with the U.S. Department of State, to new host nations requesting the unique engagement capabilities available through JCTP.

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

A key program in this important engagement effort is the Reserve Component's State Partnership Program. SPP grew out of JCTP and uses Reserve personnel from various National Guard and Reserve organizations to partner with defense ministries of Central and Eastern European countries. Last year was extremely successful as National Guard soldiers and airmen conducted dozens of events including 51 Minuteman Fellowships (MMFs), nine "Guardex" events, six PfP as well as several "In the Spirit of Partnership for Peace" exercises, executed more than 25 percent of all events for USEUCOM JCTP, facilitated civic leader visits, and conducted a number of engagement activities with the Russian Federation. The MMF program bridges gaps in other engagement programs and touches levels of society that other programs cannot reach. Through this program we were able to share with our partners our experience and expertise in education, economic development, disaster response, environmental topics, and numerous other subject areas.

When delegations from Tennessee, Minnesota, Indiana, Alabama, Vermont, Illinois, Kansas, and California conducted civic leader visits to SPP counterpart countries, the long-term vision for SPP had been realized-moving beyond military-tomilitary contacts into other important elements of society. Through these activities, state civilian officials in the realms of education, commerce, agriculture, medical emergency services, and disaster response exchange their considerable knowledge and expertise with their partner-nation counterparts.

MARSHALL CENTER

One of the most important and effective regional engagement activities within the U.S. European Command is the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The Marshall Center strengthens security and cooperative relationships among key nations within the theater. It serves as an essential institution for bilateral and multilateral communication and military and civilian exchanges throughout the region.

This organization builds bridges between militaries that once stared at one another through the crosshairs of weapons of war. Under the auspices of the Marshall Center, the once-warring parties of Bosnia came together last year and agreed to slash military spending. Marshall Center graduates have served as peacekeepers in Bosnia and as far away as East Timor. Graduates from Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are now helping to integrate their militaries into NATO. Marshall Center programs have led a number of nations to the democratic restructuring of their defense planning and crisis management processes. Graduates from the Republic of Georgia wrote Tbilisi's recently announced national security strategy. Many Marshall Center graduates now serve as ambassadors, defense attachés, chiefs of defense, members of parliament, and advisors to presidents around the world. These graduates possess a deeper appreciation and respect the concepts of democracy as we understand them, and for human rights and the rule of law.

The Marshall Center is at the forefront in reaching out actively and comprehensively to militaries and defense establishments to lower regional tensions, strengthening civil-military relations in developing nations, and addressing critical regional challenges. Open to leaders from over 47 countries, the Marshall Center is a pillar of America's efforts to shape the world in ways that reinforce and reflect our values and national security interests. It is therefore important that the Marshall Center remains fully resourced in order to continue its excellent work in support of American foreign policy objectives.

THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Drawing on the success of the Marshall Center, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established in December 1999 and conducted its second seminar last July in Botswana. While it does not yet have a permanent location to call home, its rotating seminars provide a unique engagement vehicle in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both civilian and military senior defense officials of almost every African nation gather with U.S. and other friendly nation counterparts to examine and compare experiences on national security strategy, defense economics, and civil-military relations. They then validate their impressions in an end of session capstone exercise. Its forum of open, two-way discussion has enjoyed great success on the continent and builds and strengthens bilateral and multilateral relationships.

NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

In January a year ago the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of the Near East-South Asia (NESA) Center under the management of the National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C. The purpose of the Center is to enhance regional stability by providing an inclusive, neutral institution where regional military, diplomatic, and national security professionals can broaden their understanding of the national strategy formulation process, examine regional security issues, improve their defense-related decision-making skills, and develop cooperative relationships with one another. Participation is open to military and official civilian representatives of all countries within the NESA region with which the U.S. Government maintains formal diplomatic relations. It is also open to non-NESA countries that have strategic interests in the NESA region. The inaugural two-day conference was held at NDU in November, and the first executive seminar will be held in Washington during May.

AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a Department of State training program designed to improve the capabilities of several African nations to conduct humanitarian crisis response and peacekeeping operations. ACRI-trained forces could be offered by their governments for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted by the Organization of African Unity, the UN, sub-regional African organizations, or any other multinational coalition. ACRI also works to shape the African environment by promoting professional and apolitical militaries, reinforcing respect for human rights, and providing a strong example of democratic civil-military relations. This UN-approved program of instruction combines U.S. and UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations doctrine. Program instruction develops common standards for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations among the participating ACRI countries. Recently, the program was expanded to include brigade-level training focusing on the command, control, and logistical aspects of supporting a multinational brigade in the field.

OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF

Last year USEUCOM was tasked to help train five Nigerian battalions, one Ghanaian battalion, and one Senegalese battalion in order to participate in UN operations in Sierra Leone, and more strategically, to support the professional development of the Nigerian military-an important force for regional stability. This operation is being conducted in fiscal year 2001 using State Department peacekeeping operations (PKO) funding as well as DOD resources made available under Presidential drawdown authority.

To accomplish this mission, Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) was tasked to execute the mission with Army and Air Force units in support. Based on information provided by the SOCEUR-led Military Survey Team, a 10-week training program using U.S. instructors and an equipment support package was developed. Execution of the train-and-equip program was designed for three-phase completion, commencing last October, with mission accomplishment likely later this year. Upon completion of the training program, each battalion should be capable of operating and maintaining newly acquired equipment, conducting daylight company level attacks and conducting day and night defensive operations as a maneuver company under command and control of a battalion headquarters.

We have now completed phase one of the three-phase program and our personnel have performed magnificently. However, interagency policy-level decisions must be made early enough in the process so funding and resources can be programmed to meet timelines and support requirements. Additionally, human rights vetting must be complete for all personnel to be trained, to include attached units, prior to the initiation of training. There must also be host nation agreement on the training program at every political and military level in order to assure mission success. Operation Focus Relief is not an operation without risk. However, with only 200+ U.S. personnel assigned in non-combatant roles, the dollar investment is minimal and the payoff great in that it is successfully training local forces to deal with regional problems. In this way, Operation Focus Relief is pioneering a new method of engagement.

KEY THEATER MISSIONS AND CHALLENGES

Challenges in the USEUCOM AOR will continue as the U.S. works to strengthen and maintain the NATO structure, prepares forces to better respond to future conflict, shapes the international environment through engagement, executes contin

gency operations, and monitors potential future conflict areas. I have highlighted key challenges and continuing missions below to give an idea of the diversity of theater challenges and missions.

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY

"The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is dependent upon interoperability between organizations, processes, and technologies.”

Joint Vision 2020

The U.S. European Command and America's allies and friends recognize that most military operations in the future, from peacekeeping and humanitarian relief to a major theater war, will typically be multinational in character. Success in multinational operations will depend on two factors: the capabilities of the national forces involved in the operation; and the degree to which these forces can be melded to create an effective force. These factors will demand a high level of interoperability and enhanced capabilities between the participating national forces.

In this vein NATO has met and excelled at every challenge since the end of the Cold War precisely because of its ability to commit multinational forces structured to meet military threats to its members. NATO's greatest challenges today originate not externally, but from within. The growing asymmetry in technology between European and U.S. military forces is producing a serious imbalance in our military capabilities. Furthermore, Europe's shrinking defense industrial base and limitations in production of advanced military capabilities could lead to a future where only the U.S. has the ability to engage globally.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative, launched in April 1999, is an effort by the European members of NATO to resolve glaring capabilities shortfalls between them and the U.S. as evidenced by past NATO exercises and Operation Allied Force in and over Kosovo. The Capabilities Initiative's two primary thrusts, improving national capabilities and exploring ways to pool capabilities, allow our allies and partners to enhance interoperability, take advantage of economies of scale, and afford participation by those countries that do not possess the resources to go it alone. The initiative specifically targets five capabilities: effective engagement; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; sustainability and logistics; and communications/information systems. As Europeans work to improve their national and collective security, we have encouraged defense cooperation and procurement using the DCI roadmap and believe it mutually reinforces the needs of NATO and the European Union (EU).

The DCI's success depends upon whether Europeans are willing to spend more, and more wisely, in narrowing the gap between their military technology and warfighting capability, and our own. Should Europe prove unable to engage in military operations at or near the level of U.S. capabilities, it may leave them vulnerable and limit the U.S. in some cases to unilateral action. Such a future undermines America's strategic vision and assumptions-diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Finite resources and domestic political realities dictate that unilateral action cannot be the future norm. Unilateral action endangers the historical link between the American and European peoples. While the issue of DCI is being worked at the highest levels in NATO, it is critically important that Congress work to engage their European counterparts on this issue. The U.S. must continue to engage with its European allies to help foster the necessary changes to enable Europe to remain a contributing strategic partner across the spectrum of potential operations. DCI is a crucial area on which the future of a strong Trans-Atlantic link may very well depend.

EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO SECURITY STRUCTURES

The establishment of a common foreign policy, supported by a military capability, within the EU is one of the most important political-military issues facing Europe and the United States today. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is worked hard, continuously, and at presidential and prime ministerial levels in every capital in Europe. If the military and political links that eventually define the relationship between NATO and the EU do not result in transparency, coordination, and a cooperative effort, it places at serious risk the future of the alliance. Indeed it is the form these permanent arrangements between the two will take, and assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities, that are the most contentious and potentially destructive questions currently under debate.

The recently completed Foreign Minister's meeting in Brussels was not able to reach agreement on these issues and will require much effort by the new administration. We believe that SHAPE headquarters can play a constructive and indispen

sable role by accomplishing the future military planning for both organizations, thereby_negating the need for a duplicative headquarters solely to support the EU. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO continues to evolve within U.S. redlines as the EU develops, through the ESDP, both capabilities and institutions for its security and defense aspirations. Even though the progress to date has generally met U.S. expectations, I would suggest that officials in Washington remain vigilant to ensure that ESDP remains relevant from a U.S. perspective. They should emphasize the requirement for Europeans to develop their capabilities, maintain NATO-EU linkages, and underscore the necessity for the inclusion of non-EU NATO members in emerging security and defense arrangements.

Successful implementation of the European Security and Defense Policy within the European Union will require a concerted effort between the European members of NATO, EU members who are not in NATO, and Canada and the United States. This cooperation is essential to build the military and political links between NATO and the Union necessary to achieve a common strategic vision and make the needed improvements in technological capabilities.

Last November witnessed positive developments in the Capabilities Commitment Conference. This effort has been a primary focus of the French during their 6 months as President of the EU last year. The planning scenarios used to determine capabilities and forces required for the ESDP Headline Goal Force have remained realistic. In this regard, the EU has commitments for a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 personnel, which is the minimum goal. The EU member countries placed a total of 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 warships at the EU's immediate disposal to support this RRF. If this force becomes reality it is sufficient to establish the EU as a significant military power.

The military staff at SHAPE played a very constructive role in assisting the EU's interim military staff in the development of these goals. The Catalogue of Forces turned out to be impressive, with high-end capabilities that are fully in line with Europe's DCI efforts. My main apprehension regarding capabilities is that they remain compatible with NATO Force Goals once the EU force is established and that the Europeans follow through with the necessary financial commitments to correct identified capability shortfalls.

In my role as the military commander of NATO's forces (SACEUR), I am fully engaged in providing advice and perspective as this issue evolves. In my estimation, if handled successfully by NATO HQ in Brussels and the European Union, the ESDP process will strengthen the security posture of the European continent. However, there are many complicated factors remaining before this capability is realized. The central issue, in my view, is the method by which a plan is developed and presented. When a potential conflict or crisis emerges the planning should be conducted by the SHAPE staff, with EU military augmentation. The Deputy SACEUR would then take the completed plan to the EU and I would send it to the NATO political authorities. If NATO elects not to involve itself, the EU could pick up the mission and deploy forces as required. If the process does not follow this model the EU will be unnecessarily creating large and redundant staffs and a real possibility of double counting and tasking existing NATO forces. Realization of ESDP largely hinges on the Europeans' willingness to make the necessary fiscal and political commitments. Any newly financed capabilities, however, must be in line with DCI-not duplicating but rather reinforcing alliance capabilities.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION

There are currently nine European nations that aspire to NATO membership. While the decision to expand the alliance is a political one and will ultimately be made in capitals across Europe and North America, an aspirant's military readiness will be scrutinized and is certainly part of the equation. Thus far, the nine aspirants have benefited from U.S.-funded defense assessments as well as from the NATO Membership Action Plan with its associated Partnership Goals. These mechanisms have provided a valuable roadmap toward reform and interoperability in the event that additional nations are offered NATO membership.

As for the three newest members of the alliance-Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic-the Interagency Group estimated that a 10-year process would elapse before these nations fully transition from past Warsaw Pact doctrine, equipment, and organization to NATO interoperability. One should avoid any unrealistic expectations of full integration this early-only 3 years since the Madrid invitations. Nevertheless, they have made great progress. Each has performed well in both exercises and deployments, including the very demanding environments of Bosnia and Kosovo where they share the burden through a contribution of nearly 2,500 troops to the international effort.

EUROPEAN REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

A number of potentially hostile nations are working to develop long-range missiles to coerce and threaten countries in North America and Europe. President Bush has stated that we will deploy missile defenses as soon as possible. These defenses, he has made clear, must protect not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies.

NATO's Strategic Concept also recognizes that "the Alliance's defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missiles defenses." As the U.S. pursues this capability, I suggest it continues to consult our friends around the world. Open and frank discussions on this initiative between the U.S., NATO, and our other European allies, will further understanding and help avoid alienating our valued friends.

The defenses envisaged will reinforce the credibility of U.S. security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. No one can reasonably argue that Europe would be more secure if the U.S. were less secure from a missile attack. An America able to defend itself from missile attacks is an America better able to defend Europe and common Western security interests. As consultations proceed with allies on missile defense, we realize they will continue to consider the appropriate role of missile defenses in their respective national security strategies for dealing with the changing international threat environment. In keeping with the fundamental principle of the alliance that the security of its members is indivisible, the United States is open to discussing possible cooperation with allies on longer-range ballistic missile defense, just as we have with our discussions and cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force Protection (FP) remains a top USEUCOM priority. We are exercising an aggressive Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) program providing clear AT/FP policy, measures, and tools to mitigate risk and maximize security for our personnel and their families. We have implemented a number of innovative AT/FP programs, examining the application of state-of-the-art technology to enhance access control and explosive detection, and are continuing our efforts to field mass notification systems throughout the theater. We are making progress, but resourcing continues to challenge our AT/FP Service priorities.

U.S. European Command is in the staffing process of publishing a significantly updated AT/FP Operations Order (OPORD) 01-01 prescribing AT/FP standards and requirements. These new mandatory requirements encompass FP engineering design standards for new construction, major renovations, and existing facilities. USEUCOM has also instituted a comprehensive Installation AT/FP Program Manager course to train the unit FP officers in our AT construction and design standards. To date, we have established AT/FP responsibilities for DOD elements and personnel at 67 Chief of Mission locations throughout the USEUCOM AOR.

Coupled with this, 137 AT/FP vulnerability assessments, including 74 Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, have been undertaken over the past year. These assessments have identified AT/FP vulnerabilities and assisted commanders in addressing those deficiencies through the use of countermeasures, procedural changes, and resourcing-endeavoring to eliminate or mitigate their potential exploitation by terrorists.

We have developed and fielded a web-based Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (VAMP). The VAMP captures results of vulnerability assessments, prioritizes AOR_vulnerabilities, identifies deficiencies, and lists corrective actions needed or completed. VAMP is a management tool available to every commander and AT/FP officer from the theater down to the installation level and allows commanders and decision makers the ability to track and identify the actions taken or required to correct and/or mitigate vulnerabilities at specific installations throughout the AOR.

We employ risk management and mission analysis processes in all deliberate, crisis, and contingency operational planning and exercises. Threat working groups and assessment tools, such as the VAMP, play a critical role in these processes. In light of recent events these processes are receiving additional scrutiny. Although we cannot eliminate all vulnerabilities, we continue to use risk management when deciding missions in this theater in order to reduce risk to our personnel-identifying vulnerabilities and resources required to reduce exploitable FP vulnerabilities.

Our intelligence operations continually analyze and assess potential terrorist threats to U.S. installations, facilities and personnel. We use a variety of systems to disseminate intelligence within the command and provide routine and time-sen