch on last year's campaign by completing the occupation of Rumania, and that he believed the Russian débâcle in Galicia would ensure the

* The Germans claim to have taken, between July 19 and Aug. 18, 42,000 prisoners, with 257 guns, 548 machine-guns, 50,000 rifles, and a large quantity of other material.

success of the enterprise. The retreat of the Russian armies in the Bukowina made the position of the Rumanians very difficult; and it is likely that, but for the firm front which their armies maintained against Rohr and Mackensen, the situation would have become extremely grave. Scherbatcheff had two main lines of communication-the railway through Czernowitz and Suczawa, and thence down the valley of the Sereth; and the Bender-Jassy line, which joins the former at a point forty miles west of Jassy. After the loss of Czernowitz, he had only the Bender-Jassy route by which to obtain supplies; and the pressure to which it, and the lines through southern Russia, were subjected, must have been very great. In fact, there was an obvious possibility that the armies in Moldavia might fail through lack of ammunition and other supplies. Again, shortly after the fall of Czernowitz, the Archduke Joseph's left wing occupied the upper part of the Suczawa valley, the region east and south of Kimpolung, and the north-west corner of Moldavia, as far south as the Tolgyes Pass. Not only did its advance threaten to take in flank Scherbatcheff's positions west of the Sereth, but its general front was within eighty miles of Jassy, and only half that distance from the junction of the railway from Jassy with the Sereth valley line, through which all his supplies had to pass. This critical situation was reached in the early days of August, at the time of Mackensen's first rebuff; but the Archduke was unable to make further progress with his left wing, possibly because it became necessary to send or divert reinforcements to Rohr and Mackensen.

While the Germans were glad enough to seize the opportunity offered by Brusiloff's breach of the truce' on the eastern front to reconquer Galicia and Bukowina, and to attempt to occupy Moldavia, they appear to have thought it expedient to exert pressure nearer Petrograd, with the idea that a threat to the capital might create a situation favourable to the conclusion of a separate peace. On Aug. 20 they made the first move on the Riga front, by advancing between Mitau and the coast, and driving the Russians back behind the river Aa on the west, and, on the south, as far as the southern

branch of the Dwina at Dahlen. On Aug. 31 von Hutier* forced the passage at Ixkul (where, early in the month, the Russians had abandoned the bridgehead), and moved north to cut the railway from Petrograd. The Russians retreated precipitately, abandoning the north bank of the river as far east as Friederichstadt, and losing, according to the Berlin account, nearly 9000 prisoners and 325 guns. On Sept. 5 they halted on the line River Melupe -Segewold-Friederichstadt, the Germans contenting themselves with maintaining contact by means of light troops. The lull continued for a fortnight, after which the scene of action was transferred to Jacobstadt, where the Russian troops had shown signs of instability by abandoning, on Aug. 26, a section of the defences northwest of the town. An attack, delivered in this locality on Sept. 21, caused the Russians to retreat hurriedly behind the river, abandoning the town, and the bridgehead, which enclosed it on a front of twenty-five miles.

The immediate effect of the fall of Riga was to cause a political crisis, which, however, did not take the form which might have been expected. Successive Commanders-in-Chief had urged upon the Provisional Government the paramount necessity of enforcing discipline in the army, and among the railway and other establishments behind the front, but without avail. The Government was practically unmoved by the disasters in Galicia; and at the date of the Moscow Conference (Aug. 26) a series of recommendations drawn up by General Korniloff had not been adopted. Speaking at the Conference, he declared that the fall of Riga was imminent, and that Russia could only be saved by the complete regeneration of the army. His warning fell on deaf ears, so far as the majority were concerned; and the Government, being dominated by the Soviet, continued inactive. When, three days later, Riga fell, he appears to have become more insistent in his demands, and it was even stated that he ordered a force to march on Petrograd, to depose the Government. The accounts of what happened at this period are incomplete and conflicting, and the motives which inspired the chief

* Commanding the 8th German Army. He was opposed by the 12th Russian Army, which held the Dwina line below Friederichstadt.