Introduction

commands to the maximum extent practical; present and justify their respective positions on DOD plans, programs, and policies; cooperate effectively with one another; provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration; and eliminate duplication.

The individual services have always had the primary role in weapons acquisition. In an attempt to strengthen the joint orientation of the Department, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act, which amended title 10, gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders stronger roles in Department matters, including weapons acquisition. It designated the Chairman as principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense and gave him several broad authorities. For example, the Chairman is expected to provide for strategic direction of the armed forces, prepare strategic plans, perform net assessments of the capabilities of U.S. and allied armed forces compared with those of potential adversaries, and advise the Secretary on the requirements, programs, and budgets of the military departments in terms of the joint perspective.

Regarding this latter responsibility, the Chairman is expected to (1) provide advice on the priorities of requirements identified by the commanders of the combatant commands, (2) determine the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals conform with the combatant commands' priorities, (3) submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels to achieve greater conformance with these priorities, and (4) assess military requirements for major defense acquisition programs. In addition to these responsibilities, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993 directed the Chairman to examine what DOD can do to eliminate or reduce duplicative capabilities.

Assisting the Chairman in providing the Secretary advice on military requirements and the programs and budgets of the military departments is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Staff, which are subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation provides, in part, analytical support to the Secretary in the management and oversight of service programs and budgets.

Introduction

The overall objective of this review was to assess whether the Secretary of Defense has sufficient information from a joint perspective to help him decide whether new investments in combat air power should be made, whether programmed investments should continue to be funded, and what priority should be given to competing programs. To gain a broad perspective on the context in which these decisions are made, we sought to determine (1) how U.S. air power capabilities have changed since the end of fiscal year 1991; (2) what potential threat adversary forces pose to U.S. air power; (3) what contribution combat air power modernization programs will make to aggregate U.S. capabilities; and (4) how joint warfighting assessments are used to support the Secretary in making air power decisions.

The scope of our review included (1) fighter and attack aircraft, including
attack helicopters and long-range bombers equipped for conventional
missions; (2) key specialized support aircraft that enhance the capability
of combat aircraft; (3) munitions employed by combat aircraft; and
(4) other major systems-particularly long-range missiles, theater air
defense systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles-that perform missions
traditionally assigned to combat aircraft. Our scope did not encompass
assets dedicated primarily to airlift, such as the C-17 and V-22 aircraft, and
U.S. special operations forces. Also, the potential contribution of allied
forces was not considered.

We reviewed in detail six key mission areas in which combat air power plays a prominent role:

performing offensive and defensive operations to achieve and maintain air superiority in areas of combat operations,

interdicting enemy forces before they can be used against friendly forces, providing close support for ground forces by attacking hostile forces in close proximity to friendly forces,

suppressing enemy air defenses by jamming or destroying enemy air
defense forces,

refueling combat aircraft in the air to sustain combat operations, and performing surveillance and reconnaissance to obtain intelligence data for combat operations.

In conducting these reviews, we reviewed numerous reports, studies, and other documents containing information on these missions and the primary platforms and weapons used. We discussed capabilities, requirements, force structure, and modernization issues with officials and

Introduction

representatives of various offices within OSD, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and the operational commands. We compared and contrasted performance data on current and planned weapon systems by mission area to acquire a good understanding of the joint capabilities of the military forces to perform the missions and to identify overlaps and gaps in capabilities. Separate reports on the interdiction, close support, suppression of enemy air defenses, and air refueling reviews have already been issued, while our reports on air superiority and surveillance and reconnaissance are still being prepared. A listing of the four issued reports and of other GAO reports related to this body of work is included at the end of this report.

We supplemented the six mission reviews with more detailed assessments of (1) recent and planned changes in the capabilities of U.S. forces and of the current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries to counter U.S. air power and (2) the military advice on joint requirements and capabilities being developed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense. For information on changes in U.S. capabilities, we drew upon information gathered on the six mission reviews. We also used examples from our other published reports on major DOD modernization programs to illustrate our findings. For information on current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries, we reviewed reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and discussed threat information with intelligence agency personnel.

To assess information being developed for the Secretary of Defense on joint air power requirements and aggregate capabilities of the services to meet those requirements, we evaluated the JROC and its supporting joint warfighting capabilities assessment (JWCA) process, which assist the Chairman in carrying out his responsibilities. We discussed the functioning of this process and air power issues being examined with Joint Staff officials who oversee the process as well as assessment team representatives from the Joint Staff and OSD. We reviewed the May 1995 report by the independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.2 We also discussed the report with Commission staff and reviewed documents the Commission developed or acquired. We conducted this review from May 1994 through June 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

2Directions for Defense (Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, May 24, 1995).

Chapter 2

U.S. Air Power Is Formidable and Improving

While force downsizing may give the appearance of a loss in capability, the United States continues to retain in its conventional inventory about 5,900 modern fighter and attack aircraft, including 178 long-range bombers and 1,732 attack helicopters, and over 1,500 specialized support aircraft. It also has growing inventories of advanced precision air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons for its combat aircraft to carry and an expanding arsenal of accurate long-range surface-to-surface missiles to strike ground targets. Inventory levels for the aircraft included in our review are shown in appendix II.

DOD has spent billions of dollars in recent years to make its current
frontline combat aircraft and helicopters more efficient and effective.
These enhancements include improved navigation, night fighting, target
acquisition, and self-protection capabilities as well as more aircraft
capable of using advanced munitions. Specialized support aircraft used for
air refueling and surveillance and reconnaissance, which are vital to the
effectiveness of combat aircraft, have also been improved, while forces for
suppressing enemy air defenses are being restructured. Additionally,
advances in the ability of U.S. forces to identify targets and communicate
that information quickly to combatant units should further enhance the
capabilities of current forces.

Combat Air Power
Force Structure Has
Been Changing

Fighter and Attack Aircraft
Inventories Are Smaller

The size and composition of the U.S. combat air power force structure
have changed considerably since fiscal year 1991, the year the Persian Gulf
War ended. Cutbacks in the number of combat aircraft adopted by the
Bush administration and further cutbacks by the Clinton administration in
its 1993 Bottom-Up Review are scheduled to be completed in 1997. While
the number of fighter and attack aircraft, including B-1B bombers and
attack helicopters, is being reduced about 28 percent from 1991 levels,
other new and emerging elements of combat air power, such as long-range
missiles and theater air defense forces, have grown in number and
capability. Specialized support aircraft have experienced varying levels of
change in their inventory.

Changes in aviation needs since the end of the Cold War, coupled with
cuts in defense spending, have led DOD to reduce its combat aircraft
inventory. These changes have been most pronounced for Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft and Air Force
bombers-from about 6,400 in 1991 to about 4,160 in 1996. DOD considers
about 65 percent of these aircraft as authorized to combat units to perform

U.S. Air Power Is Formidable and Improving

basic combat missions and 35 percent of them as backup aircraft maintained for training, testing, maintenance, and attrition replacement reserves. Figure 2.1 shows the change in the total inventories of these types of aircraft from 1991 to 1996.

Figure 2.1: Changes in DOD Fighter and Attack Aircraft Inventory, Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1996
Aircraft inventory

This smaller combat force structure has been accomplished primarily by retiring older aircraft that are often expensive to operate and maintain, such as the Navy and Marine Corps A-6 medium bomber and A-7 light attack plane and the Air Force A-7, F-4 fighter, and F-111 strike aircraft. At the same time, many newer model aircraft have entered the fleet since the