15- !, te veat 1950 al as our total water-turne aving aŭ estilanted Vaze of $2.759, ac Alter, a' s lim tran prici as pervert by Y le and 33 t by va. C letta. Iregt reverse for t. at vear as estimated at als ut of which, Ather. k., a ujis recrived chet 1, or 37 540/100 If, geteturi Arora. .jan 'ma i catetere laid te diferi elve in revene woud have been sus 700 000, az iste kat twice the present Mr_H_Gerral. N...fl. pres, lest of t ́e Nati nal Coacol of Arsenicat. §. ip COD a year as Tejate mo ang te vacie of car ེ་འ༅་གིས་ཆ At present there wems to be no soliten to the prolem presented by the "indirect" carrer Oar foreign treatum guarantee fun freed an în tila rispet to the ship of every nation In any subwrly plati, we are forced to iniciade the "ini.rect' carrier in our calculations. RATIO AND PROPORTION It would apts ar fi at in any particllar trade the American live operat–g on that route B.. ་་་ Pat the cargo space provided by itm mlip bears to tie t ta, cargo space prova ard by mii the ships in that trade, over any given period By cargo space we mean tonnage available for cargo per sailing, multiplied by the number of sailings during, let us say for purposes of illustration, 1 year. For example, if the vessels of the American company provide one-third of the cargo space available on any one route, the American company is entitled to one-third of the cargo moving in that trade. The number of ships operated by the company is not pertinent; it is the number of sailings and the cargo space available per sailing that determine a line's total capacity over any given period of time. Two ships of the same cargo deadweight tonnage are not to be considered as equal if one, by reason of greater speed, makes 15 round voyages per year while the other makes only 12. In the hypothetical case just cited, if the American line is not actually securing one-third of the total cargo available, the reason for this condition must be discovered and every legitimate means taken to overcome or correct that condition. If the line is obtaining a greater portion of the total crago than indicated by its percentage of cargo space, so much the better. It is probably doing so by reason of more intensive solicitation, greater care in handling commodities, better service to the customer. With this percentage of cargo space established, taking all factors into consideration, there exists a basis for determining the amount of subsidy necessary. Careful investigation should disclose whether or not the American line is operating economically as possible, whether its personnel is efficient, whether its overhead is in keeping with sound business practice. HOW THE METHOD MIGHT OPERATE Having settled these matters, let us give an example of the manner in which the amount of subsidy might be fixed, by recording an imaginary one-sided conversation. The speaker is Uncle Sam, talking to an American shipowner: "Mr. Shipowner, the records show that the following conditions apply in your case. You maintain weekly sailings; the average deadweight of your ships is 11,000 tons, and deducting 1,500 tons for fuel, stores, water, etc., the average cargo deadweight tonnage per ship is 9,500. That figure, multiplied by 52 sailings a year, gives you a potential annual carrying capacity of 494,000 tons, eastbound. In our calculations we must consider both east- and west-bound business, however, for we want you to exert just as much effort to obtain homebound cargo, so your total annual east- and west-bound capacity is double that figure, or 988,000 tons. "Your competitor, Line X, operates fortnightly sailings, with ships of 7.500 cargo deadweight tons; its annual carrying capacity is therefore 360,000 tons. "And your competitor, Line Z, operates a weekly service, but its ships are larger than yours, averaging 11,000 cargo deadweight tons, and its annual carrying capacity is therefore 1,144,000 tons. "The total capacity in your trade is therefore 2,492,000 tons annually. Your percentage of this total is, let us say, about 40 percent. "In this trade, the records of the division of statistics of the United States Shipping Board Bureau show the annual volume of exports and imports, eliminating tanker and other bulk cargoes, to be 1,200,000 tons. In better times it amounted to almost double that figure, which accounts in a measure for the fact that today the trade is overtonnaged. However, our analysis shows that for the proper development of our foreign commerce and the national defense it is necessary for us to have available in this trade a fleet of American ships able to render the service of which your ships are capable, both as to size and speed. "SETTING THE QUOTA "Our investigation shows the average freight rate in this trade to be $6 a ton. Total annual revenue, based on 1,200,000 tons is therefore $7,200,000 annually. Your ships' cargo deadweight capacity represents 40 percent of the total available in this trade; we therefore expect you to transport 40 percent of this 1,200,000 tons, and your revenue, therefore, should be $2,880,000 annually. "We also find that your costs for investment, insurance, depreciation, fuel, maintenance and repair, supplies, solicitation, overhead, salaries, and so forth, amount to $3,600,000 annually, so without substantial assistance, you are bound to incur a loss of some $720,000 a year, even though you carry your proportion of the trade. Of course, when times were better and a greater amount of cargo fertig, you were able to operate your ships more nearly at their capacity, and your ima was proportionateis lower – Bit, condition a being what they are, we will pace your mutudy at $16.000 a voyage, or $8,32,000 anni ially, which mrivind permit you to cover your present josses atid lay aside something toward If you fail to secure your allotted 40 percent that is your hard luck We expect you to exert every effort to attail, and hoi that fig re If you exceed Uat percentage, the nibsidy wii stili stand, and the additional frogt rever je Perhaps this wai enat je voŊ to bund new sips more quickiv. Pommibuy, in doing so, you will find it advantageous to inercase voir antital carrying empacity, and therefore your percentage of the total space avaliable in the trade, either by binding larger slaps or faster obes When that time Cothen, we will raise the ante accordingly, if it is found that by so doing your Operating expenses are increasedi * If a new line enters the trade or if at v one of your competitors adds to has atral cargo carrying empacity by increasing the number of salgs or the size of tas atpm, theret y resducing your percentage of the total cargo dealwecht tonnage in the tra le, we cannot reasonabiy expect you to carry more Ul an ti at percentage and wil, therefore increase yo ir sute. IV. We boacve, however, that tia policy will act as a deterrent to any line which might seek to freeze you out of your proper al are of the bes A fruit Batin order to make gooi, või mist at least maintain your que ta te liv, thầm is to wizijue un tertaking, for it must be tørre in hand t; at before the war there were practica.¡v no Alberican ühes operating in our fere gh trade. Ninety percent of our overmna trade was ther cared by foregen 1 ag lines, which to lay are operat ng just as ILALA «2 ps wit', at me frequent sa il 25 Ba tay did i 19,5, notwit istanding oar itinatalie rgit to carry a fair porten of ear foreign trade in ships fiving the American, fad Nit is (TVIOLAN that whatever progress has been made, or will be ma le in. t at dirvet, n, has been necomposte i, iti a se tine, at the expetise of test foreign üres, although it is also true tist traje folows the fag and American slips have been re-primit de oveľ the past 15 years iti Uie creat, ti of certain of our tirement day export al 1 itp.t business. Ship operation is, like almost any other activity, a sirvival of the fittest, and your success lies nästay in your own efferta It's up to you! ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INITIATIVE Natura"y, arv j'an sich as this w...‚'1 not be affected by any present eonIce A¿tveiler ts or foreigti trvatunna It won't however, have some effect on *ག**ik} p 1£e"t tw%P པའི་བ༞ en••»! tes I, w I ́e latter may offer so the vantages, but when frygt m ted acering to prearra" ROİ e, it is orly to be expected that in cent ve to secure na re cargo tan ti at Pri tritei by any part.car thes share of the revenue wul te duned and D'infire the aim of C ngress will not be met W aver ata ketier v of exTRO ALA ting this plan, the same prir ciples te atti'ited to tiatsgns kger hiན བོན བཞི T'e p'au does not ecrfemi ate in present provians for Government lenes for ship ecnstruction, Italy, there are • me kurks' un tre present construction joan set ip i'd be urned out Other a is a res ly provided by law, such as the va! Reserve, etc., i he made fully effective, at iwe Peb ști dise „ssed here drei merely as a • kgestion, it is b eved to be a wifka' e ore, at i obe when world, in tre jong run, entai no greater expense Van Vse present mail œntract system ing should, ar i must, stard on its own feet, denerding for ita utuste sjeres ct, ita að ty to secure business and operate off carry It n. at net beleve t'at governmental - iy w 1 contul je forever, and any mute, by pan shonid, first of all, provide for proper encouragement of private Progress will welee me en mert or er tie sne tris pan by its renters, einer e.. lential or for patra'i t. THE MERCHANT MARINE RADIO ADDRESS OF HON. DAVID I. WALSH, OF MASSACHUSETTS, IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE ON THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE Representing in part in the United States Senate a State whose early history was conspicuously associated with maritime activities, I have long been of the opinion that an adequate merchant marine is one of the major requirements of the United States. In times of peace we need a merchant fleet in order that our trade may be extended and protected with adequate service at fair and reasonable rates. In times of war, whether this country or others alone be involved, the need for adequate shipping facilities is even more imperative. If the United States is engaged in combat, our merchant fleet serves as an auxiliary to our Army and Navy operations. If other countries are involved in strife, their merchant vessels will be chiefly in war activities and will be withdrawn from American commerce. In the absence of an American merchant marine, the result will be American products piling up at our terminals for lack of shipping facilities, or transportation only in foreign bottoms at exorbitant rates and uncertain service. Today our merchant marine facilities are inadequate to effectively meet the requirements of either peace or war. Our tonnage has declined in both size and effectiveness since the close of the World War. In numbers they may appear adequate, but in effectiveness they are not. Our fleet is weak because most of its vessels are old and slow. Worst of all, arrangements are not being made rapidly enough for replacement of ships when they pass the age of usefulness. Our merchant fleet operating in international trade, carrying goods and passengers, is only approximately one-fourth the size of Great Britain's and about the same size as that of Japan. From the total number of our merchant ships it would appear that we have almost three times as many ships as are listed above. The catch in that fact is that many of them are engaged in coastwise trade. Were war to break out tomorrow, it would be necessary for the United States Navy to take over a large part of American merchant shipping for auxiliary work. Even then, this arm of our national defense would be far short of our requirements. Our national defense would be seriously endangered by a lack of certain types of merchant vessels which naval authorities declare are absolutely essential to the waging of successful warfare. President Roosevelt, in a recent message to Congress, has called attention to our inadequate merchant-marine facilities and urged remedial action during the present session of Congress. Senators and Representatives already are studying the problem attentively, and I am urging all citizens who believe in a strong line of national defense to vigorously support the administration program for an adequate merchant marine. The President in addressing Congress presented outstanding and imperative reasons for an adequate merchant fleet, as follows: "To me there are three reasons for answering the question in the affirmative. The first is that in time of peace, subsidies granted by other nations, shipping combines, and other restrictive or rebating methods, may well be used to the detriment of American shippers. The maintenance of fair competition alone, calls for American flag ships of sufficient tonnage to carry a reasonable portion of our foreign commerce. "Second, in the event of a major war in which the United States is not involved, our commerce in the absence of an adequate American merchant marine, might find itself seriously crippled because of its inability to secure bottoms for neutral peaceful foreign trade. "Third, in the event of a war in which the United States itself might be engaged, American flag ships are obviously needed, not only for naval auxiliaries, but also for the maintenance of reasonable and necessary commercial intercourse with other nations. We should remember lessons learned in the last war." The American merchant marine problem is not a political question. It is a patriotic question. It is one of economics as well as military defense. Presidents of the United States, beginning with George Washington, have recognized it as such. All of them have stressed the urgent need of a strong merchant fleet. Up to the period prior to 1860 the Nation recognized the need for possessing and maintaining a merchant fleet strong enough at all times to cope with fleets of other nations. at venaels the United States held a strong post or in world My own state of Massachum tte was rich in mar time bustory -laring རྔོལ་ཉིམ་ལྔ་ལས༔ Prior to 1960 we carried over ti.rew.q.arter of our see at t me other ist uns have vern, ited to wrest commiero ni ma sipremacy frimti im In 1910 we reached e jem post in our at hting activities carry ig less tint. 9 percent of our for an portreter der De American flag And to a destite the fact that ex genees 1 Ty the World War e impe, ef us to spend more Van $300 000 000 15 Tenshi itating out there ant fest, we are activ carrying only a turd of our foreign trade () ral, art mig1 te-fresa comt led us to spend in 20 mont's for an emergency feet an alto it twee the aim of the vaise of the ocean going ficets of the word ཆོ་པ་ ཉིམིས་སྙན་མ And even this stupendous expert fit ire only served during the emergites within & pros, le at a ley late eclipetitive here'art marine for the Unite i Matem Practically 90 percent of ti is expenditure was int so far as proving for a permanent more ant marie* Iran experience is a painful illastra of the cost of our lack of prepare fremm in 1413 the last year for which official figures are ava 'a' le sluts flying the az retires rite 1 only about 8 percent of the total tonnage of all co mitries ating in it fernational traie. ire an mir hart to orenov a pr mitent postion in word 1 st spring is de to a gravel 1 argument is repeatedly at i regus larly advanced here and strmi that there a'was wil be en z gh foreign vesseis to take care of our regirements. Tinnemort is faliscio s and da gero is to eir patronal welfare I te price of such a poney is too big to pay, as 'as been puncijave v demonstrated prior to and after our entry into the World War. It is true that in pe,ce t men foreign vessels generativ may be obtained to carry Am", an go is, I t at w at ནti.«! Av;» et mix de ry the secretary of the Treasury in 1915 estimate: ti at age cuit are and industry på 4foregi ») pOwners it there ved frest rates daring that 1 year al se a tetar of 8511,684 400, It was est rate!t tour per ole were taved over a bihot, dollars during the 3 ra bed re cir entry into the World War for transporting their products rength, in reased rates 11. vast sul went mostly into the pockets of foreign Let us now eons fer tùs plea for t'e use of foreign bottoms from t'e defense ata ipat We were at a trucent at at te on,threak of the World War Having been,se we had practies"la no peril art feet to use as a tuny al a ay Pary been juged me the beef t at we probably bever wo ad be y dued in another war and test if we did heer me involved anche, we could ensuy cht un trenchant ire' after fr meter thes we were woefully unprepared when I Le res ilt was the demand for ni pa to entry fronin and a 11 am to t. em arose t'at we affered a costiv delay and that we had to pay everhetart withs of money to foreign nations for t'e me of t ́eir vesseis zu uatsaft“c sq་ nསརྨེs !wathg upsc』ཧཱུྃku carry the Ames.cat au era ** st helped the Vibes wit te war The United States paid to Great Britain, and France, akore da total of $120 576 15007 for tre tratt The War Department estimates that Great Britani's at carrying of United stes troops are att of money would have b.lt maUY aiting t'e war ༞ན་。》』8་ 3་" * t Fun it im f the Word War at 1 .t སྙ་་་་་་ལྷུན་€ £ @ ༄⌘ **€ཁ*#W。 Durigte warat actua vind to take me, frihava, veme tm... Per. 』vwan『 {woutratatte itutsa"tif at,t་ས (arit:,t its merelant apa for 15,000 met 8":*opiq«R! ༄* ! ·{a "%avy» *£f* rid calcun to compare t'ereative strengt, of the haves of telat me without aneling teir there' ant matile strengt Our sofort uste e per et ces ili tie war should convince las of the receis.ty of two longer de a *g þar for a there' aut marine in te in.ted t-tes see nd to that of no other nston Many efforts have been made durig te last 15 years beg fg with the Merel at Mare Act of 1920, to start such a movement, but we have been unsuccessful |