logically from one another in an attempt to make them alone and helpless. The next logical area to examine is, Did it work? Was it effective? What was achieved by doing this? This must be done with any enemy weapon, whether that weapon is made of metal or whether it is a technique or a set of techniques like this.

In relation to this it is necessary to review just momentarily what the Chinese objectives were in the whole program. I wish to second most emphatically Major Anderson's contention that all desires to communicate ideas and develop propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, the Chinese principal objective was the control of the prisoners. It is dangerous to have several thousand enemy soldiers behind your lines even when they are not armed. The Germans found that out. The Japanese found it out. Americans in captivity are notably difficult to control.

So, in terms of this objective, did the Chinese accomplish what the program primarily, in my opinion, was designed to accomplish?

They did to a degree to which you cannot assign a precise value. However, it appears that it was possible in North Korea to maintain security in the prison camps holding Americans with less expenditure of enemy military strength than we expected them to have to expend to control these people. In other words, it didn't take as many guards or as many guns or as many barbed wire fences. That is important to us from the standpoint of simple military operations.

As far as their selling ideas, getting acceptance of communism by Americans, one can only speculate about this. You certainly can't assign degrees of acceptance of Communist indoctrination, particularly from a man's own statements if he is under the emotional stress of just coming out of a prison camp and is being questioned by an Intelligence agent. It is impossible to get anything except a wild guess at best. It is my impression that, as Dr. Segal pointed out, they were extremely unsuccessful in selling the ideas. They did, however, accomplish the production of a certain amount of propaganda material and they did, I repeat, manage to control these men with less expenditure of troops and materiel on their part than we think would have been ideal.

You heard all kinds of discussions of what the results are in terms of resisters and collaborators. I don't honestly think that is our area of principal interest, at least not in my particular field of endeavor. I am interested in the 80 percent that they said were in the middle. I am interested in the average soldier, if there is such a thing, the ordinary fighting man who finds himself in this situation, who is not a hero of the Nathan Hale variety and is not an out-and-out opportunistic informer or collaborator. You will find a few such people in any large collection of men.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean we are not interested in the defectors? Major MAYER. I am interested, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not quite get the significance of that.

Major MAYER. I mean that my primary area of concern is with the large general group in the middle rather than either of the two extremes. In considering the future welfare of soldiers in the American Army in this situation this is going to be the majority. These are the people that possibly the most can be done with. These are the ones who deserve a good deal of our attention. I don't mean that the others are

inconsiderable. I just mean that this is where I have focused my principal interest in terms of corrective measures.

Senator MCCARTHY. Could I interrupt to ask a question which I asked a witness this morning? I should like to ask you the same question, if I may. Am I correct in the assumption that the vast majority of the men who served in Korea-Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Corps proved themselves really good Americans, good soldiers, and that the group who defected or did not come through were just an infinitesimal part of the military?

Major MAYER. You are certainly correct in saying that the great majority of Americans

Senator MCCARTHY. So, as a whole there is no reason that we cannot be proud of the military conduct in Korea.

Major MAYER. Yes, sir; we can be proud of the behavior in Korea, but we have to recognize what lessons are still involved, because no matter how well they did, we would like ideally, if we are going to have to fight this enemy, to do even better. Otherwise there would be no point in improving any of our weapons.

With this large central group, the 80 percent you have heard described before, we came across a number of things which we would like to correct from the standpoint of the welfare of the soldier himself. For example, we found that apparently they had some difficulty in developing close buddy relationships. We would like to see these relationships as we have in previous wars, because they give strength to the soldier. They protect him. They help keep him alive. The more and the better your buddy relationships are, the more strength you have against any threat.

Secondly, we would like to see active and continued resistance on the part of soldiers who are in enemy hands. Our new code of conduct says almost at the very beginning, "If I am captured by an enemy I will continue to resist." This, of course, is the mission of the soldier, whether he is in a POW camp or on the battlefield.

We would like to see more engineered escapes. We would like to see a continuing, active program to get people out, because not only does this demoralize the enemy but it does good things even for the men who don't escape. It does good things for the emotional life of the man left behind in camp. For every man who escapes, the fellow left behind escapes just a little bit. At least he knows there is somebody going home who is going to fire up the people about what is happening to us. Maybe it will hasten our repatriation. So we would like to see

that.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the chances of escape?

Major MAYER. The chances of escape, Mr. Chairman, are related very closely to the presence or absence of escape groups. Escape as a solitary individual pastime is doomed to almost certain failure. However, even under the conditions existing in Korea, with the escaping prisoner being surrounded by people of a different race and therefore he is more easily recognized, even there it is conceivable. Based upon what Americans have done in previous wars in similarly difficult situations, if enough people work on the preparation and enough people cover up his movements, if enough people are engaged in the escape committee, it is conceivable that a man can escape. In fact, we expect escapes to occur in this fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they succeed in escaping from our compounds? Major MAYER. I am not qualified to answer that in any quantitative sense, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I can appreciate this one point which is made. I don't know how tremendously important it is, but, of course, the more resistance the more threat of escape, the more danger of escape that the prisoners can create, the more it taxes the strength, the manpower, and so forth, of the enemy, and thus insofar as combat that many troops are neutralized, so to speak. They are occupied with something other than on the front line killing. Taking it overall, I don't know how big a factor it would be, but I assume that in war everything that taxes, obstructs, or hinders the enemy from putting his maximum force of destruction where our troops are, which detracts from it to any extent, therefore helps the cause.

Major MAYER. Absolutely; but also it is important for what it does to the prisoner himself.

The CHAIRMAN. To the man himself.

Major MAYER. Even if no escape ever actually takes place, the constant sustained activity-you remember Mr. Hunter said something about keeping your mind busy-is a good defense against the best the Communists have. Escape and preoccupation with it is an important part of it.

Senator MCCARTHY. If I may interrupt again, Mr. Chairman, there is a big difference, of course, between urging your soldiers to try to escape when the enemy is following the Geneva Convention rules of warfare. You know if a man is apprehended he will not be mistreated so badly. But as far as the North Koreans were concerned, as far as the Japanese were concerned, frankly I would not have advised any of my men to try to escape. Am I right in that?

Major MAYER. Certainly it is a point very well taken. The Japanese used to threaten, for example, if 1 man did escape they would shoot 9 others. This has a deterrent effect on escapes, but not a total deterrent effect. I can't believe that we can ever retreat from the position that one of the primary duties of the soldier who is for the moment held captive is to try in some way to escape. This is an opinion. The CHAIRMAN. That has to be left up to the soldier.

Major MAYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He should not be directed to try to escape because it might mean immediate death not only to himself but to some of his fellow prisoners. It is something which has to be left to his discretion after he has been properly trained and indoctrinated and has become a good soldier. When he is on his own like that he certainly has to be the final judge.

Major MAYER. This emphasizes the fact that escape has to be done as an organized community effort, that it cannot be just the isolated efforts of individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; let us go ahead.

Mr. KENNEDY. Major, on the question of the participation or cooperation with the Communists are you using the figure 15 percent or have you used in the past a larger figure? I want to get it straight now for the record.

Major MAYER. I have in the past said that the total number of people that the Communists managed in one way or another to get

to engage in activities ultimately detrimental to the prisoner himself or to the country was probably closer, in my opinion, to 30 percent. Based on this, 15 percent were the hard core that we have heard described several times before. From the point where one is completely cooperative with the enemy to the point where he does absolutely nothing is not just one big jump. It is a series of little steps. It is possible, therefore, to have an opinion as to the seriousness of any given amount of cooperation. It seemed to me that an additional 15 percent beyond the hard core were active enough in what the Communists wanted them to do, like the study group.

Mr. KENNEDY. Major, isn't that other 15 percent one of the problems or difficulties, and to a lesser extent those who did not participate or those who did not resist? Isn't that group one of the biggest problems that we have to face?

Major MAYER. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. I wanted to make sure we understood that that is one of the difficulties. I don't think we should pass over it as just the 80 percent, but this other group which did participate and did cooperate.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will have to announce at this time that a quorum is not present, and therefore you may proceed and make a statement for the record. If later a quorum returns, we can then verify what you now say under oath.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, if you are going to have to leave shortly, we have one other witness who has to leave the city. How long will you be, Major?

Major MAYER. I was going to leave tonight. You mean how long here? Just a very few minutes.

Mr. KENNEDY. We have another witness also.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has to go to a conference at 4 o'clock, a meeting of conferees on the public works appropriation bill. I have a little interest in the outcome of that conference, and I think I had better be present to look after that interest.

All right, go ahead, Major. We will proceed as expeditiously as

we can.

Major MAYER. In relation to what you were just asking about, Mr. Kennedy, invariably the question arises, Did this experience in Korea reveal that there was something defective about Americans or that our people can't stand up to the Communists? I wish to say emphatically that this is not what the Korea experience showed at all. It did, however, point out for us areas for maximum effectiveness of our fighting forces in any future conflict, particularly against a Communist enemy-areas that, however good they are now, desirably could be strengthened. This is what the Code of Conduct in the military service attempts to do.

We know in studying combat soldiers and what makes them fight and why they break down during battle that there are certain factors which defend a man against terror and anxiety and being unable to go on in the face of this terrible threat of being dismembered or killed in battle. These factors are pretty simple, and they are classical. They are not the private property of the psychiatric department. They include certainly adequate, firm, consistent, predictable leadership.

They include a definite, well-defined system of discipline, and by this I do not mean punishment. I mean the kind of discipline that is internalized, a system of values, as Mr. Hunter talked about and as Dr. Wolff even suggested, the kind of discipline that arises from within the individual and makes it possible for him to function effectively as a member of a group and as actually a member.

We know that the sense of group identification, of belonging, is extremely important in defending a man against fear and anxiety in battle. We know that morale and esprit de corps are essential. We know that his training and his knowledge of the situation of the enemy can defend him.

The Code of Conduct simply reemphasizes, in relation to each of those things I have mentioned, what we have been trying to teach all along. The Code of Conduct, although it uses the language of a prisoner of war, talks about loyalty to other individuals. It talks about continuing to resist. By Executive order of the President it states, "I will try to escape and assist others to escape." The Code makes other statements, such as keeping faith not only with one's comrades but with the United States of America in prohibiting any statement which would hurt the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps a copy of that should be supplied for the record.

Major MAYER. Yes, sir. I have a copy right here which belongs to the judge.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it might be printed in the reocrd at this point for the information of those who read the record. (The document referred to follows:)

CODE OF CONDUCT

FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.