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ted States Guring the World War is recalled. Not only do state al post of te greatest V. 'ue, from t ́e standout of d of tice et, deres upon the 1 ch me, s but so afford inrsh and a restave mad auxiony force of De Valte ca shot be overestimated

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ike th A as ad Navy have only 15h national defe 1, ses Da li sbtragh 16 is true of peace the merchan No one wai gun ay that the Coust Gurd, the Lightd lovbor, he good robs the Ree an rtier, and other service% Fby the Gwennant do not posses de 3. te. s to the Na! 91, so geat as to far outwe sh the expergitares and yet, taking of the bilas e -beet

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A counting 0o e us a bisis, it will appear that none of vid that all of the money exper ded by the

no gllect pet. L except at the case of customs recoj 's, het zoug, the dever peut of the rivers and habeas of the

SHIP TONNAGE AND MEASUREMENT TERMS EXPLAINED

The hearings held in 192% on the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 ered very complete definitions and explanations of ship tonasurement terms. I will insert them at this point:

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by wll displace f's own welt of water. Sea or salt *ely 64 poun's per cubic foot. If we and the nu er of that port -n of a lo thig ship which is under water it is a to determine t'e ship's disp sceper t.

for weighs ap, roximately 64 posnes per eul le fout the total ced defect represented by the under water portion of the ship mulrej zoser's tac total nu? ber of pounds of water displaced by the

total number of cubic feet of the ur der water portion of the ship 's 25 t will give the num er of totis of w ter displaced, sit e 35 -11 for or 35 tật -× 64 pour 1s equals 2240 pour 18,

e that a ship is „leat in a quet body of water. The water Poles a solid re ** of ice (For the purpose of this illustration. ***n of the ice is 12hored. The slip is 1 fred out of the ice, 'I le in the ie then represents the form of the under water portion of the then fill this cavity with water to the level of t'e surface of the water is pin ped out of the cavity and placed on one side of a scale, spliced on the opposite side of the scale. The scale will then

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to prove t' is, if the water on the scale which ba'ances the weight of is again poured into the cavity in the ice and we proceed to put the k into the cavity, the water in the cavity is forced aside or displaced slip occupies the entire space in the cavity, at which time it will and all of the water which we previously found equaled the weight Irapiacement, light-The weight of the ship, excluding cargo, passengers, water, stores, dunnage, and such other items which are necessary for use Trascreement, loaded --The weight of the ship including cargo, passengers, water, stures, dunnage, and such other items necessary for use on a which brings the vessel down to her maximum draft.

~ght tone—The carrying capacity of a ship in tors of 2240 pounds dference between the dispiacement light and the displacement loade 1 As an 11 "stration, a ship with a light displacement of 4 000 tons has a draft ** 9 feet; at this displacement (4.000 tons and draft of 9 feet) her deadweight Her loaded disnlacement would amount to 15.000 tons and she would have a draft for this londed displacement of 30 feet There fore her deadweight ↑he the difference between the light and loaded displacement, or a carrycat seity of 11.000 tons

Caron dendice ght tons. The number of tons (2240 pounds per ton) which remolo after deducting fuel, water, stores, dunnage, and such other items beessary for use on a voyage from the deadweight of the vessel. As an

illustration, a vessel of 11,000 tons deadweight takes aboard fuel, water, stores, dunnage, and such other items necessary for a voyage amounting to 1,200 tons, the cargo deadweight available will then amount to 9,800 tons. The cargo deadweight varies according to the weight of the last-named items. In other words, for a long voyage fuel may be carried for a round trip and the quantity of stores proportionately increased, which would reduce the figure for the cargo deadweight tons by a like amount.

Gross tons.-The entire internal cubic capacity of the ship expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton, except certain spaces which are exempted, such as peak and other tanks for water ballast, open forecastle bridge and poop, excess of hatchways, certain light and air spaces, domes and skylights, condenser, anchor gear, steering gear, wheel house, galley, cabins for passengers (when on decks not to hull), the other items (as enumerated in Measurement of Vessels, published by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation). Net tons. The tonnage of a ship remaining after certain deductions have been made from the gross tonnage expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton. Among the deductions are crew spaces, master's cabin, navigation spaces, donkey engine and boiler, shaft trunks, percentage of propelling machinery space, and other items (as enumerated in Measurement of Vessels, published by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation).

Register tons.—Register tonnage is applicable to both gross and net; in other words, it can be expressed as gross register tonnage or net register tonnage. However, as a general rule it is ordinarily used with reference to net tonnage.

Power tons.-This is used to classify the ship for the purpose of establishing the rates of pay of the ship's officers and is calculated by adding together the gross tonnage and the indicated horsepower of the ship. The result is power tonnage.

Grain cubic.-The maximum space available for cargo measured in cubic feet, the measurements being taken to the inside of the shell plating of the ship or to the outside of the frames and to the top of the beams or underside of deck plating. In other words, if a bulk cargo was loaded such as grain it would flow in between the frames and beams and occupy the maximum space available.

Bale cubic.—The space available for cargo measured in cubic feet to the inside of the cargo battens, on the frames, and to the underside of the beams. In a general cargo of mixed commodities the bale cubic applies. The stowage of the mixed cargo comes in contact with the cargo battens and as a general rule does not extend to the skin of the ship. From figures taken from an actual ship, the grain cubic amounts to 641,000 cubic feet and the bale cubic amounts to 470,000 cubic feet.

Cargo stowage factor.-The bale cubic divided by the cargo deadweight equals the stowage factor. In other words, a ship with a bale cubic of 570,000 cubic feet and a cargo deadweight of 9,800 tons would have a stowage factor of about 58 cubic feet.

VALUE OF MERCHANT MARINE TO FARMERS OF AMERICA

In further evidence of the value of a merchant marine to the farmers, I wish to call attention of the committee to the 1928 hearings, in which Mr. Fred B. Brenckman, Washington representative of the National Grange, a national farm organization extending from Maine to California and having at that time approximately 800,000 members. Mr. Branckman said:

With 56 percent of our exports composed of agricultural products and confronted with the necessity of expanding our foreign markets in order to dispose of our agricultural surplus, the farmer is vitally interested in the maintenance of an adequate merchant marine.

I simply want to observe, Mr. Chairman, that probably no other class among our people was more seriously embarrassed and more heavily penalized by our lack of merchant ships at the breaking out of the World War than the farmers of the United States. When Great Britain commandeered 1,500 of her merchantmen for war purposes and when our German ships were swept from the ocean, it left us with very inadequate means of getting our products to market. Then

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that we learned the meaning of freight embargoes, and our products .««i up in warehouses and elevators and upon the docks, with scarcely ¡m to transport them. During this emergency the price of transporting a vitton from Galveston to Liverpool rose from $250 to $50 a bale. It is ated that it cost the cotton growers of the South $750,000,000 more to -ẹ the etion crop for 1914 than they received for it. The major portion „singe loms was directly due to our inck of shipping facilities At the same De cont of transporting a bushel of wheat from New York to Liverpool »d from 8 ovt's a bushel în 1914 to 27 cents in 1915 and during the war - the peak charge of $136 a bushel. In this disastrous and expensive we had brought sharply home to us the extreme foily of depending ex univery upon the ships of other countries to carry our foreign

OnYonnono, which we paid for our war time fleet gave us the ships r almoiutely vital to winning the war and today the Government tuting a portion of what is left of that fleet in the interest of American 1 for the benefit of ail our people. It is manifest that the vessels of mast he kept in repair and that there should be adequate provision - Manchal Units, we are to suffer a painful repetition of the experience

ge, of course, is in favor of giving proper encouragement to private to engage in the whipping Fusiness, but we consider the merchant #72 la vital importance that if private enterprise is unable to furnish - and supy the faciaties demanded by our expanding commerce, fa 3 persuaded t at it would be better for the Government to conbe sh. fing busiless for the time being, rather than to have no mereat all. Mh has been said of the losses incurred by the Govern file operations of the United States Shipping Board, but this leaves beration the obstacles and difficulties with which the Board bas ¡nd to contend Now, of course, we all realize that fleet was built rand that in the very nature of things the whole or a part of ♫ that fleet will have to be charged off as a war cost and we feel ww.ta autogether fair to the Shipping Board to el arge ail of those d defe is that have been sustained to the management of the Board. over ooks the service which it has rendered to our people

1. freight b 1 is est. Lated at $720000.000 a year and if it may be cat fright rates are 10 percent lower than would be the case if we ps, it is at parent that the operations of the Shipping Board result og of $72 0 0 000 a year to the American people. The deficit sustained

ernment during the past year, in connection with the operations ; 12 Board, a counted to only 15 or 15 million dollars, which is par tuvery small sum when compared to the benefits conferred upon the In 19026 when the English coal strike was in progress, many of the ** <j«« t↑« fi w' jeh we were depending were withdrawn and utilized in coal from this country to Great Britain In this emergency, the * Board paced nearly 100 ships of the reserve fleet into commission, gear wheat and coffin to foreign markets, resulting in a saving to

in farmer which has been estimated at $600.000.000. If the Shipg Band should continue to lose an average of $18.000.000 a year, which is kris berate the deficits are stendily declining, the service rendered ☛ Board to the Ar erican farmer alone in 1926 would offset those deficits. If almost 36 years ⚫

€4.93 000 000 000 in the time of the war for vessels that we probably bought, under normal conditions, for abent one sixth of the amount, ** are paying $120000000 a year interest on the money we borrowed to thume sh pa and we feel, out of all that, the American people are entitled merchant marine and one that would be on a sound and continuing basis, Now, I desire to insert in the record a statement of Dr. Julius Kin, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, in a radio address delivered ry 5, 1933:

COMMER TAL VALUE OF THE MERCHANT MARINE

he importance of this shipping business both in terms of freight and in Vingres for supp Tew Tabor, and other essentials, is all too little api res lated before the war, our shipping was earning in this traffe about $35000,000

a year, and was spending for supplies and other purposes in this country about $26,000,000. As against these two figures, our shipping in 1931 (a very low subnormal year) earned no less than $187,000,000 in freight carrying and spent about $141,000,000 in this country for supplies, wages, other items of operation, etc. There is no doubt whatever that much of this business-doubly precious in those gaunt times-would have been lost if it had not been for the valuable help of the new shipping laws. * * It seems to me that it would be as ill founded a policy to abandon the merchant-marine services we have built up as it would be to tear up thousands of miles of our railways and highways and to invite foreign nations to rebuild them with their capital and labor. We have the ships just as we have our domestic transportation systems, and they are ships that are well able to hold their own in the company of those of any other nation.

BENEFITS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE TO THE NATION

I now wish to insert a statement made by a former chairman of the Shipping Board before this committee during the merchant marine investigation held in 1931. Mr. T. V. O'Connor, then Chairman of the Shipping Board, stated:

During the period 1921-30 the water-borne foreign trade of the United States amounted to over 900,000,000 tons of freight, valued at $74,000,000,000. It is significant to note that American ships, which before the war carried less than 10 percent of our commerce, during this 10-year period carried over 40 percent, or upward of 360,000,000 tons of freight valued at nearly $25,000,000,000. Passenger and freight revenues accruing from this vast movement of traffic totaled approximately $9,000,000,000. On the most conservative estimate, fully one-third of this revenue must be credited as a direct gain to American labor and industry through the possession of a strong merchant marine.

As already indicated, the vessels of the Shipping Board operated from 1917 to 1920, inclusive, at a substantial profit to the Government.

Subsequently shipping conditions throughout the world were such that losses were sustained by the Board's fleet. Up to the end of the fiscal year 1930 these losses totaled something less than $100,000,000.

However, in incurring this loss, the fleet handled business which brought to the Government, and consequently to the American people, gross revenues amounting to approximately $2,180,000,000. Had not the American merchant marine; then owned almost entirely by the Government, aggressively competed for and secured this business, it would have been handled by ships of foreign registry.

When we consider that foreign ships are built abroad, that their earnings are largely invested abroad, and that they are manned almost entirely by foreigners who spend most of their money in other lands, the meager financial benefits accruing to this country from foreign ship operations become at once apparent. On the other hand, the earnings, wages, and purchases involved in the operation of Amercan ships ar all transactions which directly benefit the Government and people of the United States. For this reason the American merchant marine, most of which is now privately owned, has in no small degree been an effective instrument in the stimulation of domestic industry and labor.

When we come to consider the way in which an adequate merchant marine opens up additional foreign markets, we enter into another phase of the benefits derived from having a merchant fleet of our own. Aside from the stabilization of rates, and the consequent savings in freight charges to American exporters and importers, the records of the past 10 years must convince the most skeptical that trade does follow the flag.

Whereas in the decade prior to 1914, the value of our foreign trade carried in American ships averaged but $300,000,000 annually, during the decade 1921-30 it averaged $2,600,000,000 per annum.

In 1914 only six American-flag ships, of 70,000 gross tons, were operated in our trade with Europe. In 1930 there were 232 American ships, totaling 1,500,000 gross tons, and our trade with that region had increased 50 percent. In 1914 there were five American ships, of 23,000 gross tons, operating between the United States and South America. In 1930 the number had been increased to 90, and our trade had increased 200 percent.

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we had to American ships trading to the African Continent. Today -ps, tota ing 12500 g os tons, and our trade has increased 325

with the Orlent tells the same story In 1914 there were five is oper thig from Pacific const ports to the Far East. In 1930 ter had grown to 140 ships, of a mallion gross tons, and our tride e dej Tession showed an increase of 380 percent.

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ment wit ng forth the savings in freight rates, the promotale, and textuation to industry and labor afforded by a it mai ne under the Ameri an flag, it has been posable only to *** Way a few of the results achieved it should be stated at the expense involved, lange though it his been, has resultei *nt of o ali se, Vices-o crateg to ad our principal forein Le American shopper and traveler is assured of depend ble car*g regular service nt rensonino e rates, and the country at large re aux hairy force which in time of national emergency will anju zimali e to the Uard Stites Navy.

VIUF OF SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING INDUS,RY TO NAVY

x: I w h to insert a statement made in 1882 by Hon. William ater, then Secretary of the Navy:

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forests of the Navy are inseparably involved with those of the com

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e is the first chject of the Naval Establishment

ton for such protection is made a si zle war may

sut fleet bevond hope of recovery, The carrying trade

• •] [* slow to refien to its old channels. As the merchant marine critical per upon the Navy, wo, on the oflor bind. the

katter how strong it may be, n.ust in emergency avail itself of the ** of the merchant marine.

Referring then to the war between the States, Secretary Chandler - that this was clearly shown during that war. He said further:

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tbreak the Navy had normally a tonnage of 105,271 tons. To in21-975 tens of xl poing were bought These purchased ships were for war purposes bit they were nevertheless indispersable. If 10 war our maritime nevesuties had been recognized and the of the Navy and the merchant marine had been understood and ash the Government might have saved millions of dollars and have had beginnig vessels capable of capturing the English built commerce. - ad blockade ru ters

the Navy must in emergencies resort to the merchant marine for ships, time draw upon it for officers and men to supply its deficiencies. The (1/3 stablishment is further dependent on the merchant marine through on to the saip bu, ding interests It must be able to build ships within try and all the requirements for ship building must here exist. The s and the skilled mechanics must be here, but the ordinary demands of the Navy will not support a single establishment and ship builders cannot tess they find employment and profit in building commercial vessels, If therefore, the present downward tendency of the merchant marine is unchecked, the Navy will soon be in a position that in the event of war it will be e to build a single vessel or to recruit its numbers by officers and seamen of tag'i al experience.

It may be argued that empital would be put into shipping if shipping were Stale The ret iy is that shipping would become profitable if it received as r treatment as other forms of investment. All the interests liable to suffer en foreizm cor-petition are protected, but that commerelal industry in which trerrati nal competition is sharpest, in which rival nations come face to face, is *? by the Government to take care of itself.

If Lufacturers are protected and nothing is done for shipbuilding, capital 1.. seek employment in manufactures for which the Government guarantees a return Even our transcontinental railways, which had nothing to fear from foreign competition, have received grants which, in comparison, places the inter cenric carrying trade under fatal disadvantages.

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