Nic. Yes, indeed, Socrates; that is my opinion. Soc. Aud courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful? Nic. Yes. Soc. And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils? Nic. True. Soc. And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time? Nic. That is true. Soc. Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; and courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present, and past, and of any time? Nic. That, as I suppose, is true. Soc. Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. do you say to that alteration in your statement? Nic. I agree to that, Socrates. What Soc. But then, my dear friend, if a mau knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal with gods or men. Nic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say. Soc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue ? Nic. I suppose that is true. Soc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue? Nic. Yes, that was what we were saying. Soc. And that is in contradiction with our present view? Nic. That appears to be the case. 200 Soc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage if Nic. We have not. La. And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the discovery, as you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon. Nic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbor and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject of discussion; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damou, whom you think to deride, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge. La. You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates; and if my sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself. Nic. To that I quite agree. if Socrates is willing to take thein under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus. Lys. He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths? Soc. Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? certainly think that no one should; and under these cir- 201 cumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves. and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, that Let us then, regardless of the remarks which are made upon us, make the education of the youths our own education. Lys. I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favor of you: come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation. Soc. I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God willing. |