yond their reach, or out of their way. Befides, men cannot be always attentive to every part of what they do know. And fome have constitutionally fo uncommon a fhare of thoughtlessnefs, that, with the fame, nay, much more defire and pains, than others, to be exact and punctual, they appear to be fingularly negligent. These evidently need compaffion: and feverity to them would be barbarous. Now and then indeed a little chiding may be neceffary for the cure of their infirmity; but it ought never to be more than is neceffary, and always intermixed with expreffions of encouragement. : Thus you have seen, who are the least fit objects of our difpleasure after which it will be useful to specify, who are the moft fit; and may allowably have much greater liberties taken with them by us, than commonly are. I mean ourselves: of whom we probably know full as great misdemeanors, and from whom we have certainly received much greater injuries, than from any one else; over whom also we have the largest authority, and are the most indispensably bound to exercise it. Yet even here it is poffible to be guilty of excess. For anger muft aim at good, when directed against ourselves, no less than if it were against any other perfon and is always faulty, when it tends to our harm; even were it no further harm, than discompofing us beyond reafon. And fome want to be cautioned in the strongest manner, at times, to beware of immoderate felfdiflike, because it may urge them to the raileft and most fatal extremities. But felf-indulgence is infinitely the commoner failing and therefore the general rule muft ever be to preach up due rigour in this cafe; for due tenderness will feldom be forgotten. Here then we may well employ that fuperfluous warmth of spirit, which we are apt to turn quite another way; and shall never employ it better, than to correct its own exorbitances: that, so spending our displeasure upon our own unjuft vehemence, we may put on towards all our brethren, (and every human creature is fuch,) bowels of mercies, kindness, bumbleness of mind, meeknefs, long-fuffering; forbearing one another, and forgiving one another,—even as Chrift hath frgiven us :-and let the peace of God rule in our hearts, to the which we are alfo called in one body *. : * Col. iii. 12, 13, 15. SER IN a former difcourfe on these words, after proving that anger is a lawful paffion, but a very dangerous one, I proposed, I. To defcribe its due bounds, with the common exceffes of it. II. To diffuade from fuch exceffes. III. To direct how they may be avoided. Now in general the bounds of every paffion are those, which reafon, fufficiently enlightened, prescribes. And the particular bounds, which it prescribes to this paffion, are, as I have already obferved, well enumerated in the philofopher's rule: that he who is angry, only on fuch occafions, and with fuch per fons, and in fuch manner, and at fuch time, and for fuch conti nuance, as he ought, deferves praife in the exercise of this faculty. On the two first of these heads, therefore, the occafions and objects of our anger, I have already enlarged and, as the proper ones will be almost fure to be remembered, and the improper ones are much too many to be specified again, I fhall proceed, without any repetition of either, to the following part of the rule, which is III. That we be angry only in fuch manner as we ought. This comprehends both the degree to which our displeasure may allowably rife, and the inftances in which it may be fitly expreffed. There is a poffibility of being lefs angry than we should. Our fenfe of wrong actions may be too faint and by taking, in confequence of this, but a flight notice of them, we may confirm confirm the faulty in a bad courfe, inftead of deterring them from it. And especially, when their faults do us no harm, whatever they may do to others or themselves, we are often very backward either to exprefs or feel any refentment, even where it is our peculiar duty. But if, while they injure others, they serve us; far from being difpleafed, we are very apt to defend and encourage them. Yet there are fome in the world, whom a generous ardor of mind occafionally difcompofes too much, on feeing injuftice done to their fellow-creatures. But these are rare. It is in our own cases usually, that we are inclined to excefs and in them our danger is very great. To avoid it therefore, we should, all of us, frequently reflect, that our paflions being only given us for auxiliaries to fupply the imperfection of our higher principles; if they move us enough to fet us upon acting right, it fuffices; and if they move us more than is requifite for that end, it will commonly be too much. Where we properly can, the very appearance of displeasure should be avoided for, though it be a method of cure, yet, being a difagreeable one, if we have recourse to it without need, we treat our patient ill. And, even where we must fhew ourselves offended, this may very well be done, indeed best of all, without allowing ourselves to be inwardly difturbed. For thus, at the fame time that we preserve a due authority over those with whom we are concerned, we fhall keep our own temper in a state of tranquillity, and fit for whatever lies before us. In matters of moment, it is not always in our power to be abfolutely calm: but this confideration should increase our care not to be agitated too much. For he who is angry more than he hath cause, is fò far angry without a caufe. And therefore we must have regard, both to the proportion of the fault, and our right to take notice of it. For a person may deserve a great deal of anger, and yet deserve little or none from us. Exact determinations indeed of this proportion are hard to give; and probably would do harm if they could easily be given. For, were the limits of lawful anger in every cafe precisely known, most people would venture without fcruple to the utmost extent of them; and fo of courfe be hurried beyond them whereas the difficulty of difcerning exactly where the tranfgreffion begins, is a strong caution to ftop at a safe distance from it. But instead of thinking thus, we commonly conclude, conclude, that fince anger may juftly rife according to the provocation, and much of it is daily fhewn about fmall things, any degree whatever is defenfible in great ones. Now evidently this reafoning ought to be inverted as follows: only a moderate refentment being permitted us, where the offence is ever fo heinous, hardly the flighteft ought to be expreffed, where it is but little. And though we cannot ascertain minutely the due quantity in each, the observation of two rules will fecure us from any important error: never to lose the government of ourselves, or do an injury to any one elfe. The firft of these directions is fundamental. For if once reason be dethroned, rules and bounds are nothing. And though it be a dreadful evil to let any paffion feduce us from obeying that principle, which God hath authorized to regulate our whole conduct, yet it is peculiarly dangerous to follow this blindfold: which precipitates men inftantaneously, and without leaving room for a moment's reflection, into the extremities of mischief to others and themfelves; and even where it is not hurtful, is however fingularly disagreeable and unbecoming. We must therefore attentively remember, that, though difpleasure may be allowable, rage cannot and accordingly forbear, not only all acts of violence or infult, but all vehement gestures, all noify and unreasonable talk, and above the reft, that shocking, though common method of venting fury, by oaths and imprecations: invoking the notice of God in a condition when we ought to dread it; and bringing down that wrath on our own heads, which we vainly and wickedly call for upon others. But avoiding these extravagances is not all is nothing indeed, if, under a calmer appearance, we permit our resentment to go undue lengths. It is true, anger can be useful to others only by giving them uneafiness: but often a plain and grave fignification, that we dislike their behaviour, will give it sufficiently and then to add cutting, though guarded, words, is cruel. Sometimes the same perfon, having both blameable and valuable qualities, nay exerting both together, may deserve that reproof fhould be tempered with praise. And where but little forbearance hath been merited, prudence frequently requires much to be exercised: because it may foften and win over those, whom roughness would drive to desperation. And And, if we ought thus to moderate the juft expreffions of our displeasure: much more ought unjust ones to be utterly forborn. We must by no means think, that every trifling, or perhaps imaginary, provocation gives us a liberty, which the very greatest do not, of betraying fecrets, throwing random afperfions, and faying in the peevish fit whatever it fuggefts. Men do not lofe all the rights of human nature immediately, because they have chanced to offend us. Their fault in doing fo may be confiderable, or may be fmall: but this one crime cannot transform them into quite different creatures from what they were before it can never intitle us to speak falfehoods of them and very feldom, to fay prejudicial truths. Injurious words may feem a flight matter to those who utter them; efpecially if they are fuch, as the world calls decent but the perfon, to whom they relate, experiences them to be heavy and bitter things: and what his feelings must be, is the point, that we should have in view, reflecting what our own would be in the like cafe. However, the guilt of anger is yet more aggravated, when it mifguides our actions, as well as our tongues. If it prompts us only to withhold from others, without caufe, those kindneffes and favours, to which they had fome equitable claim, or, which, though they had not, we had hitherto fhewn them, or intended for them; this alone is very hard and wrong Ufage. Indeed who almost could be secure even of a day's continuance of friendship, if every thing, which it were poffible to take amifs, might put an end to it? But, if wrath pufh us on to do harm instead of good, then it hath arrived at its heighth of injuftice. Not but we may lawfully in fome cases inflict punishment on those who have given us offence. But then anger is not to be the prosecutor: much lefs to pafs or execute the sentence. It is not so often, as we are juftly displeased with any one, that he is to fuffer: but then only, when a valuable purpose requires it. Now we are by no means qualified to determine that point, while our inward disturbance is vehement : nor fhould we ever allow ourselves to act, before we are cool enough to judge: nor are we always cool enough, when we think we are. And therefore we fhould learn to fufpect our tempers, have regard to the opinion of the unprejudiced, and lean to the moderate fide, when there is any doubt which is right. It will comparatively feldom happen, that excess of mildnefs will do any great mifchief: but the VOL. I. contrary |