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Aircraft Inventory Levels (1991 and 1996)

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System
Navy
E-2 Hawkeye
EA-6B Prowler
EP-3E Orion
ES-3 Viking
KA-6D Intruder
KC-130 Hercules
P-3B/C Orion
S-3A Viking
S-3B Viking
Air Force
C-130 Pacer Coin/Senior
Scout
E-3 AWACS
EC-130H Compass Call
EF-111A Raven
HC-130 Hercules
KC-10 Extender
KC-135 Stratotanker
MC-130 Combat Talon
RC-135VM Rivet Joint
RF-4C Phantom
TR-1/U-2R/S

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DOD
Unmanned aerial vehicles
Total specialized support
aircraft
Total aircraft

2,177

1,581

10,383

7,472

Note: This table only includes aircraft which were in the scope of our review.

Appendix III

Major Combat Air Power Program Funding
Status

year 1996

Then-year dollars in millions

Fiscal year 1997

Cost through fiscal and balance to Weapon system

complete Total program cost Combat aircraft F/A-18 E/F fighter/attack

$4,895.1
$76,063.6

$80,958.7 F-22 fighter

14,029.2
56,063.9

70,093.1 Comanche helicopter

3,111.9
41,670.5

44,782.4 Longbow Apache helicopter

1,884.0
6,391.2

8,275.2 B-1 bomber mods

1,283.9
2,494.0

3,777.9 AV-8B remanufacture

528.3
1,790.0

2,318.3 Weapon Tomahawk cruise missile

10,911.3

2,935.8

13,847.1 Advanced medium range air-to-air missile

8,032.8
3,355.2

11,388.0 JSOW

546.6
4,512.4

5,059.0 Army tactical missile system - brilliant antitank

946.7
4,046.2

4,992.9 Joint air-to-surface standoff missile

25.0
3,272.2

3,297.2 Longbow Hellfire missile

616.1
1,990.8

2,606.9 JDAM

316.9
2,153.7

2,470.6 Army tactical missile system-antipersonnel/ antimaterial

1,808.6

649.7

2,458.3 Sensor fused weapon

728.1
1,219.5

1,947.6 Combat Support Joint surveillance target attack radar system aircraft

5.330.2
4,021.4

9,351.6 E2C airborne early warning aircraft

658.5
2,672.6

3331.1 Cooperative engagement capability

622.8
1,965.0

2,587.8 Joint surveillance target attack radar system ground station module

827.8

559.3

1,387.1 Other Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missile

3,194.4
4,058.1

7,252.5 Navys sea-based area (lower tier) theater ballistic missile defense

669.0
4,898.3

5,567.3 Theater high altitude air defense system

2,439.0
10,225.0

12,664.0 Crusader (advanced field artillery system)

255.1
2,386.0

2,641.1
Note: Total program cost data on the Joint Strike Fighter program is not yet available from DOD.
CBO has estimated that the program could cost $165 billion in 1997 dollars.

Data on the Crusader includes only research, development, test, and evaluation costs.

Source: DOD's Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, December 31, 1995, except for the Comanche, joint air-to-surface standoff missile, Patriot, Navy (lower tier) theater ballistic missile defense, and theater high altitude air defense programs. The figures for these programs are based on data we acquired during our reviews of the programs.

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This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, “Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions”, dated June 20, 1996 (GAO Code 701040), OSD Case 1175. The Department disagrees with many of the draft report's findings and partially concurs with the draft's recommendations; thus, overall, the Department partially concurs with the draft report. The Department disagrees in particular with the draft report's finding that ongoing major combat aircraft acquisition programs lack “sufficient analysis of needs and capabilities” (see p. 9 of the report). The Department also disagrees that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense are receiving inadequate advice, in particular inadequate joint military advice, to support decision-making on combat air power programs.

The draft report stresses the need to improve the process by which joint military
advice is provided to the Secretary of Defense on combat air power programs. The
Department notes that existing processes have been adapted to incorporate a substantial
amount of joint military advice and that many steps have been taken in the past few years
to improve the extent and quality of joint military advice provided to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary. For example, the present Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
(JWCA) process carried out under the leadership of the Joint Staff is a major addition to
the quality and quantity of analytical and military advice presented to senior departmental
leadership. Several examples exist of sophisticated analytical efforts in the JWCA:
process to integrate different warfare areas and combat functions; these are cited in the
more detailed comments attached to this letter. Thus, the Department concurs that the
Joint Staff needs robust analytical capabilities and has taken action in recent years to
strengthen those capabilities.

The Department agrees that analytical support for overall decision-making can be improved and has included funding for such improvements in the FY 1997 President's Budget now being considered by the Congress. The Department is continually seeking ways to improve its decision-making processes to deal with the greater uncertainties in long-term defense planning that have followed the end of the Cold War. These improvements are being made to an existing set of processes that the Department considers to be robust; they do not reflect a judgment that the current basis for decisionmaking is inadequate.

Comments From the Department of Defense

All three of the Deparment's major combat aircraft acquisition programs will face careful scrutiny before they proceed past the next acquisition milestone. A review of F/A-18E/F capabilities and quantities will be carried out early next year when the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision is considered by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). A DAB review of the F-22 will be held prior to commitment to production. A comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is being designed now for the Milestone II review of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

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Comments From the Department of Defense

GAO DRAFT REPORT-DATED JUNE 20, 1996

(GAO CODE 701040) OSD CASE 1175

“COMBAT AIR POWER: JOINT MISSION ASSESSMENTS NEEDED BEFORE

MAKING PROGRAM AND BUDGET DECISIONS”

DOD COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

O RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO asserted that the future viability of U.S. air power
requires that the Secretary of Defense make informed decisions in at least two critical
areas--how best to reduce unneeded duplication and overlap in existing capabilities and
how the force can be recapitalized in the most cost-effective manner. To make such
decisions, the GAO concluded that the Secretary must have better information coming
from a joint perspective. Accordingly, the GAO recommended that the Secretary, along
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop an assessment process that yields
more comprehensive information in key mission areas. The GAO indicated that this can
be done by broadening the current joint warfare capabilities as sessment process or
developing an alternative mechanism. (p.13, p.90/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp. 13, 75-76.

DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The DoD considers that adequate information is
available to the Secretary of Defense to make decisions on U.S. combat air force
programs. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense receive comprehensive advice
on combat air power programs through two parallel processes: the Planning-
Programming-and-Budgeting System (PPBS) and the systems acquisition process. Joint
military force assessments and recommendations are provided in both processes. The
quality of analytical support could be improved, but the extent of support available has not
been insufficient for decision-making.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides advice to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Chairman's Program Recommendations at the outset of each year's PPBS process. Later in the year, when final decisions are being made on priorities for that year's update of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), he provides the Chairman's Program Assessment to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. These documents draw from the work of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) analyses as well as from consultations with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs) and their staffs. The JWCA process is very broad in scope and incorporates both quantitative analyses and integrating military judgment concerning capabilities, limitations, and risks.

The PPBS process was expanded significantly during the 1980s to offer full participation by the Joint Staff and CINC staffs in all phases of FYDP development. The major program review issue process that takes place each summer includes full Joint Staff representation on issue teams. Further, CINC representatives in the Pentagon can participate as they choose and copies of draft issue presentations have been made available to CINC staffs electronically on a timely basis since the 1980s for their participation as

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