Purpose

No other nation relies as heavily on combat air power for its military strength or has invested as much in it as the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated major acquisition programs estimated to cost over $300 billion to modernize its combat air power forces over the next 15 to 20 years. These forces include about 5,900 fighter and attack aircraft, including long-range bombers equipped for conventional missions and attack helicopters; specialized combat support aircraft; advanced weapons for the combat aircraft; long-range missiles; theater air defense forces; and other key air power assets.

Because difficult tradeoff decisions will likely be needed among
competing air power programs as the nation moves toward balancing the
budget, GAO conducted detailed assessments of six key air power missions1
to provide information useful to the debate. This culminating report
builds on and synthesizes the findings of these six reviews and other GAO
reviews of air power programs. GAO's overall objective was to assess
whether the Secretary of Defense has sufficient information from a joint
perspective to help him decide whether new investments should be made,
whether programmed investments should continue to be funded, and what
priority should be given to competing air power programs. To gain a broad
perspective on the context in which these decisions are made, GAO Sought
to determine (1) how U.S. air power capabilities have changed since the
end of fiscal year 1991, the year the Persian Gulf War ended; (2) what
potential threat adversary forces pose to U.S. air power; (3) what
contribution combat air power modernization programs will make to
aggregate U.S. capabilities; and (4) how joint warfighting assessments are
used to support the Secretary in making air power decisions.

Background

Title 10 of the U.S. Code and DOD'S functions directive authorize each of
the military services to acquire air power assets to meet its
responsibilities. DOD's current air power assets, many of which perform
multiple missions, were largely developed through the military services'
investments of hundreds of billions of dollars primarily to acquire
autonomous combat air power capabilities in preparation for a global war
with the Soviet Union. The Air Force acquired bombers to deliver nuclear
strikes and fighter and attack aircraft for conventional and theater-nuclear
missions in the major land theaters, principally Europe. The Navy built an
extensive carrier-based aviation force to control the seas and project
power into the Soviet Union's maritime flanks. The Army developed attack

'These include interdiction, air superiority, close support, air refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, and surveillance and reconnaissance.

helicopters to provide air support to its ground troops. The Marine Corps acquired fighter and attack aircraft and attack helicopters to support its ground forces in their areas of operation. While each service had many similar capabilities, each also largely operated within its own spheres.

Today, the geographic areas of operations for combat air power that characterized much of the Cold War no longer apply. The air power components of the four services are now focused on joint operations with a strategy of preparing to fight two major regional conflicts versus a global war. Most of the likely theaters of operation are small enough that, with available refueling support, all types of aircraft can reach most targets.

The individual services have always been the primary players in the acquisition process based on their broad responsibilities to organize, train, and equip their forces under title 10 of the U.S. Code. However, to achieve a stronger joint orientation in DOD, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in chief (CINC) of the combatant commands stronger roles in Department matters, including the acquisition process. As principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is now expected to advise the Secretary on the priority of requirements identified by the CINCS and the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments conform with these priorities. The Chairman is also expected to submit to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals to achieve greater conformance with CINC priorities. Subsequent legislation has given the Chairman additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can eliminate or reduce duplicative capabilities and to assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs from a joint warfighting military perspective.

According to the 1995 National Military Strategy, major modernization programs involving significant investments are to be undertaken "only where there is clearly a substantial payoff." To evaluate the merits of the services' weapon investment proposals, programs, and budgets, various entities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, provide the Secretary independent analyses as needed. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out the Chairman's responsibilities. This assistance includes identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements (including existing systems and equipment), ensuring that the assignment of program priorities reflects

Results in Brief

projected resource levels, and considering alternatives to any acquisition program identified to meet military needs. A key goal of the Council is to achieve cross-service resource allocations that yield an overall defense capability that is more than the sum of the separate service capabilities. To support the Council and the Chairman, a joint warfighting capabilities assessment process was set up in 1994 to examine key relationships and interactions among warfighting capabilities of the services, including providing insights into joint requirements.

Sufficient information is not being developed from a joint perspective to enable the Secretary of Defense to prioritize programs, objectively weigh the merits of new air power investments, and decide whether current programs should continue to receive funding. DOD has not established joint mission area requirements and compared them to the services' aggregate capabilities. Therefore, it cannot be confident that force structure and modernization decisions will result in the most cost-effective mix of forces to fulfill the National Military Strategy.

Reductions in the U.S. inventory of combat aircraft have been largely
offset by key enhancements to U.S. air power capabilities. These include
performance improvements in combat aircraft-such as increases in
night-fighting and targeting capabilities and growing inventories of
precision munitions for the aircraft and of advanced long-range missiles to
attack ground targets. Conversely, the aircraft and air defense forces of
potential adversaries have not been substantially improved and do not
pose a serious threat to U.S. air power's successful execution of its
missions. These nations have considerably smaller forces, and their
equipment is generally older and less capable than the U.S. forces'
advanced systems. These nations' efforts to modernize their forces will
likely continue to be inhibited by declines in the post-Cold War arms
market, national and international efforts to limit the proliferation of
conventional arms, and the high cost of advanced weapons.

Because DOD does not routinely develop information on joint mission needs and aggregate capabilities, it has little assurance that decisions to buy, modify, or retire air power systems are sound. The urgent need for such information is underscored by the reality that hundreds of billions of dollars will be required to finance combat air power investment programs as currently planned. Serious concerns about the affordability of these plans within likely defense budgets have been raised. Based on its assessments of air power mission areas and other reviews, GAO Concludes

that DOD is proceeding with some major investments without clear evidence the programs are justified. These assessments indicate that some modernization programs will add only marginally to already formidable capabilities, while the need for others has been lessened by the changed security environment. For some programs, there are viable, less costly alternatives.

GAO believes that the Chairman could better advise the Secretary of
Defense on air power programs and budgets if he conducted more
comprehensive assessments in key mission areas. Broader assessments
that tackle the more controversial air power issues would enable the
Chairman to better assist the Secretary of Defense to make the difficult
trade-off decisions that will likely be required. However, certain
long-standing obstacles must be overcome if the key challenges related to
air power are to be met head on. The Chairman must be the strong
advocate for the joint perspective that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation
intended. The well-being of the U.S. military as a whole must be placed
above the interests of the individual services. And if circumstances change
and program adjustments are needed, the Secretary and the Chairman
must be willing to challenge the strong constituencies that develop around
major acquisition programs. If DOD is to shape its force smartly within the
bounds of likely budgets, existing levels of redundancy in capability must
be questioned, and no program, once begun, should be considered
irrevocable.

Principal Findings

Despite Downsizing, U.S.
Air Power Capabilities
Remain Formidable

The United States has made many significant improvements to its combat air power capabilities in recent years. Although DOD has reduced its total combat aircraft about 28 percent since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the military services continue to retain about 5,900 advanced combat aircraft. These aircraft are increasingly being supplemented by other air power assets such as long-range cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and theater air defense forces.

Many of the services' combat aircraft have multimission capabilities that allow combatant commanders greater flexibility in employing aviation assets. The aircraft are also more capable of autonomous navigation, night fighting, target acquisition, self-protection, and the use of advanced