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Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not
Based on Joint Assessments

Some Investments Are
Proceeding Without
Clear Justification

meet those requirements. Therefore, such reviews can provide little
assurance that there is a valid mission need, that force capabilities are
being properly sized to meet requirements, and that the more
cost-effective alternative has been identified. Additionally, because many
weapon system modernization programs fall outside the major defense
acquisition program definition, many service modernization initiatives are
not validated by the JROC.5

DOD has defended its requirements generation system, saying the services have valid complementary requirements in many of the mission areas. In its opinion, the overlapping capabilities acquired add to the options available to U.S. leadership in a crisis and allow combatant commanders to tailor a military response to any contingency. We acknowledge that flexibility is important to respond to contingencies and that a certain amount of overlapping capability is needed. The question is whether, in the post-Cold War era, the United States needs or can afford to sustain current levels of redundancy. Advanced combat systems are not only costly to acquire, they are also expensive to operate and maintain. For example, DOD data indicates that the annual direct cost to operate and support an F-14 in the active inventory is about $2.2 million, an F-18 about $1.7 million, an F-15 about $3.2 million, and an F-16 about $2.2 million. These figures include the cost of the aircrews.

The lack of information on joint mission needs and aggregate capabilities to meet those needs prevents a definitive answer as to whether DOD's air power investment programs are justified. Based on our past reviews of individual air power systems and available information we collected on our six mission reviews, we believe that DOD is proceeding with some major investments without clear evidence that the programs are justified. When information is viewed more broadly, some programs appear to add only marginally to already formidable capabilities in some areas. Also, the changed security environment has lessened the need for some programs, and for others, viable, less costly alternatives appear to exist.

Additional Capability
May Not Be Needed in
Some Mission Areas

Whether DOD's planned investments represent the most cost-effective mix of air power assets to accomplish combat air power missions is unclear because past DOD assessments have largely skirted the question of sufficiency. However, available information suggests that existing

5For example, only 3 of the 12 close support programs we reviewed were classified as major defense
programs subject to JROC review. The other nine programs, with estimated costs totaling over
$5 billion for fiscal years 1996 through 2001, were not reviewed.

Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not
Based on Joint Assessments

capabilities in mission areas like interdiction, air-to-air combat, and close support are quite substantial even without further enhancements.

In the interdiction mission area-the diverting, disrupting, delaying, or destroying of enemy forces before they can be used against U.S. forces both current capabilities and those expected to be in place in 2002 are sufficient to hit all identified ground targets for the two major regional conflicts with considerable margin for error. Based on service data on current and planned interdiction capabilities and Defense Intelligence Agency and service threat assessments that identified enemy targets, the services already have at least 10 ways to hit 65 percent of the thousands of expected ground targets in two major regional conflicts. Some targets can be hit by 25 or more combinations of aircraft and weapons. In addition, service interdiction assets can provide 140 to 160 percent coverage for many types of targets.

Despite this level of capability, the services are modifying current platforms and developing new weapon systems that will provide new and enhanced interdiction capabilities over the next 15 to 20 years at a total estimated cost of over $200 billion. These enhancements include the F/A-18E/F attack fighter, the ATACMS, major modifications to the B-1B bomber, more PGMS and improvements to aircraft and weapons, and acquisition of the Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter. The Joint Strike Fighter, which is not included in the $200 billion estimate, will also provide interdiction capabilities.

In the area of air-to-air combat-a critical mission to achieve and retain air superiority-over 600 combat-designated F-14 and F-15 fighter aircraft are dedicated to this mission. This number far exceeds the quantity and quality of fighter aircraft potential adversaries are projected to have. In addition, about 1,900 other combat designated multirole fighter aircraft, such as F-16s and F/A-18C/Ds, while not dedicated to air superiority missions, are very capable air superiority fighters. These aircraft could assist F-14s and F-15s to defeat enemy fighters before being used for other missions such as interdiction and close support. The capabilities of these fighter aircraft have also been enhanced extensively with the procurement of advanced weapons-particularly over 7,400 advanced medium range air-to-air missiles and through continuing improvements to these weapons and to support platforms, such as airborne warning and control system aircraft, that help the fighters locate, identify, track, and attack enemy aircraft at great distances. Despite the unparalleled U.S. air-to-air capabilities, the Air Force plans to begin to replace its F-15s with 438 F-22 fighters in 2004, at

Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not
Based on Joint Assessments

Changed Security
Environment Appears to
Lessen Need for Some
Programs

an estimated average unit procurement cost of about $111 million. Release of long-lead production funding for the first lot of four F-22s is scheduled for fiscal year 1998. DOD expects that the F/A-18E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter will further add to U.S. air superiority capabilities.

In the area of close support, the military services collectively possess a
substantial inventory of weapon systems. These assets include five types
of artillery, four types of attack helicopters, five types of fixed-wing
aircraft, and 5-inch naval guns on cruisers and destroyers. DOD data
indicates that in the year 2001, the U.S. military will have about 3,680
artillery systems, 1,850 attack helicopters, and 2,380 multirole fixed-wing
aircraft that can provide close support as well as an unspecified number of
naval 5-inch guns. The services plan to spend over $10.6 billion to further
improve these capabilities between fiscal years 1996 and 2001, including
major improvements to the Marine's AV-8B close support aircraft and the
Army's Apache attack helicopter. Additional major acquisition programs
that could further enhance close support capabilities include the
F/A-18E/F strike fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter, and advanced munitions
to attack ground targets.

Given the current security environment, the extensive aggregate capabilities U.S. forces now possess may lessen the need to proceed with several key modernization programs as currently planned, since the capabilities being acquired are not urgently needed. The two most prominent examples are the planned production of F-22 air superiority fighters and modifications to the B-1 bombers.

The Air Force is proceeding with plans to begin to acquire F-22 air superiority fighter aircraft in fiscal year 1999 and rapidly accelerate the pace of production to 48 aircraft per year. This is being done despite the services' unmatched capabilities in air-to-air combat. The Air Force initiated the F-22 (advanced tactical fighter) program in 1981 to meet the projected threat of the mid-1990s. Since the F-22 entered engineering and manufacturing development, the severity of the projected threat in terms of quantities and capabilities has declined. Instead of confronting thousands of modern Soviet fighters, U.S. air forces now expect to confront potential adversaries that have few fighters with the capability to challenge the F-15, the current U.S. frontline fighter. Further, our analysis, reported in March 1994, indicated that the current inventory of F-15s can be economically maintained in a structurally sound condition until 2015 or later. Thus, the planned rapid increase in the rate of production to achieve

Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not
Based on Joint Assessments

6

initial operational capability in 2004 may be premature. Further, because F-22s are expected to be substantially more effective than F-15A-Ds, replacing the F-15A-Ds on a one-for-one basis, as currently planned, may be unnecessary. DOD estimates the average procurement cost of an F-22 will be about $111 million.

In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that several current or soon-to-be-fielded fighters are at parity with the F-15, but provided no further details. Although we recognize that several foreign aircraft being developed will be at rough parity with the F-15C, it is uncertain how quickly the aircraft will be produced. It is also unlikely that large quantities will be available and affordable by potential adversaries.

In the case of the B-1B bomber, DOD needs to reexamine the need to keep this aircraft in the inventory and make several billion dollars of modifications to it. With the Cold War over and a reduction in the requirement for a large fleet of manned penetrating bombers that can deliver nuclear warheads in a global nuclear war, the B-1B will no longer be part of the U.S. nuclear force. The Air Force plans to modify its fleet of 95 B-1Bs to increase their conventional capability and sustainability. The B1Bs can currently carry only the 500-pound unguided, general-purpose bomb and cluster munitions; but after the modification, the B-1Bs will be able to carry more types of conventional ordnance. Several factors make the continued need for B-1Bs questionable. First, DOD considers its current capability sufficient to meet its requirement to interdict enemy targets identified in two major regional conflicts. Second, our analysis of Air Force targeting data indicates the modified B-1B would strike a very small percentage of the Air Force's designated targets. Third, combatant command officials stated they would use far fewer B-1Bs than DOD cites as necessary. Fourth, other Air Force and Navy aircraft can launch the same munitions as the modified B-1B and others.

Retiring the B-1B would increase U.S. forces' dependence on other capabilities and the risk that some targets might not be hit as quickly. However, it is reasonable to expect that the targets assigned to the B-1 could be hit by other assets, including missiles such as ATACMS and Tomahawk. If DOD retired the Air Force's 95 B-1Bs immediately, it could save almost $5.9 billion in budget authority over the next 5 years. These

"Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 1994) and Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 1995) discuss the issues of the F-15's capabilities and concurrency planned in the development and production of the F-22.

Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not
Based on Joint Assessments

issues surrounding the B-1 are discussed in our report on the bomber force, which we expect to issue shortly.

Viable, Less Costly
Program Alternatives May
Be Available

Analysis suggests that viable, less costly program alternatives may be
available for some mission areas. The Navy's planned purchase of 1,000
F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft at an estimated cost (as of Dec. 1995) of
$81 billion is a case in point. The F/A-18E/F is intended to replace
F/A-18C/D aircraft and to perform Navy and Marine Corps fighter escort,
interdiction, fleet air defense, and close support missions. The aircraft's
origins are traceable to a 1988 study that identified upgrade options to the
F/A-18C/D in performing these missions. However, the operational
deficiencies in the F/A-18C/Ds that the Navy cited in justifying the
F/A-18E/F either have not materialized as projected or can be corrected
with nonstructural changes to the F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, the
F/A-18E/F's operational capabilities will only be marginally improved over
the F/A-18C/D. In addition, while the F/A-18E/F will have increased range
over the F/A-18C/D, the F/A-18C/D range will exceed the range required by
the F/A-18E/F's system specifications, and the F/A-18E/F's range increase
is achieved at the expense of its combat performance. Also, modifications
to increase the F/A-18E/F's payload have created a problem when
weapons are released from the aircraft that may reduce the F/A-18E/F's
potential payload capability.

Over the years, the Navy has improved the operational capabilities of the
F/A-18C/D so that procuring more of them, rather than the new model
F/A-18E/F aircraft, could be the most cost-effective approach to
modernizing the Navy's combat aircraft fleet in the mid-term. In this
regard, additional upgrades, should they be needed, could be made to the
F/A-18C/D, which would further improve its capabilities. These upgrades
include a larger fuel tank for more range and strengthened landing gear to
increase carrier recovery payload. Then, for the long term, the Joint Strike
Fighter could be an alternative to the F/A-18E/F. The Joint Strike Fighter's
operational capabilities are projected by DOD to be equal or superior to the
F/A-18E/F at a lower unit cost.

The Army's Comanche helicopter program provides a second example. In initiating the program, the Army sought a family of lightweight, multipurpose helicopters whose justification centered on practicality rather than the threat. The program was expected to inexpensively replace a fleet of Vietnam-era helicopters with new helicopters that would be up to 50 percent cheaper to operate and support. Within these economical

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