Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not confines, the new helicopters were to offer as good a technical performance as possible. Subsequently, however, specific requirements were developed, and the program emerged as it is today-a threat-based program to yield the next generation high-performance helicopter armed with 14 Hellfire missiles at a cost significantly higher than that of the Apache, the Army's most advanced and costly helicopter. At least three alternative helicopters are available that we believe could, if DOD continues to support both the F/A-18E/F and the Comanche programs. Conclusions DOD faces considerable funding challenges in modernizing its forces for the 'Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost Air Power Modernization Programs Are Not requires close and continual examination to ensure a substantial payoff in added capability. The absence of joint mission area analyses makes it difficult to assess whether planned investments in air power modernization are warranted. Without a full understanding of joint requirements and aggregate service capabilities in each mission area, the Secretary of Defense does not have the information needed to make decisions about whether existing capabilities are sufficient to meet anticipated challenges or whether additional investments are justified. The fact that DOD is proceeding with modernization programs whose justifications do not, on the surface, appear to be compelling illustrates the need for continuing comprehensive mission area assessments. No program-regardless of the investment already made-should be considered irrevocable-but should be continually examined as circumstances and capabilities change. Although we have limited our illustrations in this chapter to major modernization programs, smaller programs would also benefit from mission area assessments. These assessments would help DOD determine the validity of the need for all types of new weapons investments as well as procurement quantities and also decide whether to reduce or retire existing assets. Chapter 5 Decisions on Air Power Programs and Key Defense Through key legislation, Congress has sought to better integrate the capabilities of the military forces, provide for improved military advice to the Secretary of Defense apart from that provided by the military services, and strengthen the joint orientation of DOD. Although DOD has improved its joint orientation in many respects, the individual services continue to heavily influence defense decisions, particularly those related to investments in weapons. Stronger military advice from a joint perspective is needed if the Secretary is to objectively weigh the merits not only of combat air power but also of other defense programs. Although DOD has begun to assess selected warfighting capabilities from a joint perspective, this process is still evolving and has not yet led to any identifiable reductions in overlap and duplication among deployed air power forces. Nor has it led to specific platform proposals to deal with the high cost of recapitalizing DOD's combat air power or specific proposals to transfer resources among services to meet higher priority needs. Better analytical tools and data are needed to improve joint warfighting assessments, and certain other obstacles must be overcome to reduce overlaps and achieve a stronger joint orientation. Collectively, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to better integrate the military forces, provide a channel for military advice to the Secretary of Defense apart from that of the individual services, and strengthen the joint orientation of the Department. Although DOD officials believe that the Department has improved its joint orientation in many respects, some of the underlying conditions that led to this legislation continue to surface. National Security Act of 1947 Sought Integration of Military Capabilities In many respects, the circumstances leading Congress to enact the Decisions on Air Power Programs and Priorities Require Comprehensive Joint Goldwater-Nichols functions. This agreement-termed the Key West Agreement-delineated services functions and was aimed at preventing unnecessary duplication. During this period, intense interservice competition for drastically Almost 40 years after the National Security Act sought to better integrate Various provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation were directed at correcting these lingering problems. For example, it designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. This provided a channel for military advice apart from the military services. The Chairman was also given new responsibilities designed to improve resource decision-making, including advising the Secretary on program recommendations and budget proposals developed by the military departments and other DOD components. Decisions on Air Power Programs and Although DOD officials believe that progress has been made toward a stronger joint orientation within DOD, Some of the key provisions of Goldwater-Nichols aimed at preventing unnecessary overlap and duplication have not had the intended effect. For example, to ensure reexamination of opportunities to reduce overlap and duplication, Goldwater-Nichols directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to periodically report to the Secretary of Defense his recommendations on how the assigned functions of the armed services should be changed to avoid undue redundancy. The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 added additional matters for the Chairman to consider in his report, including the extent to which the armed forces' efficiency would be enhanced by the elimination or reduction of duplication in capabilities of DOD components. The Chairman completed two reviews-the most recent in 1993-but neither has led to significant changes in service roles, missions, and functions involving combat air power. Congressional dissatisfaction with the results of the Chairman's reviews was one factor leading it to direct DOD to establish an independent commission to review the allocation of roles, missions, and functions among the armed forces and to recommend how they should be changed. The ensuing Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces reported its findings in May 1995. Once again, some of the same problems that had led to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation nearly 10 years before surfaced. For example, the Commission observed that the primary problems in weapon system acquisitions were traceable to inadequacies in the early phase of the requirements determination process. In the Commission's view, the lack of a unified concept and analysis of warfighting needs was the critical underlying problem. The Commission concluded in its report that joint thought and action needed to become a compelling reality throughout DOD if the objectives of Goldwater-Nichols were to be realized. It recommended various actions to improve the management structures and decision support processes related to DOD's requirements development and budgeting. A key conclusion in this regard was that the JROC and OSD staff needed to have a greater ability and willingness to address DOD needs in the aggregate. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the JROC's charter over joint requirements formulation be strengthened. It also recommended that DOD increase the technical and analytic capacity of the Joint Staff to better assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The Secretary of Defense requested more study of several key Commission proposals. Many of these |