issue, the Russians would look at that and they would laugh. This is not something that should make any Russian planner stay awake at night for even a single minute.

Chairman LEVIN. I do not think they are laughing about what you are proposing. From what I gather, they are not laughing at all, unless you think that is just

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is because of the larger treaty issues, but what I am trying to emphasize is, this capability we are talking about at Fort Greely may disturb a North Korean planner, but it is not in any way a capability that threatens Russian missiles at all.

Chairman LEVIN. But they do view it as a serious possible violation of a treaty, is that correct, with broader implications? Is that a fair statement, that they view it that way?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is a fair statement, and I am trying to make a distinction which I think is a relevant one between the broader implications of the treaty, which we take very seriously, and the actual military implications of this deployment, which are quite modest.

Chairman LEVIN. I want to be really clear, though, on one point. You do intend now that the Fort Greely activity have as soon as possible an operational capability, albeit rudimentary. That is your current intent, is that correct?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Not necessarily.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, you do intend that the tests work well, and the threat from North Korea is here and now.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The General said 4 to 6 years. There are some people and I cannot say I am quite this optimistic. There are people who think the North Korean regime might collapse within that time frame.

Chairman LEVIN. But that is not where you are coming from. You believe the North Korean threat is basically here and now, is that not correct?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is moving along rapidly, yes, sir. Chairman LEVIN. You do want the tests to succeed, is that not correct?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Given those two facts, what you believe and what you hope, is it not a fair statement to say that you want the Fort Greely activity to have the operational capability, albeit rudimentary, as soon as possible? Is that not a fair statement?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think that is a fair statement. I am not a lawyer. I do not know what intent means.

Chairman LEVIN. Your intent.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would like that development to give us an option for a rudimentary operational capability.

Chairman LEVIN. To give it to us as quickly as possible.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. So then you are going to have your review group tell us whether or not, since that is your intent for that activity, that activity then would violate-yes or no, we do not know yet the ABM Treaty, and we are going to have a compliance review group decision on that issue, I assume, when?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Soon.

Senator BUNNING. First of all, I would like to ask that my opening statement be put into the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Bunning follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JIM BUNNING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us again. I would like to begin by congratulating you on a successful test this last weekend. The defense of our Nation from all kinds of threats is the most important responsibility of government. Ballistic missiles, and the weapons they carry, contain a threat of destruction so terrible that ballistic missile defense must be our first priority in protecting this Nation.

During the 1980s when President Reagan wanted to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe, many resisted, believing that it would be provocative to the Soviet Union. The result, as we all know, was that we were able to convince the Soviets to remove all of their intermediate range missiles, in exchange for removing ours.

The world is very different today than it was then. Russia is not our enemy, and we are not proposing to deploy an offensive system, as President Reagan did. We are going to deploy a defensive system, that will protect our citizens from the threat of a rogue nation or of an accidental launch.

Our missile defense system will not threaten the Russian's strategic capabilities. Once they know that to be true, they will accept our program, and perhaps wish to work with us to establish their own. The only people who should be upset by our defensive shield, are those who might one day wish to threaten us with their missiles.

It is important to remember that arms control treaties exist because they improve the security of both parties to that treaty. When the strategic situation changes, as it has since the end of the Cold War, and those treaties hinder security rather than strengthen it, then they serve no further purpose. This is clearly the case with the ABM Treaty.

Gentlemen, I realize that we have a long way to go to protect our country from this threat, but we will never get there unless we continue to press forward.

Senator BUNNING. I congratulate you, General and Mr. Secretary, for the successful test that we had last Saturday. It is a step in the right direction, obviously. To succeed is better than failing, and to move one step forward in the missile defense program is very important at this point in time.

A question for Secretary Wolfowitz. Russia is actually located a lot closer to a large number of countries that are developing ballistic missile technology. They are closer than we are. It would seem to me that the threat to their nation is at least as great as the threat to ours. If that is the case, then it would seem to be in their national interest to develop national missile defense also. Do you feel that a limited national missile defense is in Russia's national interest, as well as ours?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do absolutely, Senator, and if you will indulge me for a minute, we had talks with the Russians 9 years ago. În the summer of 1992 Dennis Ross led a delegation to Moscow and met with Foreign Minister Mamyedov. One of the things they addressed specifically was the situation of the threat of third countries to both of us, and the impression our people had at the time was that there was a great deal of Russian interest in the possible danger to themselves from these capabilities, and at one point in the discussions, the subject came up.

The Russian side said, well, what would you Americans do if you had a missile defense capability in space and one of these third countries launched a missile at us, and the American side said, well, if we could, we would shoot it down, and this was the moment

at which people were falling asleep in this hot room, and they suddenly woke up. The Russians were, I think, quite surprised, pleasantly surprised that in this new world we would see a threat to them from third countries as something we would like to help them defend against.

We talk about a new strategic framework with Russia. We do not just mean amendments to the ABM Treaty, we mean a different kind of approach to the whole subject. I think it would include, Senator, along the lines of your question, every effort to work cooperatively on improving missile defenses, because it is not in the interest of the United States-and let me repeat this-it is not in the interest of the United States or Russia to be vulnerable to limited missile attack from any direction. I do not believe it is in the interest of Russia for the United States to be vulnerable to limited missile attack. I believe that we have more to do working together to cooperate in dealing with that than in trying to work around the edges of a 1972 treaty between two hostile adversaries.

Senator BUNNING. I would like to follow up. Would you characterize the fiscal year 2002 testing program as being the first step in developing a missile defense system that is more concerned about being successful than being in compliance with an outdated treaty from 1972 which does not take into account modern threats? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think this is the first time that the Secretary of Defense-and General Kadish I guess should be the witness here when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, I want you to develop the best possible development program to move as rapidly as we can to explore these technologies and be in a position to deploy. Do not worry about the ABM Treaty. If there are ABM Treaty issues, you through your compliance review group will bring them to me, but I will resolve them. I think that was the first time you had that guidance, is that not correct, General?

General KADISH. Certainly during my tenure, yes.

Senator BUNNING. Let me ask the General a follow-up, then. The Clinton administration designed its ballistic missile program around the goal of ensuring compliance with the ABM Treaty. As a result, it only pursued technologies that would not violate the treaty, rather than pursuing technologies that had the best chance of working.

Unlike the previous administration, I actually want to see a missile defense system that works. The current RDT&E program pursues a number of different technologies that the previous administration did not. Do you believe that the structure of the current program provides the most likely chance of developing a system, or a group of systems that can actually defend the American people? General KADISH. I do, Senator, and that is the basic thrust of the multilayered system approach, because we have to consider mobile systems, sea-based and others, in order to achieve that, which do have treaty implications.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, in fairness, the last administration did submit in its last budget a request for money for the Shemya radar, which, as a matter of fact, would have been a violation of the ABM Treaty. They were prepared at least in that area to move forward, but I think constrained the program artificially with a variety of technologies that General Kadish is pursuing that

I think were kept off of the table because of their treaty implications.

Senator BUNNING. One last question. It is about the groundbased interceptors and radars in Alaska. Please, please explain to me-and I know you have tried to explain to many others--the advantage gained for the program by that placement. I mean, is it specifically to counter North Korea, or is it specifically to develop and test the technology?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me try, since I am not the technician, and then the technician can correct it, but as I have understood the explanations, and it made sense to me, in order to move beyond kind of rudimentary capability that was demonstrated in the test Saturday night that you saw the film strip on, in order to begin to introduce the sort of real-world complications that I think Senator Akaka referred to with multiple decoys and multiple angles, longer ranges, in other words, in order to be more realistic, you need a different test bed, a more dispersed test bed.

Alaska allows us that geometry. It also puts it in a place where that test bed will ultimately begin to be the basis of an operational capability, and it is a philosophy of, if we are going to spend this much money on a test bed, let us have it be in a place where it could also become operational, rather than deliberately put it somewhere where it cannot be operational, and then have to reproduce that whole expenditure somewhere else.

General KADISH. I would agree wholeheartedly with that. That is exactly why we chose to do it this way. Instead of building it twice, we build it once, basically.

Senator BUNNING. My time has expired. I want to thank you both for your straightforward answers, and Godspeed.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Cleland.

Senator CLELAND. Mr. Secretary, are you on track for deploying a national missile defense system by 2004?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I am not sure what on-track means, and you may not have been here when General Kadish explained, with this test bed in Alaska, if things worked well we would have expect to have in the time frame 2004 to 2006 some rudimentary capability to set up an operational system, but it is rudimentary. It is not something I would call a national missile defense system. It is not a long-term procurement.

ty.

Senator CLELAND. Will that violate the ABM Treaty?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That would surely violate the ABM Trea

Senator CLELAND. How much will that system cost?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. What is the test bed, General?
General KADISH. The test bed itself, or a larger system?

Senator CLELAND. How much will this system, this rudimentary system deployed between 2004 and 2006, that violates the ABM Treaty, how much will it cost?

General KADISH. I would like to be precise for the record, but as I remember the number, the physical emplacement of the test bed is about $750 million out of the budget for the development program.

[The information referred to follows:]

committee on a bipartisan basis will provide adequate levels of funding for the Pentagon generally.

I want to come to a direct question about Russia and ask you to speak a little bit more on it. Last week when you were here, you expressed not only a commitment to attempt to negotiate modifications in the ABM Treaty consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense program you and General Kadish outlined, but I thought you expressed a certain degree of optimism about the ability to reach those modifications with the Russians. To some extent, you have done that this morning.

After the hearing last week, in response to your testimony, there was an interview with the minister of defense in Russia, Ivanov, and I guess at best, as I read the interview, I would describe his frame of mind as puzzled by the optimism expressed here, and at worst, I would say he disagreed with it.

Of course today we see on the front page of the papers Mr. Putin and Mr. Jiang embracing in friendship, and one of the items that draws them together is their opposition to our missile defense initiative, and even agitated by what has pleased and delighted us here, which is the successful test on Saturday.

So why are you optimistic about our ability to negotiate the necessary modifications with the Russians on the ABM Treaty to allow this program to go forward?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If I might very briefly, before I answer that, in opening you talked about the balance among different things, and I would just like to point out that our adversaries, the countries we worry most about, are investing heavily in the offensive capability. It is the one Iraqi capability we underestimated during the gulf war. It is in many ways one of the biggest weaknesses in our overall defense posture, and I think our adversaries have discovered it.

I think we have done a careful job of balancing, but it is a very big increase. It may not be as big as Bill Kristol or Bob Kagan would like it. Frankly, it is not as big as I would like, but it is the largest in 15 years, and it is a 7-percent real increase. It is substantial.

To come now to your main question, my reasons for optimism rest most fundamentally on the fact that I think we have a fundamentally different relationship with Russia, but we have not yet gotten to the point of really developing that or elaborating it in ways that I think are important.

I think their concerns about the ABM Treaty rest very heavily on broader political significance of the treaty, as I think-and I do not want to put words in the chairman's mouth, but it seems to me that was one of the points he was making when I said that from a military point of view, from a Russian military planner's point of view what we are doing is insignificant.

I think what they are looking for is a framework of relations with the United States, and I hope it is one that addresses the real security needs of this era. I do not think the Russians have to lay awake at night worrying about our attacking them with nuclear missiles, and I do not think we need to waste a lot of time worrying about them attacking us. I think what we have is very substantial common interests in mutual stability in Europe, and mutual stabil