Dr. SEGAL. Upon their repatriation it was found that 45 percent of the participators gave some evidence of accepting Communist ideology to some degree. Again the bases for these data are the very same as I described earlier for the total prisoners population. Only 4 percent of the resisters gave any evidence of accepting communism to any degree.

Among these 45 percent of the participator group who accepted communism to some degree over half accepted little of the captors teachings and only a few were strongly sold.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you suspend for a moment? A quorum of the committee is now present.

Will you state under oath that the testimony you have given during the brief period that a quorum was not present is the truth? Dr. SEGAL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

(Committee members present at this point: Senators McClellan and McCarthy.)

Dr. SEGAL. To summarize our findings with respect to ideological orientation of prisoners of war: as I said earlier all of our results point to the fact that participation with the enemy was based on grounds other than ideological. It is questionable, in other words, whether more than a handful of our prisoners behaved in the way they did either out of love or contempt for communism as a way of life.

What role did preferential treatment play? This is the next question which we will discuss. It is here in the character of the prisoner's response to the blandishments of the enemy, that we find the major key to the riddle of the prisoner's behavior. It was material rather than ideological inducements or considerations that made a strong difference.

How susceptible were our prisoners of war to the material inducements of the enemy? How prone were they, in other words, to bend to the captor's demands in the face of offers of special treatment and privileges?

The contrast here between the participator group and the resisters is a very striking one. 91 percent of the resisters were not in the least swayed by the enemy's promises of reward. The same can be said of only a minor handful of participators. The participators were by and large opportunists in their behavior. It is important to point out at this point, as Secretary McCarthy mentioned yesterday, that this type of behavior, of accepting a reward in return for cooperation with the enemy, of collapsing in the face of the enemy's blandishments and coercion, did not take place in the middle of a metropolis like Washington or any other city, but in an environment of deprived and unwholesome and physically and psychologically sick conditions which. obtained in the Korean prison compounds.

So when we say that a proportion of our men succumbed to the enemy's blandishments, in return for cooperation, this has to be put in the setting in which it occurred. It occurred in the Korean prison compound, and everything that the Korean prison compound entailed. The question is now raised, opportunistic for what? Were the rewards of the captor real or just promises? Our data indicate they were very definitely real for those who paid the price. The Communist captor in other words was not so unrealistic as to think that a prisoner of war would cooperate if the rewards which motivated him were found to be unreal.

May I have the next chart, please. (The chart follows:)

Dr. SEGAL. This is the degree of preferential treatment meted out to our prisoners of war comparing the two groups, the participators and the resisters. Forty-two percent of the participators received a great amount of preferential treatment. Only 26 percent received little or none. Among resisters, only 4 percent can be described as having received an extensive amount of preferential treatment with

95 percent having seldom or never been the recipient of any rewards given by the captors.

The nature of those rewards included cigarettes, candy, alcohol, better food, better medical care, parties, sleeping late, freedom from physical labor details, and so on. Again I must repeat that all of this is not to say that the life of the participator prisoner was plush by any normal standard, but only that it was improved considerably by his yielding to the enemy's demands.

For those who craved such rewards or whose value systems permitted it, somehow the bargain was worth making.

Now, if we may, let us turn to the other end of the captor's pain and pleasure technique, the mistreatment. It has been commonly believed that participators cooperated with the captor only after they were subjected to cruel mistreatment and tortures of a physical sort. This was not the case. May I have the next chart, please.

Dr. SEGAL. On the contrary, participators who returned from Korea were rarely the victims of any considerable mistreatment or physical abuse. It was not the participator but the resister, the prisoner who never really did give in, who actively thwarted the enemy, who bore the brunt of the enemy's pressure, including both threats and actual physical abuse and mistreatment.

As shown in this chart, over three-fourths of the participators who returned from Korea received little or no pressure in their internment and only 3 percent were severely mistreated. Roughly three-fourths of the resisters received moderate to extreme pressures and less than one-fourth got by with little or none.

This should be made clear: It was not necessary of course for a prisoner to personally experience mistreatment at the hands of the captor to know that the threat of punishment was always present.

The loaded pistol on the table between the interrogator and the prisoner spoke its own message. We found that participators were very much more susceptible to threats, direct and implied threat, than were the resisters.

In summation, one of our most important conclusions, supported by many specific items of information analyzed, is this:

Participators, those few participators who cooperated with the enemy, did so so as to avoid the threat of pressure and, moreover, to reap the reward of preferential treatment. The resisters resisted in spite of considerable pressure to participate, while at the same time refusing the offers of rewards which the captor extended.

Senator MCCARTHY. Do I understand you correctly to say that aside from any physical torture there was the mental torture, the threat of physical torture, the thought that there might be torture? Dr. SEGAL. Senator McCarthy, even the experience of being captured itself, without any explicit threat being made, and the stories of brutal abuses that the Koreans early in the war meted out, was itself an anxiety producing situation. But quite beyond that, as you point out, sir, implied and explicit threat was very tellingly used by the captor in inducing cooperation among our prisoners of war. So it didn't necessarily take actual tissue damage to induce cooperation.

What were the relationships among the prisoners of war in Korea themselves? In other words, in what setting did the enemy's system of reward and punishment operate? Our data indicate that 38 percent of the prisoners showed little or no concern for their fellows and that only 13 percent showed an extreme concern and compassion for their fellow prisoners.

(The chart follows:)

Dr. SEGAL. In this connection there are some remarkable differences between the resisters and participators. Almost two-thirds of the participators showed little or no concern for their fellow prisoners as compared to only 9 percent of the resisters and at the other extreme a third of the resisters evidenced strong concern for their fellows as against only a very small proportion of the participators.

I should point out, however, that the concern for fellows which the resisters showed was reserved primarily for fellow resisters. Toward participators, toward men whom the resisters saw and knew were accepting rewards in return for collaboration and even in some instances informing, the resisters felt very little other than hatred and contempt; in fact many of the resisters' organizations which sprang up in the Korean compounds, cliques in which resisters banded together, many of these were designed primarily for the abuse, mistreatment, and even murder of collaborators. These attitudes remained evidently beyond repatriation, for in their post-repatriation interviews these resisters give strong evidence of feelings of hatred and contempt for their fellow POW's who were participators.

Senator MCCARTHY. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman.

I was absent for half an hour over in appropriations. See if I understand your testimony. You are using a lot of statistics which I have difficulty following. Is it safe to say that the vast majority of the soldiers who fought in Korea refused to go over to the Communist cause and remained good loyal Americans?.

Dr. SEGAL. That is correct, sir. There was only a small proportion who behaved in the ways which I have just described, who cooperated in return for rewards.

Senator MCCARTHY. And the reason for the cooperation, I gather, was in many cases their mental or physical torture? Largely mental?

Dr. SEGAL. Largely mental, defined by the environment in which they were living, and in part, perhaps, by the personality traits and value systems which these men had, traits which we might find in any civilian population as well. Opportunistic behavior is not restricted to Korean prison camps, but is to be seen in civilian life as well, from which life these men were drawn.

Senator MCCARTHY. The reason I asked that question was that I was afraid that from these statistics the story might go out that a sizeable number of the soldiers were easily misled and disloyal. I understand now, if I may repeat, that your testimony is that the vast majority were good, loyal Americans even under tremendous pressure.

Dr. SEGAL. Yes, sir. Up until this point, Senator McCarthy, I have contrasted the very small percentage of men who were participators against the small percentage of men who were out and out active resisters.

I shall say something in a very few moments about the large mass of our prisoners, the 80 percent who fell into neither category. That will fill in the picture.

In summarizing this particular item of information we might say that there was little esprit or cohesiveness or mutual concern among the POWs, this by design of the captor and not helped by the situation which obtained among the prisoners of war, by the suspicion and divisiveness which the captor encouraged among our men.

May I have the next chart, please.