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You will see that this plays more and more a part. Occasionally physical violence would creep through during periods of great pressure or where it was thought to be especially effective with a particular individual, but it seldom had official support.
The fourth item, the development of persuasion techniques and the exploitation of the intimate interrogation prisoner relationship is defined, is begun at least, with the Communist state police system.
As we go into the second quarter of the 20th century, with its various versions of the state police indicated by these various initials, the most recent being the MVD. The KGB, which is the committee of state security or, now, the state police system, has recently been separated from the MVD and has its own administrative organization. But throughout its history the Communist state police has been linked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It has had more or less intimacy and now again is in a period of relative separation.
Finally, we come to the idea of indoctrination of prisoners of war, which was developed by the Russians in dealing with their large German Army population. A good deal of experience was gained. Lastly, the development of the Chinese system which is a direct outgrowth of the Russian, with its own special variations.
As you will see later, group pressures are applied far more than they were in the Russian. Self and group criticism
was again refined, and more emphasis on prisoner indoctrination during the period of detention as contrasted to the Russian, was a feature.
I won't stop further to give details at this point because I hope to touch upon
all these matters later. Mr. KENNEDY. May I ask you one question there, Doctor: The system which was used against the prisoners in Korea, then, was not a new system, but it was also used against the German prisoners who were captured by the Russians in 1940, is that correct?
Dr. WOLFF. Yes. I should say that it had additional features. The Russians used their method, which is different from the Chinese in detail, against the Germans. Then the Russians transferred or communicated their methods about 1949 to the Chinese, and then the Japanese were exposed to the earliest experience of this sort, the Japanese prisoners. All the time this was being worked up in more detail. Finally, the last product of this effort is in relation to the Korean. So we come to this via the Russians through three prisoner-of-war populations, really.
Now I would like to turn to the next chart.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will order that these charts be printed in the record as presented. The chart to which the witness has just referred in his testimony will be made exhibit No. 1. The one now being presented will be identified as exhibit No. 2 and printed in the record at this point.
(Exhibit No. 2 follows:)
EXHIBIT No. 2
IMPORTANT COMMUNIST ATTITUDES
(a) Dissident members of the Communist Party.
(c) Social groups inimical to the state.
(9) People who have had contact with foreign nationals. 3. KGB decides who threatens party or state.
4. Crimes may be objective; committed accidentally or with innocent motives, or consequential; potential consequences of acts or attitudes. 5. “Evidence" of criminality includes
(a) Membership in a suspect group.
(d) Unverified reports of informers. 6. KGB does not arrest a man without evidence of criminality. 7. Therefore, anyone arrested by KGB is a criminal. The CHAIRMAN. All right, Doctor, you may proceed. Dr. WOLFF. In order to understand the procedure, I am afraid it will be necessary to take another excursion into the politics and attitudes of the Communists, which seem to be somewhat remote from our topic, but I feel essential to an appreciation of the procedure.
I have written out rather simply what I think to be pertinent.
As regards political crime--and what I have to say today has this alone in its implication--as regards political crime, anyone who is a threat to the party or the state is a criminal. You will see how that can be elaborated. Potential criminals, therefore, may fall into broad categories: First, dissident members of the Communist Party. That requires no explanation.
Second, ethnic groups suspected of nationalist aspirations.
Seventh, those Russians who have had contact with foreign nationals.
The KGB, that is to say, the State police, decides who threatens the party or the State. I think we have to pause to consider what is political crime. There are three general categories. The crime may be actual in the sense that a man is caught redhanded, so to speak, with the evidence of giving information to an enemy state or of actually committing sabotage, and so forth. That is actual. That is really not relevant to our topic and out of the area of discussion. More important are the crimes that are known as objective, which are committed accidentally or with innocent motives. That is to say, a factory manager may go to overuse of a part or machinery and cause the structures to break down and delay the ultimate production. Under those circumstances he is liable to criticism and actually is considered guilty of a crime. Or through lack of experience something may be broken or damaged.
The second type is the consequential crime, in which utterances or acts that apparently are quite far removed from having political implications are viewed or can be seen as having repercussions that are of an ominous or destructive nature. This is quite different from the western point of view and I think it must be emphasized, since it becomes very relevant to the kind of relationship that is developed between the interrogator and the prisoner in some of our subjects.
What constitutes evidence of criminality As mentioned above, membership in any of these suspect groups, minor infractions, acts that can be looked upon with suspecion, and unverified reports of informers.
The next point is an extremely important one and I can't overemphasize it. The KGB does not arrest a man without evidence of criminality. When I say criminality. I have in mind just what I have included above. This is important psychologically because a man who is being arrested knows that they have some evidence of some kind or interpret his acts in some way to make him a criminal. He doesn't know exactly what it is, but already his mind is prepared for trouble and he knows he is not innocent. Therefore, any one arrested by the KGB is almost by definition a criminal.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, once he is arrested, once the police decide to arrest him as a criminal, there is no hope then for vindication or acquittal ?
Dr. WOLFF. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Judgment is made and in effect sentence is passed as to guilt or innocence prior to arrest.
Dr. WOLFF. That is right. He can make a dicker and come off with as little as possible.
The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon?
Dr. WOLFF. He can make some sort of arrangement or have barter or work as hard as he can about making his crimes minimal, but he is coming out of it with some sort of guilt.
The CHAIRMAN. He is already convicted in the minds of his accusers prior to his arrest.
Dr. WOLFF. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. Whether he can get off with a light sentence or some reprimand or whether he is shown some leniency, depends on how he might cooperate?
Dr. WOLFF. That is right, sir.
This gives both the interrogator a great advantage and softens, so to speak, the prisoner because he knows that he is guilty.
Senator BENDER. How long, Doctor, has this process been in effect ? That is, how long have the Communists practiced, not in China but in Russia itself, this system of punishment?
Dr. WOLFF. I can say it was probably highly organized and fully developed by the time the famous purge trials in the thirties were generally publicized. I would say somewhere in the late thirties. Dr. Hinkle, is that your impression?
Dr. HINKLE. This development of this attitude toward criminality was developed in the late twenties and early thirties, but to a certain extent it floated out of the old Russian law which had a presumption or at least laid a certain amount of the burden on the prisoner to prove his innocence at the time of his arrest in any case.
Senator BENDER. Doctor, while all this was going on, it is obvious that in this country the impression of many educators and even some clergymen was that this was a great experiment in democracy and they were very sympathetic to the whole Communist program. Certainly, since you have been engaged in this work for so long, why was it that so many intelligent people, or allegedly intelligent, and so many people who were well educated, cultured people in this country, fell for this business?
Dr. WOLFF. It is difficult to answer the question.
Dr. WOLFF. Yes indeed. I think many of them were unaware of this kind of relation to the political criminal. They saw something of the management of the common crime or something of the attempts to deal with the needs of the law-abiding citizen according to the Russian concept, but perhaps they were quite ignorant of this orientation. That would be my guess about it, as well as a general delight in confusion.
Senator BENDER. These purges inside of Russia were going on and people generally throughout the world were aware of the hundreds, in fact thousands, of people who were being exterminated by the government itself who disagreed with their point of view. I can't quite understand why we had so many people in this country who almost prided themselves on defending a system which you describe here. Dr. WOLFF. I am afraid I can't help. It is
It is really extraordinary. Senator BENDER. But you are aware of that. Dr. WOLFF. Yes.
Senator BENDER. Has this system which you describe ever been used by any governments other than Russians and Chinese?
Dr. WOLFF. Of course, as the influence of these states has spread, it was obviously introduced in the new states. They are the two chief kinds of methods, the Eastern European method or what might be called the Asiatic or Chinese states, and each of these principal states, the Chinese and Russians, are imposing these practices on their newly acquired communities. But I have no knowledge of any other of the western societies introducing such methods or using such methods.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Doctor, proceed.
The CHAIRMAN. The chart now being presented will be exhibit No. 3 and will be printed in the record at this point.
(Exhibit No. 3 follows:)
EXHIBIT No. 3
CRUCIAL FEATURE OF LEGAL OPERATION
If a man is arrested his case cannot be settled until a protocol (“confession") has been prepared. This protocol must be signed by both prisoner and interrogating officer.
Dr. WOLFF. The next point to be emphasized is indicated in the chart. The crucial feature of legal operation explains why so many of our informants have to make some kind of confession, since in a sense it is written into the law and practice. If a man is arrested his case can not be settled until a protocol “confession” has been prepared. This protocol must be signed by both prisoner and the interrogating officer.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to inquire at this point, Doctor, does that mean where they commit what they judge to be a capital offense ?
Dr. WOLFF. This has to do with political crime or state crime, nothing else.
The CHAIRMAN. Whatever they determine is a capital offense. Is this followed meticulously in those instances? Before they are executed they obtain a confession?
Dr. WOLFF. I believe they have the right to make administrative decisions. If a man absolutely refuses to sign or cooperate in any way, under special circumstances the police have the right to execute without further discussion or without printed confession.
The CHAIRMAN. But they do undertake in each instance to obtain a confession?
Dr. WOLFF. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Until that becomes hopeless they do not abandon the effort?
Dr. WOLFF. That is true.
Dr. WOLFF. With the two points to be remembered: The conviction of guilt on the part of the interrogator and the prisoner, plus the fact that some sort of deposition must be made before the case can be closed, I think we begin to see the direction in which the process is going to move.
The CHAIRMAN. The chart being presented now may be made exhibit No. 4 and printed in the record at this point. (Exhibit No. À follows:)
EXHIBIT NO. 4
greatly reduced Great need to talk
Utter dependence on anyone
by interrogator's refusal to
dort OM 00S Nord OS