Meno. CAN (AN you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way? Socrates. O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, of whom your lover Aristippus is one, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and Steph. all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I 71 am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me; if I were inspired I might answer your question. But now I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not. And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the citizens; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of anything how can I know the "quale?" How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? that I could? Men. No, indeed. Do you think But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly? Soc. Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did, in my judg ment. Men. Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? Sur. Yes, I have. Men. And did you not think that he knew? Soc. I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please. therefore. to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view, for I dare say that you and he think much alike. Men. True. Soc. Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me. By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really know what I have been saying that I have never found any body who knew. : Men. There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that. Take first the virtue of a man: his virtue is to know how to administer the state, in the administration of which he will benefit his friends and damage his enemies, and will take care not to suffer damage himself. A woman's virtue may also be easily described her virtue is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates. 72 Soc. How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as, for example, beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer that? Men. I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees. Soc. And suppose that I went on to say: That is what I want to know, Meno; tell me what is that quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike: you would be able to answer that? Men. I should. Soc. And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be. they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, “ What is virtue?" would do well to have his eye fixed. Do you understand? Men. I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on; does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? Men. I should say that health, regarded as health, is the same, whether of man or woman. Soc. And is not this true of size and strength? If & woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference? Men. I think not. 73 Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is not like the others. Soc. Why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? Men. I did say that. Soc. And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? Men. Certainly not. Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice? Men. Certainly. Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? Men. True. Soc. And can either a young man or an old one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust? Men. They cannot. Sor. They must be temperate and just? Men. Yes. Soe. Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues? Men. That is the inference. Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same? Men. They would not. Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that vir tue is. Men. Will you have one definition of them all? Soc. That is what I am seeking. Men. What can I say but that virtue is the power of governing mankind? Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Ought the child to govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave? Men. I think not, Socrates. Soc. No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is "the power of governing; " but do you not add "justly" and not unjustly? 6. Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree to that, for justice is virtue. Soc. I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is "a figure" and not simply "figure," and I should say this because there are other figures. Men. Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue that there are other virtues as well as justice. Soc. What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me. 74 Men. Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnificence are virtues; and there are many others. Soc. Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common element which runs through them all. Men. Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. Soc. No wonder; but I will try to arrive a little nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered roundness," he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is "figure" or " a figure;" and would answer you Men. Certainly. 66 a figure." Soc. And for this reason that there are other figures? Soc. And if he proceeded to ask, what other figures are there? you would have told him. Men. I should. Soc. And if he similarly asked what color is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is color or a color? you would reply, A color, because there are other colors as well. Men. I should. Soc. And if he had said, Tell me what they are, you would have told him of other colors which are colors just as much as whiteness. Men. Yes. Soc. And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure which comprehends straight as well as |