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Mr. GOODIER. Just the opposite. This 1,200 acres that I am referring to and there are other places like it, I own some of it myself, similar to it-it blew a little the first year. We did get enough moisture to create a weed float on it.

Senator THYE. That is different. I thought it was lying wide open to shifting sands.

Mr. GOODIER. No. That is why I want it written up, I don't know whether it will work on a national scale. I am interested in the ground I know. If that ground is left untouched through a period of 5 years it will not be a blow hazard for anybody. That has been gone through

up there in the 'thirties.

Senator THYE. Will it go back to native weeds?

Mr. GOODIER. The first year it gets a weed cover with rain. This year we had absolutely no moisture and even our prarie lands that was never plowed is blowing. It will go back to weed cover the first year and native grass will come in and in about 5 years it is covered enough to protect it from a blow condition, but it takes longer to get back to the quality it had before plowing.

Senator THYE. The Government must initiate a program of some kind or you will not have a voluntary idleness of the land.

Mr. GOODIER. The majority of farming there is done by nonresident farmers. The Baughman Corp. owns a good portion, almost a half of Cheyenne County, and it is farmed by land leasers. They are honest boys and I have no quarrel with the Baughman idea out there. But in order to induce them to retire some of this land from cultivation there must be a long-term agreement drawn up. They are not going to voluntarily do it.

Senator YOUNG. During what years was the soil breaking?

Mr. GOODIER. It started in 1948 and carried through until 1951. There hasn't been much breaking up since 1951 but it is all being stirred up by chiseling practices to keep it from blowing and every time it is touched it blows a little worse.

Senator YOUNG. When was most of it put into production?

Mr. GOODIER. From 1948 to 1951 and they have tried a summer fallow sequence on it since then.

Senator THYE. You mean it was not in production during World War II?

Mr. GOODIER. No, it was not.

Senator THYE. It came in in the Korean war?

Mr. GOODIER. Yes, sir.

Senator YOUNG. Any explanation of why it came in so late?

Mr. GOODIER. The only explanation I can give is that speculators bought most of that land that came in thinking through the supports they might be able to make a little money and help the United States Government out through income tax. I don't criticize them for coming in. It looked like an opportunity for investment that would pay dividends but it has had a very, very bad effect on the country as a whole up there.

Senator YOUNG. Those were years of good rainfall in that area? Mr. GOODIER. Yes, the last year of good rainfall was 1950, but those fields that I think should be retired never raised good wheat in the good years. They had 1949 and 1950 that were good years and wheat is a crop that generally produces its best in that country on the sod year, the year it is broken up.

Senator THYE. How was that dealt with after you brought back the acreage control on wheat? Did that figure into a county base as well as State base?

Mr. GOODIER. I am not too familiar with the working of it, not being a wheat farmer, but I understood it is broken down into a county base and allocated out as an individual unit.

Just one more request I want to make before I leave. We have tried and tried out there to control the wind and God has failed to control it. When you gentlemen get back to Washington please control the wind.

The CHAIRMAN. We wouldn't be in the Senate if we could do that. Thank you.

(Statement filed by John A. Goodier, Wild Horse, Colo. :)

In view of the surpluses of wheat and other crops which have been built up under the high rigid, or 90 percent parity supports, I am of the opinion flexible supports and some type of soil bank or Government lease of excessive acres of cropland is essential to the ultimate improvement of our general agricultural situation.

Regardless Government leasing of cropland, I feel it is only fair to reason that where the Government has contributed to our burdensome surpluses through the high rigid or 90 percent parity supports in the years prior to 1955, it would be reasonable to suggest that the Government could institute a cropland lease system whereby payments could be made to farmers in return for a removal of a percentage of their croplands from cultivation for a period of let us say, 5 years or until more land is needed in cultivation after extreme surpluses have disappeared. Out here in my country, southeastern Colorado, there is perhaps as much as 25 percent of the land in a wheat farming sequence that is unsuitable for profitable cultivation even in normal years, but which has been plowed up and cropped by farmers anxious to take advantage of the high supports on wheat during the years following the start of the Korean war.

A twofold purpose could be achieved by a lease agreement set-up. Control of surplus production and control of wind erosion. The large blocks of ground that are summer fallowed and planted to wheat have been blowing away the last couple of years, and are blowing worse than ever this fall destroying our land and menacing the very health of the people and livestock in the area. If about onefourth of these fields could be leased to the Government for a 5-year period, and during that period, permitted to grow back to natural vegetation, these vast 2,000- and 3,000-acre, and even larger, fields might not get up and blow in the furious, relentless way they are under existing conditions.

Surpluses built up fast during the period of high rigid supports. I believe the flexible price system, if given a little time, will prove itself to us. Flexibility gives a leeway to adjust to current conditions. Rigidity, binding to a high goal, encouraged a greedy desire to raise all we could despite controls.

In setting up an agricultural program for another year, great consideration should be given to quality in the various crops, rather than to quantity. Any type of support prices should be such as to permit only the highest grade crop eligibility to the top support. As quality decreases, so should the payment received through supports.

We should be ever watchful of our Government's ability to keep built up a healthy confidence in our commodities on the part of our foreign markets. Our products are high quality and as such they should be known throughout the world. We should always in the future avoid the exporting of any adulterated commodity. There have been cases in the past of dumping poor-quality products on a foreign buyer. This should never happen again and our policies in selling should be above reproach, so we can build up and hold the maximum confidence in us on the part of our prospective foreign buyers.

Hoping the immediate future brings forth improved conditions in all branches of our vast agricultural enterprises and thanking you for the time and attention allowed me at this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vickers.

STATEMENT OF C. N. VICKERS, LAMAR, COLO.

Mr. VICKERS. I am C. N. Vickers, of Lamar, Colo. I operate with my son 580 acres of irrigated land.

For the record could I correct the condiiton that arose when Glenn Drosselmeyer was testifying regarding his crop insurance?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think that is of much importance to the committee.

My. VICKERS. Well, he asked me if I would.

The CHAIRMAN. He asked you?

Mr. VICKERS. He asked if we could have the record corrected.

The CHAIRMAN. Surely. What do you want to correct?

Mr. VICKERS. The understanding was he had crop insurance on the full 1,700 acres and harvested 640. His crop insurace was on the 640 acres only.

The CHAIRMAN. Which 640?

Mr. VICKERS. The 640 that he harvested, on his allotted acres. The CHAIRMAN. The record will be so corrected.

Mr. VICKERS. I don't have anything in my prepared statement that hasn't been presented. I would like to bring up one point that is not in my prepared statement that is new dealing with the surplus commodities. I think you mentioned it this morning.

It came to my attention first in News Week, the matter of a way of disposing of our surplus commodities. That would be instead of producing the entire crop for 1 year, the Commodity Credit Corporation would take from storage that portion of the crop that would be the normal production for that farm, sell it back to the producer and then the producer would disposed of that at whatever market he could dispose of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would use the surplus in that way. We have had that suggestion made several times.

Mr. VICKERS. It was mentioned this morning. It had not been mentioned and I thought it should be on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

(Mr. Vickers' prepared statement follows:)

I have been disturbed by reports on the radio and through the press that the Senate Agricultural Committee is considering following the action of the House of Representatives to return to a program of rigid price supports, replacing the program of variable supports.

In my opinion, any national policy for agriculture should have the following objectives:

1. Seeks high net income for the farmer without interference with his freedom of opportunity.

2. Creates rural living on a standard equal to that found in other segments of our economy, which would encourage the building of prosperous rural communities.

3. Encourages world trade and unhampered flow of commodities in a free world market.

I believe that a return to rigid high supports will not gain the above objectives. It is my opinion that price supports alone are not the complete answer to the economic conditions facing the American farmer today. However, if legislation along the lines of supporting prices through the Commodity Credit Corporation is to be continued, a system of variable supports that encourages producers to bring quantity and quality of production into line with demand is more sound as a permanent and peacetime agricultural policy than is one of rigid high supports.

High rigid supports, which in my opinion, were continued too long following the Korean conflict, have been largely responsible for the situation agriculture

finds itself in today; namely, that of tremendous surpluses-surpluses which compel production control programs which on the record have failed to bring supply in line with demand. They also encourage the production of inferior and unwanted quality of product in many commodities.

As long as prices for agricultural products in the United States are supported so far above world markets, I fail to see how these surpluses can be liquidated. It would seem advisable to explore further the possibilities of disposing of these surpluses under Public Law 480 through enlargement of that program. The law could be strengthened by eliminating legislation requiring a portion of exports of agricultural commodities sold under this program be shipped in American boats. Why should agricultural producers be required to subsidize the merchant marine? If the merchant marine needs to be subsidized in the interests of national defense, why not do so directly instead of indirectly, and at the expense of the American farmer? Why not appropriate funds to reimburse shipping-then, charge these appropriations to the merchant marine instead of agriculture, as is now the case?

As I understand from various reports, exports of agricultural products in the 1955 fiscal year have amounted to $3.2 billion dollars-an increase of 11 percent over the previous year. I assume this figure included the sale of $468.8 million of surplus goods moved under Public Law 480 to June 30, 1955. The National Farm and Home Hour reported Saturday, November 4, that these exports now are running 20 percent above last year; exports were up on all products except cotton. No doubt, a large percentage of this increase is due to Public Law 480. If, through the elimination of the Cargo Preference Act, exports of agricultural products can be further expanded, there will be less need for supports on agricultural products; and once these surpluses are disposed of, the need for supports at any level would be reduced.

I have read that we are producing 15 percent more than the domestic market will absorb at a reasonable price. I wish to refer the committee to, and believe they should consider seriously the statements made by the editor of the Farm Journal (October issue, p. 230) entitled "Is This Fair, Mr. Dulles?" I quote in part:

"Because of the farm-support laws, our products have been priced beyond the reach of many foreign prospects; and the State Department says, 'Don't be competitive.' Because the administration backs the State Department view, Secretary Benson in Europe lately has had to go around saying, 'We won't dump.'

"Meanwhile, in many instances with American aid, other countries have learned to produce for the very customers who, because of our high prices, will no longer buy from United States farmers. Some of these markets are irrecoverably lost.

"So our foreign sales fall off, prices go down, while surpluses accumulate, acreage restrictions increase, and storage costs taxpayers a million dollars a day. Acres are diverted to soybeans, potatoes, oats, and other crops which, in turn, fall in price. Now overhanging the market is six times as much wheat as normal, three times as much cotton, and twice as much corn, while other products, too, pile up.

"When government kept its awkward hands out of business, Americans were able to trade and sell things almost anywhere. They could do so yet, if they were free to try.

Government is a mighty poor sales agent for American farmers. Even if all departments worked together, it would do the job badly. When, as now, the powerful State Department throws its weight against the efforts of the Department of Agriculture, agriculture gets the worst of the deal.

"After paying their share of high taxes for foreign aid, farmers should not also be expected to suffer from low prices, plus the penalties of a highly imperfect farm program."

This editorial strengthens my belief that there is a need for examination of our exports sales policies before going to a policy of Government price fixing of agricultural products.

We must do 1 of 2 things to absorb the 15 percent overproduction and tremendous surpluses previously accumulated. Either we must sell our products to other countries at competitive prices, or cut our production at home. Many claims and counterclaims have been made regarding variable versus rigid supports. With the excessive supplies now held by the Commodity Credit Corporation, how can any system be expected to get results? I believe every effort must be made to increase our sales abroad. Also, any future policy must require

higher standards of quality products be offered on the world market. Farm prices will depend more on what our Government does to expand world trade rather than any action to support prices domestically at any stated percentage of parity.

If we are producing 15 percent more than is needed domestically, and if we have lost 30 percent of our export markets since 1951, then a return to rigid supports can result only in Government-administered prices. The question then is, Are we going to adopt a policy of Government-administered prices, or are we to have legislation on farm policies that will permit the pricemaking forces of a free-enterprise market to operate?

It is a simple decision of Government price fixing or a free market. I believe in the long run a free market will insure for the American farmer objective No. 1, namely, a larger net income without interference of freedom of opportunity.

The policy of rigid price fixing, intended as it is to give farmers a so-called fair price, can lead to placing agricultural producers in a position where the fair price would be the ceiling price; and prevent prices from rising higher during periods of short crops when higher prices are needed to offset lower yields. Another point to be considered is that of mounting costs of things farmers have to buy. Recently we rented additional land, creating the need for a new tractor. Our implement dealer priced this tractor to us around $3,600, stating that we had better take the tractor at that time as there was to be a 7 percent increase in tractor prices in the near future. Our income has dropped in the past year. This, coupled with drought conditions the last 2 years, has pointed up the tremendous increase in cost of operating a farm. An examination is due of the legislation which set the minimum wage law at $1 per hour before deciding that the only answer to the farm problem is administered price fixing. I am not opposed to labor receiving good wages, but it looks as though the only sound way to increase wages further should come from lowering costs of production, so the price of farm machinery and other costs to farmers will not have to be raised further.

Finally, I would like to make the following points to be considered for inclusion in any farm program if it is to be based on the present premise of parity and acreage controls:

1. Write into the law a section requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to call for a vote on acreage controls before supplies get out of hand.

2. It would seem reasonable to me that when the producers of one commodity vote to restrict production and ask for supports, they should not be permitted (as they can do at the present time) to plant the acreage taken out of that particular crop to any other crop. It is unrealistic to expect a program where no resources are retired from production to solve the surplus problem.

3. The proposed methods of assisting farmers to adjust production to demand by establishing a soil-conservation program, wherein producers would be reimbursed for loss of income on acreage taken out of production, has much better possibilities of bringing production into line with demand than by a system of high price supports.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arvid Mattson.

STATEMENT OF ARVID MATTSON, INMAN, KANS.

Mr. MATTSON. I am Arvid Mattson, farmer from Inman, Kans. I believe that when the sliding-scale flexible price-support plan was steamrollered through Congress it was one of the most cruel and unfair measures ever to be imposed against the American farmer.

What crime had we done that we should be forced into a position of second-class citizenship by saying that we should only have 75 percent of parity?

The losses sustained by farmers as a result of the sliding scale immediately found their way into the pockets of processors, whose profits increased very substantially as a result, together with certain processors who had done very well financially before, had no need of such a windfall. Consumers were left out almost entirely as far as any reduction in the price of food trickling down to them.

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