FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A 1992 Defense Science Board (DSB) report31 on ballistic missile defense underscores our concerns on discrimination. Not only does the report speak of the unpredictability of the actions of "Third World Aggressors" with regards to their employment of penetration aids. The DSB panel makes the following recommendation: "The US response to the problem of PENAIDS should be a highly focused intelligence effort and a substantial testing program in which flexible and robust radar and interceptor techniques can be developed and proven against a wide variety of simple PENAIDS and tactics." The findings and recommendations of this report remain valid today. B. DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA (CRITERIA 4 – 6) The three criteria under deployment – production readiness, capability to sustain, and capability to field were selected to demonstrate that all necessary planning functions have been completed with enough detail at the time of DRR to allow for the production and deployment of an operationally suitable and sustainable system by 2005. 1. Criterion #4: NMD Production Readiness " Definition: "An assessment of the program's readiness to produce the system. ' Assessment: While there is no direct data to support findings in this area, it is apparent from difficulties in maintaining flight test schedules that the extreme quality control that must be maintained in assembly and preparation of the EKV will complicate the weapon system production process. Discussion: This criterion is an assessment of the NMD program's readiness to produce the components of the NMD system - with the quality and reliability necessary to meet the NMD program requirements on time to support a FY05 deployment in accordance with the phased production program and required DAB milestones. A production readiness assessment will be based on system and element manufacturing and producibility plans. 2. Criterion #5: Capability to Field the NMD System Definition: "An assessment of the program's readiness to field the system." 31 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Ballistic Missile Defense (U), 1991 Summer Study, SECRET. 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Assessment: As stated in the Criterion #4 assessment above, the quality control requirements in assembling the EKV will probably drive the weapon system production timelines. Past experience in preparation for integrated flight testing suggests that this may have a major impact in satisfying the FY 05 and 07 delivery requirements. The LSI states that it is "aware of no evidence" that quality control is an issue. Discussion: This criterion is an assessment of the NMD program's readiness to field the system. In order to support site selection and a construction award, deployment functions such as facility/site design and environmental impact statements must be complete. The DRR Team has indicated that tactical and tactical support facility designs32 will not be at the required 100 percent completion by the DRR date. Long-lead times required for construction and environmental work make progress in this area especially critical in order to meet the deployment schedule. 3. Criterion #6: Capability to Sustain the NMD System Definition: “An assessment of the program's readiness to sustain the system once fielded." Assessment: Insufficient data available to make an assessment. The OTA assessment is expected to address survivability aspects of the program in their Early Operational Assessment (EOA) report. Discussion: This criterion is an assessment of the NMD program's readiness to sustain the system once fielded. An evaluation will be made based on progress toward the development or completion of the following items: 32 Tactical facilities are those needed to meet the operating requirements of the NMD system, including the XBR antenna mount facility, radar control and support systems facility, launch farm complex, missile field, readiness station, interceptor receiving and processing facility, interceptor storage facilities, and maintenance and vehicle heated storage facility. 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY KMR KPP LFT&E LGG LIDS LSI MDAP FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwajalein Missile Range Key Performance Parameter Live Fire Test and Evaluation LSI Integration Distributed Simulation Major Defense Acquisition Program Medium Reentry Vehicle Multiple Simultaneous Engagement National Missile Defense Operations in a Nuclear Environment Operational Test Agency Operational Test and Evaluation Parametric Endo-Exoatmospheric Lethality Simulation MBE MRV MSE NCA NMD OPINE ORD OSD OTA OT&E PEELS PLCCE Program Life-Cycle Cost Estimate FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY be validated through intercept flight testing. Multiple engagements of at least How will an EKV respond to another EKV in its field of view, or multiple How is the performance of an EKV seeker affected by a thrusting EKV or Can the X-Band radar simultaneously track multiple RVs that require different antenna orientations? Can the IFICS communicate with multiple KVs? Radar discrimination with limited a priori knowledge of the target complex needs to be flight tested prior to the FY01 radar decision. This type of test ("pop quiz" type) of flight test needs to be executed, at least during a risk reduction flight. This test should employ multiple decoys designed to mimic the RV radar signature but should not provide unrealistically detailed target or decoy information to the GBR-P radar prior to the engagement. 2. Testing Artificiality system. Current test range limitations need to be removed to adequately test the NMD Use of the FPQ-14 range radar as the source of Weapon Task Plan data needs to be phased out. Target trajectories or radar surrogate locations need to be changed to permit the organic NMD system to provide early radar cueing with the appropriate degree of position and velocity accuracy. Engagement geometries need to be devised that will provide higher speed engagement conditions for the EKV, as would be expected in the C1 timeframe with the tactical booster. 3. Operational Realism IOT&E. Avoidable limitations to operational realism must be removed before conduct of . Rehearsed engagements with a priori knowledge of target complex, target trajectory, and time of launch need to be discontinued during operational testing. Situations employing lack of a priori knowledge also need to be 54 |