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Comments From the Department of Defense

well. A general officer from the Joint Staff is a member of the Program Review Group
(PRG) that screens prospective issues before they are forwarded to the Defense Resources
Board (DRB) for decision. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a member of the DRB
and senior members of his staff routinely attend DRB deliberations. These Joint Chiefs of
Staff representatives have been active, and occasionally decisive participants in DRB
deliberations on combat air power issues.

Military advice from a joint services perspective similarly is provided regularly and comprehensively during the systems acquisition process led by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology). Joint Staff analysts are members of system Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) that prepare evaluations and documentation on systems progress. Joint Staff representatives are present at all meetings of the overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPTs) that evaluate the readiness of systems to be presented to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for approval for advancement to the next acquisition milestone. Similarly, the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the vice chairman of the DAB. The Vice Chairman also is chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which reviews in detail the joint requirements for all major acquisition programs prior to a DAB review.

O RECOMMENDATION 2: To be of most value, the GAO also recommended that such
assessments should be done on a continuing basis and should, at a minimum, (1) assess
total joint warfighting requirements in each mission area; (2) inventory aggregate Service
capabilities, including the full range of assets available to carry out each mission; (3)
compare aggregate capabilities to joint requirements to identify shortages or excesses,
taking into consideration existing and projected capabilities of potential adversaries and
whether existing capabilities may be sufficient to meet joint requirements; (4) determine
the most cost-effective means to satisfy any shortages; and (5) where excesses exist,
assess the relative merits of retiring alternative assets, reducing procurement quantities, or
canceling acquisition programs. (p.14, p.90/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp. 13, 75-76.

DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Department agrees that mission area
assessments can improve understanding of military capabilities and limitations, but
disagrees that an insufficient understanding of mission area needs has been available to
support decision-making. The DoD conducts an annual update of the FYDP and carries
out a thorough Program Review as part of its program development. The Program
Review issue teams carry out the tasks indicated by the GAO to be needed to evaluate
program adequacy. The Service Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) provide a great
deal of descriptive information on program content, future plans, and assessed capabilities.
The issue teams, which are led by either Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or Joint
Staff personnel, assess the ability of Service programs to meet the national military
strategy within available resources. They consider all available resources to meet critical
needs and develop alternative means to satisfy these needs with varying levels of
capability, cost, and risk. These alternatives provide the basis for decision by the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the best overall DoD program.

Examples of how the PPBS has worked recently to adjust Service programs to best meet overall DoD within resource constraints include the decision in 1993 to delay retirement of the Air Force F-111F force pending further development of advanced

Comments From the Department of Defense

weapons and targeting systems for other aircraft; the decision in 1994 to delay Joint
Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) acquisition and use existing aircraft more fully;
the decision in 1994 to create a DoD joint Tactical Airbome Electronic Warfare (JTAEW)
force based on the Navy Department EA-6B, retiring the Air Force EF-111A; and
decisions during 1995-96 to reshape the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST)
program as it evolved into the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Joint Staff was
centrally involved in the F-111, JTAEW and JAST issues; Joint Staff personnel led the
detailed study of worldwide force needs, capabilities and goals that led to the final
STAEW consolidation decision. Joint Staff personnel conducted warfighting capabilities
analyses in 1993 and 1994 that assessed the role of the F-111F, drawing on CINC and
CINC staff inputs, and provided advice to the DRB in their deliberations on air power

O RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO further recommended that the assessments need to examine the projected impact of investments, retirements, and cancellations on other mission areas since some assets contribute to multiple mission areas. Where investments are needed in more than one mission area, the GAO asserted that the Chairman's responsibility to assess their relative priority and contribution to overall warfighting capability is crucial in considering the results of the assessment teams. (p.14, p.91/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp. 13, 75-76.

DOD RESPONSE. Partially concur. The Department agrees that mission assessments
are important to decision-making but rees that available analytical support has been
inadequate to support decision-making. The Chairman provides the integrated assessment
that is discussed by the GAO in their draft report in the Chairman's Program
Recommendations and Chairman's Program Assessment. Integration of capabilities,
limitations, and risks across several warfare areas is difficult An example of a formal
integration of two warfare functional areas in Joint Staff analysis is the “Precision Strike-
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance" (PSISR) working group in the JWCA
process. The PSISR team focuses on understanding “sensor-to-shooter" links and
resolving inconsistencies or gaps in these links. Several General Officer Steering
Committee (GOSC) sessions of the PSISR have been held, raising awareness of key
system relationships and gaps at senior management levels.

There are other examples. The Sea-Air-Space Superiority JWCA conducted an "end-to-end” assessment of the best way to gain air superiority. Ground, Special Operations, and other forces were considered fully, and in some cases endorsed, as the best means of accomplishing selected tasks in gaining air superiority. The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Attack Operations study, led by the Strike JWCA, drew in five other JWCA teams: Command and Control; Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance; ScaAir-Space Superiority; Land & Littoral Warfare; and Counterproliferation, with the PSISR study group involved as well. The Land & Litoral Warfare and Strike JWCAs are collaborating on analysis of joint munitions requirements, as well as on other matters.

O RECOMMENDATION 4: To enhance the effectiveness of the assessments, the GAO also recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1) decide how best to provide analytical support to the assessment teams, (2) assure

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 13, 75-76.

staff continuity, and (3) allow the teams the latitude to examine the full range of air power issues. (p.14, p.91/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE. Partially Concur. The Department agrees that the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give guidance concerning needed analytical support, but disagrees that such support has been inadequate for decisionmaking. Efforts to further improve the DoD's analytical process are continuing. To satisfy the need for improved joint analysis tools, the Department has initiated the Joint Analytic Model Improvement Program. This program is intended in the near-term to improve existing models' capabilities to treat joint operations and, over the longer term, to develop a fully joint warfare model called “JWARS”.

Currently in development, JWARS is planned for release to users in three blocks, in increasing levels of resolution and capability. The first block release is planned for 1998, with subsequent releases at approximately two-year intervals. When complete, JWARS is expected to provide substantial improvements in cross-Service and crossmission analysis.

Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.

Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director
William C. Meredith, Project Director
Marvin E. Casterline, Project Manager
Jason Fong, Evaluator
Anthony J. DeFrank, Evaluator
Dale O. Wineholt, Evaluator
Nancy L. Ragsdale, Evaluator (Communications Analyst)

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