Modernization Program (RMP), Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI), Link-16, and Multi-function Information Distribution System (MIDS) data links. Also key to transforming the fleet to meet 21st century threats is our serious commitment to fleet experimentation, spearheaded by the Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport, Rhode Island. Our ongoing series of Fleet Battle Experiments, working hand-in-hand with U.S. Joint Forces Command's experimentation efforts, holds great promise for doctrinal and programmatic development. The result of these efforts will be a fleet that enhances conventional and WMD deterrence, assures access, conducts precision strike, gathers real-time intelligence, exercises joint command and control, and exploits the priceless advantages of sea control. In short, it will be a transformed Navy that continues its time-honored service, on watch for America's security. CONCLUSION I thank the committee for your continued strong support of our Navy, our sailors, and their families. Working together, I am confident that we can meet the challenges of current and future readiness, allowing the United States Navy to fulfill the missions fundamental to a more stable and peaceful world. Chairman LEVIN. Admiral Clark, thank you very much. STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, General JONES. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Thank you very much for your kind thoughts and words with regard to the families of marines who lost their lives and were injured in the accident last night at New River, North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, you correctly captured the sentiment with regard to the dangerous missions that we entrust to our men and women in uniform, and I will convey your words to their families and to the Corps. Thank you, sir. I would like to add parenthetically, although under the backdrop of this tragedy, that I am pleased to report that thus far this fiscal year is the safest recorded year for flight mishaps in recorded Marine Corps aviation history, despite the accident. With regard to the 2002 budget and the 2001 supplemental that is before you, many good things were done for our marines and their families. Quality of life enhancements, pay and entitlement, health, flying hours, military construction, force protection issues, all received great attention and we are profoundly grateful for this assistance. I am happy to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the Marine Corps is today a very stable culture. The proof of that is in its recruiting successes and its retention efforts across the board. Officer, staff, NCO, enlisted, 62 percent of the Marine Corps budget is now consumed by manpower accounts, pay, entitlements, health care and the like. This is good. It also underscores what is not being done; despite the fixes that we have made in readiness, and they have been substantial, we are still going to continue to pay for it out of deferred modernization and out of inattention to our infrastructure recapitalization, which critically needs urgent attention. I have said before that the Marine Corps is expeditionary by culture and transformational by design. I say that because words are important. I would like to talk very briefly about two sets of words. The first one is the words "expeditionary" versus "deployability." When you talk about expeditionary requirements for the Nation, you are talking about investment in speed, and speed is expensive. Speed may get you there quickly, but it will not do you any good if it is not logistically sustainable. So we talk about being able to get to different spots on the globe quickly. I just would like to underscore the fact that if you cannot sustain them once they are there it is not a good investment. Simply put, too much speed may not be logistically sustainable. Put another way, the Nation does not need all of its forces to get to spot X or Y on the globe at the same time, nor can we afford it or lift it. In 1973 we had an energy crisis and we pledged, or at least it was attempted to pledge, that we would not be held hostage to fossil fuels for our automobile industry, and we directed and pledged ourselves to transformational processes whereby our cars would become electric or solar-powered. Well, 27 or 28 years later, what we really did was modernize. We developed fuel efficiencies, better, lighter cars, safer cars, though we are still essentially dependent on fossil fuels. So you may have transformational goals, but you may wind up simply modernizing. So that is the second set of words that I would mention. Transformation versus modernization needs to be considered, how much of one you need in relation to the other. You should consider transformation and modernization and expeditionary capabilities versus simply deployable needs in relation to how we use our forces. Since the end of World War II we have deployed forces in response to burgeoning crises over 300 times, we have actually mobilized follow-on forces six times, and we have committed forces to major theater conflicts three times. So the power of our engagement strategies, which are not dependent on speed, but dependent on location and being engaged and being present and shaping the environment and doing things that are very important for our Nation and our alliances, is very important. So we need both transformation and modernization, but perhaps not in the same amounts. We are likely to need more modernization than transformation since transformation is sometimes dependent on science and physics and programs that may or may not come to pass. The Marine Corps' transformation and modernization programs are designed and on the books today to result in a convergence path that will start coming to fruition in 2008. As an example, I consider transformational programs for the Marine Corps to include the V-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, the AAAV, integrated logistics concepts which will revolutionize the way we support our forward-deployed and based forces, information operations, and naval precision fires. As an example of the modernization process, I consider the Lightweight 155, the LCAC, Landing Cushion Aircraft, SLEP program, the acquisition of HIMARS, the AH-1T modernization, the 120-millimeter mortar program, the M-4 service rifle, and the Joint Tactical Radio, and the KC-130J to be examples of needed modernization programs. I believe that the American citizen of the future generation expects that we will be the dominant Nation of influence, so-called superpower, 50 years from now. I believe we can do this if we un derstand that the purpose of our investment in peacetime is so we do not have to fight wars, and the way we used our forces in the last 50 years suggests persuasively that we are successful at doing this. We understand that national security is not an independent investment and that such an investment is the anchor that allows our Nation to be the Nation of global influence economically, politically, diplomatically, culturally, scientifically and technologically. It is abundantly clear in my judgment that approximately 2.9 percent of our gross domestic product towards this goal is insufficient. Whatever Congress decides the investment is, I recommend that it be proportional and sustained over a gradual period of time. I am truly excited by the prospect of working with the Secretary of Defense, our Secretary of the Navy, the DOD and senior military leaders to adopt better business practices, which are critically needed, and much-needed acquisition reforms. The Marine Corps is proud to be the largest activity-based costing management program in the Department of Defense currently. Our budget request, designed with both transformation and modernization in mind, balances the requirement for expeditionary forces with that for simply deployable forces. It has its convergence in 2008 and we can do that by sustaining and supporting the programs that are currently a matter of record. This is inclusive of base housing and modernization and recapitalization of our infrastructure. We have a path to success. We continue to develop our foundational needs, such as the acquisition of Blount Island, which in my judgment should be done by 2004-it is a national asset and it is a national logistics gateway; enhancing and achieving a 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift capability, due to the predictable paucity of land-based operational support bases in the 21st century. We should look at maritime prepositioned ships of the future, to explore rapid sealift. I would also caution that we pay a lot of attention to the rise of encroachment issues, which are going to face all of us in the foreseeable future. The Secretary of Defense has said we should only replace things if we have something better to replace them with. I understand that, I agree with it, and we are already moving in that direction. The rapidly deployable force with staying power that some has said is nonexistent in the military today in fact does exist and it is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. It is both expeditionary and it is deployable. It is being modernized and will be transformed in part, maybe in whole, between now and 2008, and it exists today for the joint warfighter. It possesses forcible entry capability, it is affordable, it is scalable, it is forward-based or deployed, it is sustainable, it is joint and interoperable, and it is combined arms-capable, which is a goal that all true joint forces in the future must seek to achieve. A final thought, Mr. Chairman. It is an exciting time to be a United States Marine. We look forward to our future while learning from the past, and we look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement of General Jones follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the committee; it is my pleasure to report to you on the state of your Marine Corps. On behalf of all marines and their families, I want to thank the committee for its continued support. Your efforts to increase compensation and improve the quality of life of our young men and women in uniform have been central to the health of your Marine Corps and are deeply appreciated. VISION I believe the committee is well familiar with the nature of the present international security landscape and the current state of our forces, so I will begin simply by noting some of the ways in which warfare has changed in the 21st century. In the 20th century, mass and volume were the primary methods relied upon to win wars. In their place, speed, stealth, precision, and sustainment have become the emergent principles of modern warfare. These four principles have application from the strategic to the tactical levels. Furthermore, they are key with regard to how our forces maneuver and employ weapons as well as to how they exchange information and logistically sustain themselves. The Marine Corps' vision, accordingly, is to inculcate these principles into our doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support. One indication of our commitment to do this, reflected in Marine Corps Strategy 21, is our concerted aim to enhance the strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Speed, stealth, precision, and sustainment are integral to each of these capabilities. Indeed, we are revolutionizing our approach to operations with these 21st century principles of war in mind. We are moving beyond the traditional amphibious assault operations which we conducted in the 20th century. Our goal now is advanced, expeditionary operations from land and sea to both deter and respond to crises. The Corps has been our Nation's premier expeditionary force since our landing at Nassau in the Bahamas, 225 years ago. Today, we have worldwide responsiveness and the versatility to undertake missions across the spectrum of operations. To marines, the term "expeditionary" connotes more than a given capability. For us, it is a cultural mindset that conditions our marines to be able to rapidly deploy with little advance warning and effectively operate with organic logistical support in austere environments. This is the basis of the Marine Corps' culture as well as an acknowledgement of the necessity to do more with less and to be prepared to fight and win with only the resources we bring with us, without the need to return to fixed bases for refitting or retraining. A prime example of these attributes is resident within our medium weight Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Nearly 10 years ago, in light of pressing manpower considerations, we deactivated our six standing brigade command elements. Last year, we reestablished three Marine Expeditionary Brigades by embedding their staffs within our Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters. These units are now actively operating. The 1st MEB recently participated in operation NATIVE FURY, a humanitarian assistance mission in Kenya; 2d MEB has been integrated into contingency plans for Europe and Latin America; and, 3d MEB has conducted a maritime prepositioning shipping offload in Australia. The versatility of the MEB is emblematic of the unique scalability of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. In size and capability, these brigades are midway between our Marine Expeditionary Units and our Marine Expeditionary Forces. Furthermore, our MEBs can either deploy on amphibious shipping or be airlifted into a theater of operations and join up with Maritime Prepositioning Forces. A special characteristic of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces is that they consist of five integrated elements: command; ground combat; aviation; logistics; and, supporting establishment. The MEB consists of a regimental landing team, with organic infantry, artillery, and armor elements, and in addition to a composite aircraft group with both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, it also has a combat service support group-whose supplies can sustain the MEB in full scale combat for 30 days. Each of these elements reinforces the others. This teamwork, built on training and experience, reaches across every battlefield function, creating a unique degree of synergy that distinguishes our units from others. Ultimately, our vision of the future and our expeditionary culture, along with our philosophy of maneuver warfare, come together in our emerging capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Achieving the full promise of that concept will hinge on our efforts to balance the competing demands of near-term readiness and investment in equipment modernization and infrastructure. This is no small task. 75-346 D-10 These over-arching concerns are interrelated and in the long-term we cannot have one without the others. In order to improve our near-term readiness, we have made significant internal adjustments over the past 2 years. Through reduction in attrition of our first term marines, internal management efficiencies, outsourcing, and privatization, we will eventually return approximately 4,000 marines to the operating forces. We are also utilizing numerous best business practices to make our operations both efficient and effective and now have the largest Activity-Based Costing/Management program in the Department of Defense, if not all of government. While these efforts have improved the efficient application of fiscal and manpower resources, and directly supported our commitment to personnel readiness in the operating forces, we are still assessing the totality of our personnel requirement. Should a need for additional personnel be determined, we are confident that commensurate funding and our continued recruiting and retention successes will support any required increase. Despite such efficiencies, we are, regrettably, continuing to maintain our nearterm readiness at the expense of our modernization. During the past decade, the Nation has consistently limited the resources dedicated to its national security. Consequently, the dramatic increases in operational requirements coupled with imposed constraints have mandated a substantively reduced rate of investment in equipment modernization and infrastructure. We are, in fact, at a point where we can no longer fail to rectify these shortfalls. As a nation with global responsibilities, we cannot ignore the critical importance of readiness. The fiscal year 2002 budget submitted by the President proposes increased funding for military pay and entitlements, health care benefits, flying hours, base and station utilities, depot maintenance, strategic lift, essential base operating support costs, and force protection requirements. The administration also provided increased funding for one of our most underfunded areas-our infrastructure. Additional funds provided in this budget will allow us to begin to address badly needed family housing requirements at Camp Pendleton, California, and bachelor enlisted quarters at various locations. These are of great importance to our readiness. Nevertheless, I remain concerned about the level of investment in our infrastructure and equipment modernization. For example, the fiscal year 2002 budget does not include increases for ground equipment modernization. READINESS We assess our readiness in terms of "four pillars:" marines and their families; our infrastructure; our legacy equipment systems; and, our transformation and modernization efforts. Each of these pillars requires attention and resources in order to ensure your Corps is prepared to serve our Nation's interests. I will discuss each of the pillars and comment on what we are currently doing and what we want to do with the support of this committee, beginning with the most important part of the Marine Corps, its people. Our Marines and Their Families The Marine Corps has three major goals: making America's marines; winning our Nation's battles; and, creating quality citizens. The fact that people are the focus of two of these three goals exemplifies the extent to which we recognize the special trust and confidence that the Nation reposes in us for the care and welfare of the young men and women in our charge. Safety is central to the Corps' focus on people and it is a critical component of maintaining our readiness. It is also a vital element of the quality of life that we provide our marines and their families. Along these lines, I am pleased to report that we have significantly lowered our off-duty mishap rates. Moreover, we have had notable success in aviation safety: our Class "A" flight mishap rate is the lowest it has ever been at this point in the fiscal year. For these trends to continue, it will take our unrelenting attention and we are dedicated to maintaining our focus on this important issue. One factor contributing to our safety challenge is that we are a young force. The average age of our marines is 23, roughly 7 to 9 years younger than the average age of the members of the other services. This is part of the culture of the Corps inasmuch as our unique force structure results in 68 percent of our marines being on their first enlistment at any one time. The nature of our force structure requires us to annually recruit 39,000 men and women into our enlisted ranks. To fill this tremendous demand, our recruiters work tirelessly and have consistently met our accession goals in quality and quantity for 6 consecutive years as of the end of June 2001. Retention is as important as recruiting. We are proud that we are meeting our retention goals across nearly all military occupational specialties. Intangibles-such |