STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me first join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses here this morning. They have made great contributions in the past to our Nation's security, and their advice and commentary to us is indeed welcomed.

At the outset, let me thank you, General Pace, for your assistance and your counsel and your hospitality as three colleagues of myself and the chairman of this committee and I went to Colombia not too many weeks ago. Senators Reed, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, and I made that visit. It was a very important one for us, and your participation contributed a great deal to that importance.

This morning's hearing takes place as the administration continues to conduct a review of existing policies toward China, including potential arms sales to Taiwan, and existing policies which are being reviewed toward North Korea, Colombia, the Andes, and a number of other hot spots in the world.

In recent weeks, President Bush has expressed support for Plan Colombia and for the peace process, but declined to have the United States represented at the peace negotiation table.

In recent weeks, President Bush has expressed skepticism about the course of negotiations with North Korea, thereby weakening the position of the South Korean president in his negotiations with North Korea.

In recent weeks, the President has characterized the United States and China as strategic competitors, quite a contrast to the prior characterization of his predecessor of our relationship with China as one of strategic partnership.

There is an impression here and abroad that the administration appears to be backing away from U.S. engagement in a number of critical areas around the world, from the Balkans, to the Middle East, to the Korean Peninsula. If so, I am concerned that that disengagement could cause us to lose some opportunities to ease tensions in several regions of the world and, therefore, lose opportunities to make this country more secure.

So, this is a very timely hearing. There is a huge number of issues to be reviewed with our witnesses. I look forward to their testimony this morning and the opportunity to ask them questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Unless other members of the committee have a comment, we will proceed to receive the testimony from our witnesses, and Admiral Blair, we will ask you to lead off.

The full statement of all witnesses will be admitted to the record.

STATEMENT OF ADM. DENNIS C. BLAIR, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral BLAIR. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and other distinguished members of the committee, I need to begin by thanking all of you for the support that you have given to the men and women of the Pacific Command. They know you care and it comes through to them. Thank you very much.

Our priorities in the Pacific Command are readiness, regional engagement, transformation of the Armed Forces, and resources.

I must tell you readiness is a mixed picture. We have made progress in some areas in the past year; we have lost ground in others. We can do our job today, but I remain concerned for the future unless we address some of the structural readiness issues in operations and equipment, as well as sustainment, restoration, and modernization.

I just returned, as the Chairman mentioned, from a trip to China, Korea, and Japan. With our forward-based and our forwarddeployed forces, we reassure our friends, we are deterring our potential enemies, and we are making some progress on enhanced regional cooperation which will build a security structure which will posture us for the missions of the future, as well as those of the past.

Third, transformation. Working with the Joint Forces Command, we are experimenting our way into the future in the Pacific Command using our existing exercise program, including our allies. Our concept for the future is called a joint mission force.

Finally, resources. Our strategy for the Asia-Pacific region is built on a foundation of ready, balanced, forward-deployed forces with information networks that can enable them to move around the theater with confidence and a mobility system to get them there quickly. We need sustained funding and support for those forces and for the headquarters which direct them. It is important because this region is dynamic, because America has big security interests there, and our Armed Forces play a strong role in there. As far as the question that you raised, Mr. Chairman, on China, based on my recent trip there I can make a couple of points. We probably will want to discuss it further, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Please do. In particular, review the package that has come forward from Taiwan, the procedure by which it is to be reviewed, both by yourself and the administration, and the likely timetable of the announcement, to the extent you have knowledge of that.

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir.

The requests for arms sales this year were delivered by the Taiwan Deputy Chief of the General Staff last fall, and it was an extensive list of equipment really across all three of their Armed Forces: Army, Air Force, and Navy.

My role in the process is to evaluate sufficient defense for Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. We do a detailed military analysis of the balance of likely developments and trends, and then I submit that up the chain for the President to make the final decision on which arms should be made available based on my military input and other factors.

That process is in progress right now. The rough deadline that we generally set for ourselves is next month, the month of April, that we generally reply. We are doing the work now to meet that deadline.

Chairman WARNER. When you use the word "my," my understanding of that is that it is yourself, of course, as ČÍNCPAC. But you take into consideration your senior Army commander, your senior Air Force commander. You have also a senior Navy commander and a senior Marine commander. So, it is a composite of the senior commanders of all of our forces in that region.

Admiral BLAIR. It is a composite. We benefit from several assessments that have been made over the last couple of years in which teams have visited Taiwan, have talked with the Taiwanese. We have looked carefully at the intelligence and we have come to a judgment as to what is the state, both right at the moment and the trends in terms of Taiwan's sufficient defense, and what would make that defense sufficient.

Over the long term, the most destabilizing parts of the Chinese buildup are their intermediate-range and short-range ballistic missiles, the CSS-6s and CSS-7s, of the type that were used in 1996 to fire in the waters north and south of Taiwan. I have told the Chinese directly on numerous visits, including the one last week, that the buildup of these missiles, which presently are weapons of destruction, not of military significance, but as their numbers increase and as their accuracy improves, become militarily significant, will force a response by the United States eventually in order to maintain that sufficient defense. That really is the most troubling aspect of the buildup.

I talked to the Chinese about the 18 percent increase that you mentioned when I was there. I was told at many different levels, not simply Beijing, but the field commanders that that would largely go for personnel expenses, maintenance, and then a certain amount to acquisition. But they understand, as do all armed forces, that you need to compensate people beyond your conscript force in order to be effective under modern conditions, and they are putting some money to that. So, I do not translate that directly into weap

ons.

They are having mixed success with the weapons that they are purchasing from the Russians. It is not just a case of having the systems themselves, but the entire logistical support, training, and integrating with the mother systems is difficult business. As I say, the People's Liberation Army is having mixed success in turning those into effective combat capability.

So, my overall assessment, which is in my written statement, is that for the near term, the balance across the Straits is stable. There are certain trends that have to be addressed in order to keep it stable. I emphasized with the people I talked with in China that military means are not the best way to achieve the one China, which is Chinese policy, American policy, that the military side of this equation should be kept in the background. The things that will draw China and Taiwan are nonmilitary ties, commercial, financial, information, travel, those sorts of activities.

The Chinese agree. They want a peaceful resolution as well, but they maintain the right to use force, and we maintain that resolution must be peaceful. That is where we are, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Do you wish to cover other areas of your area of responsibility (AOR)? I think it is important that you do. Admiral BLAIR. Why do I not wait for questions, sir, if that is all right with you.

Chairman WARNER. We will do just that then.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Blair follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. DENNIS C. BLAIR, USN

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Having served as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) for over 2 years, I continue to believe, as we enter into this century, that a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region is very much in the interests of America, and the world. Alternatively, an uncertain Asia may present only crises and dangers. We base our power and influence on our values, our economic vibrancy, our desire to be a partner in this critical region, and the forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Since I last testified before you, developments in the region have offered promise and continuing challenges.

Japan

Japan remains our most important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Although the economy is virtually stagnant, Japan remains the second largest economy in the world and continues to have a strong economic impact on the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts nearly 41,000 U.S. Armed Forces personnel and serves as a forward-deployed site for about 14,000 additional U.S. naval personnel. Japan also contributes $4.86 billion in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally. These forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces are key for the United States to meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia, and it is fundamental to regional security and peaceful development.

Over the past year, we made steady progress in strengthening our alliance with Japan. The two countries signed a new 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that will take effect on April 1, 2001. While the utilities cost-sharing levels are down slightly from the previous SMA, the new agreement provides for the same levels of labor cost-sharing and training relocation costs as those of the previous SMA.

Over the past year, working groups took the first steps to implement the Defense Guidelines. In addition, Japan's Diet passed the final piece of Defense Guidelinesrelated legislation: a law authorizing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to conduct ship inspections to enforce UN sanctions. Now that a site for the replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been selected in northern Okinawa, detailed discussions have begun over the type and scale of the facility. U.S. and Japan ballistic missile defense cooperation continued on Navy TheaterWide research.

On February 9, 2001, U.S.S. Greenville collided with the fishing vessel Ehime Maru, resulting in the loss of the ship and nine lives, including students. The U.S. Government and Navy have apologized to the Government of Japan and the families of the victims, are evaluating the feasibility of raising the vessel, and will provide compensation to the victims. The Navy has convened a Court of Inquiry to examine the events contributing to the incident and accountability. The U.S. and Japan have a strong bilateral relationship whose enduring strength has benefited both sides for close to half a century. We believe we will be able to move forward from this tragedy in the interests of both nations and our peoples.

The roles and capabilities of the JSDF are slowly evolving to meet future challenges. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force provided a 45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan Heights UN Disengagement Observer Force. The JSDF has also worked closely with USPACOM components to restructure bilateral exercises to develop skills for humanitarian assistance, search-and-rescue, non-combatant evacuation, consequence management for chemical, biological, and nuclear incidents, and complex contingency operations that are likely to occur in the future. JSDF is sending observers to Team Challenge, a linked series of exercises addressing these missions and involving several Asia-Pacific nations. I am also encouraged by the increased attention that the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional armed forces-the Republic of Korea in particular.

I remain deeply concerned about the Shinkampo private industrial waste incinerator abutting Naval Air Facility Atsugi. While dioxin levels have fallen significantly since Shinkampo completed the installation of bag house filters last May, construction has not started on a 100-meter smokestack that the Prime Minister of Japan

committed to building by March 2001. This situation continues to be a serious health risk to our servicemembers and their families.

We must solve individual local issues arising from our forces based in Japan. As important, however, is that the U.S. Pacific Command and the JSDF maintain the capability to defend Japan and build the capability to operate together in order to face the common regional challenges of the future-peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian relief and dealing with transnational concerns. The Defense Guidelines show the way to the future for the U.S.-Japanese alliance and we must proceed in that direction.

South and North Korea

Last year, the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) began the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. About 37,000 U.S. troops remain stationed in the ROK to deter North Korean aggression.

Political developments in Korea have been breathtaking, highlighted by the June 2000 summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-Il. Other North-South reconciliation activities included reunions between selected families separated by the war, increased aid, and agreements to increase economic links including a road and railway passing through the demilitarized zone. At the same time, North Korea's military training cycle in the winter and summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever, and the ongoing winter training cycle remains robust. North Korea continues to maintain 60 percent of its forces within 100km of the DMZ.

Given North Korea's continuing significant military capabilities, the Republic of Korea and the United States must maintain the deterrent power of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Any changes to the CFC posture must come through mutual and verifiable confidence-building measures that increase warning times for aggression.

I remain concerned about the lack of frequency clearances granted by the ROK government to U.S. forces for planning and training. For example, there are no frequencies cleared to support UAV training on the peninsula. Likewise, we are currently limited to only 126 VHF/FM frequencies for planning purposes, far short of the over 1,000 frequencies we would expect in an operational scenario. We will continue to work to resolve this deficiency.

Whatever the future holds, it remains in the interests of both the Republic of Korea and the United States to have a continued U.S. forward presence on the Korean Peninsula. Recent developments have been encouraging. The recent renewal of our Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the conclusion of the No Gun Ri investigation, and the agreement on missile guidelines reflect the mature relationship between the United States and South Korea and provide a strong foundation for future cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces Korea has also proposed a Land Partnership Plan that, once enacted by Korea, will make U.S. force presence less burdensome while enhancing training and combined warfighting capability. We also will begin negotiations for a new Special Measures Agreement that we hope would increase South Korea's financial support for the stationing of U.S. troops in the country.

The Republic of Korea increasingly contributes to meeting regional security challenges by contributing 419 troops to peacekeeping in East Timor, consulting and cooperating with the JSDF, participating in exercises such as RIMPAC (a major, multilateral naval exercise) and PACIFIC REACH (a submarine rescue exercise also involving naval forces from Japan, Singapore, and the United States), and participating as observers in Team Challenge.

China

During the past year, military developments in China have been mixed. A White Paper issued in February 2000 emphasized China's commitment to peacefully resolving its differences with Taiwan, but also specified conditions that could trigger the use of force against Taiwan. Chinese military spending increased, and Beijing continued to acquire advanced weapon systems from Russia.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing and making organizational changes in all branches of service to strengthen homeland defense, expand regional influence and support sovereignty claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea. China continues to increase its modern combat aircraft inventory and improve air defenses, particularly across the Taiwan Strait. The PLA navy conducted sea trials for eventually fielding additional surface ships and submarines, continued testing of anti-ship missiles, and received its second modern Russian guided missile destroyer. PLA ground forces continued downsizing to reduce force structure and increase mobility. The PLA missile force continued testing and fielding of newer inter-continen