rent generation of space satellites that gave us dominant battle space awareness in Iraq, were developed in the 1980s.

The point is this: One generation bequeaths to the next generation the capabilities to ensure its security.

Today, we have the security of future generations of Americans in our hands. We have a responsibility to get it right.

Because of the long procurement holiday of the 1990s, we have been left a poor hand. We must resolve to leave a better hand to our successors.

I am anxious to work with you to achieve that goal. I know full well it will take the best of all of us.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Rumsfeld. General Shelton, I know you have a longer statement, but summarize the highlights in a few minutes, and we will call on our colleagues who have to leave. I hate to do that to you. We could call on you later in the afternoon to supplement or amplify.

STATEMENT OF GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SHELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can also submit my statement for the record, if you would like. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for your very kind words a few minutes ago about my tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been my great honor to serve the men and women of our Armed Forces, and I want to once again thank this committee, each and every Senator, for your very strong and staunch support of our men and women in uniform.

I can highlight a few areas, if you would like, Mr. Chairman. First of all, with your help, I believe we have made considerable progress in many areas that have impacted the overall health and welfare of our troops in recent months. Increases in pay and allowances, pay table reform, TRICARE reform and expanded health care coverage, additional funding to provide adequate housing for our military families, and the budget plus-ups to arrest a decline in our first-to-fight units have been critical and have been provided.

But, let me also say that I believe we need to sustain this momentum if we are to preserve the long-term health, as well as the

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readiness, of our force in the years to come. Today, as we consider new budgets, new national security strategies, and new ideas of transforming the force, it is important that we always remember that the quality people in our military are the critical enablers that allow us to accomplish the things that we are asked to do.

Since my last testimony, we have been reminded of the human element of national security in several profound ways. Last October, U.S.S. Cole was savagely attacked in the Port of Aden. In that incident, 17 sailors died. Some asked why we put a ship in harm's way in such a dangerous part of the world. Well, that is what we do. We go into harm's way to protect America's interests around the world. The sailors of the U.S.S. Cole were en route to the Gulf, establishing presence and protecting our Nation's vital interests.

Last December we had two U.S. Army helicopters that crashed during a very difficult night-time training mission in Hawaii. In that crash, nine U.S. soldiers died. Some asked, why would the U.S. Army put soldiers in harm's way during a dangerous training mission in the black of the night? Well, that is what we do. We train for the most difficult missions we may face, because we know that when America's interests are threatened we have to be ready to go, day or night, and failure is not an option. We try to minimize the risk to our great men and women, but we train like we anticipate having to fight.

Then, as we all know, just a few weeks ago we had an EP-3 that was a reconnaissance aircraft flying in international air space over the South China Sea struck by a Chinese fighter, forced to make an emergency landing, and 24 of our personnel were detained. Some asked why we were conducting surveillance of another nation. Well, my answer is, that is what we do. We are vigilant. We are watchful, because we know that our interests and those of our allies in the region may be challenged, and if and when they are, we must be ready.

I am very proud of the performance of these great men and women and the many thousands of others who proudly wear the uniform of our country. They have been, and will always be, our decisive edge. Indeed, they are so good at what they do, that unless there is an accident, or an incident, then we rarely take notice of their daily contributions to our national security. They sail their ships, they fly their aircraft, and they go on their patrols, quietly and professionally, and America is safe to enjoy great prosperity, in part because of them.

However, today our forces and our people are experiencing some significant challenges, a number of which I would like to bring to your attention. Our first-to-fight forces are, in fact, prepared, trained, and ready to meet emergent requirements, but some of our other forces are not as ready as they should be. These include our strategic airlift fleet, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, our combat service support units, and our training bases, all of which provide critical capabilities to our warfighting forces.

These units are in some cases suffering the consequences of a high OPTEMPO and a diversion of resources to sustain the nearterm readiness of the first-to-fight forces. In fact, since 1995, DOD has experienced a 133-percent increase in the number of military

personnel committed to joint operations. These are real-world events, not exercises, and we are doing it with 9 percent fewer people. That has, in fact, caused a high operational tempo on some segments of our force and that, of course, puts a strain on our people.

I believe the fundamental cause of this situation has, in fact, been an imbalance between the demands of our national security strategy and the post-1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) force structure. Fixing this imbalance, of course, will be one of the top priorities for this year's QDR for Secretary Rumsfeld and all the Joint Chiefs, because the challenge will only increase over time, and we owe it to our people to get it right.

In fact, today we are struggling to reconcile a multitude of competing demands, near-term readiness imperatives, long-term modernization, and recapitalization of aging systems, and infrastructure investments that are central to preserve the world's best warfighting capability. As I have mentioned in previous testimony, and as the Secretary just commented on, we did, in fact, live off of some of our procurement in the 1980s throughout the 1990s.

Now, we have had a marked reduction in procurement. That means the average age of most of our systems, and our key warfighting systems, have been increasing, as was highlighted to some extent by the Secretary.

Let me provide you with just a few examples. Our frontline air superiority fighter, the F-15, averages 17 years of age. It is only 3 years away from the end of its original design service. Our airborne tanker fleet, as well as our B-52 bombers, are nearly 40 years old. Our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, along with our electronic warfare aircraft, such as the RC-135s and EP3s, the P-3s, and our EA-6Bs, all average between 19 and 38 years of service, and our main battle tank, the M-1, and our marine amphibious assault vehicle, are powered by engines that were designed and, in some cases, built in the 1960s.

Finally, numerous helicopter platforms for all of our services have passed or are approaching the end of their original design service lives. In fact, most of the warfighting platforms that I just mentioned meet the 25-year rule required by the great State of Virginia to qualify for antique license plates.

Our force is not aging gracefully. In fact, we are having to spend significantly more in each year to maintain our aging equipment in repair parts and maintenance down time and in maintenance support, which also increases the operational tempo of those great soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines that have to maintain them.

If we do not replace some of these systems soon, either the force structure will shrink, or we will have to continue to maintain the old systems, resulting in spiraling_operations and maintenance costs and reduced combat capability. In my opinion, these are unacceptable alternatives, which begs the question, what should we do? I believe there are two answers. First, we must bring into balance our strategy and our force structure, and we must significantly increase our efforts in procurement to modernize and recapitalize our force. The QDR should produce the strategic blueprint and the investment profile necessary to shape our force to carry out the new strategy.