the seaports. This would have stereotyped (within limits) the existing range of prices for a year ahead. Nonproducing consumers would have continued to suffer, and some of them would probably have continued to break the law; solvent producers would have benefited enormously by selling the surplus of their excellent crop at unprecedented prices; and similar benefit would have accrued to those money-lenders who retain the profits earned by producers who are not solvent. The most serious danger of the position lay in the possibility of over-exporting; the country might have seen its stocks reduced to a dangerous extent; and then even a slight deficiency in the autumn crops might have meant famine in the ensuing winter.

The nature of the measures taken by the Government to avoid this danger is not apparent to the ordinary producer. As harvest has come on, he has seen the appearance of the usual export-buyers; and probably everything has gone on much as usual in the markets, except that the prices offered have been less than he had hoped, his hopes having been raised by the exceptional prices that prevailed during the winter. Probably some producers at first held back, but the progressive lowering of the prices offered by the buyers on behalf of Government was calculated to produce the desired conviction that higher prices were not to be hoped for; and at the time of writing it appears to be probable that the object aimed at will be secured-that a compromise will be established in the matter of price, and that the surplus of wheat which the country can spare will be exported for the benefit of the Empire with the minimum of disturbance of internal conditions.

These emergency-measures are therefore likely to prove immediately successful. But the fact must not be overlooked that they affect a very large number of human beings in their daily affairs; and consequently the ulterior effects which they will produce cannot be entirely neglected. The lowering of wheat-prices must inevitably react on the prices of other food-grains; more people will be able to eat wheat, and fewer will want to buy barley or millets; consequently every cultivator who has any grain to sell is worse off than he would have been if Government had not interfered. Government

has in fact transferred arbitrarily a portion of wealth from one class of the population to the others; and the amount so transferred depends on the judgment of the two or three men concerned in fixing the prices offered for export. Their aim, it may be assumed, is to confiscate just so much of the peasants' wealth as will suffice to avoid the danger of distress (and lawlessness) among the rest of the population. The equation is not an easy one to solve; and at best the solution can be only approximate. If the price fixed for wheat is too high (higher, that is, than the theoretically accurate solution), large numbers of poor people will go hungry, and others will be deprived of the nourishing food that should be within their reach; if the price is too low, producers will suffer in pocket though not in stomach. The latter alternative is the more probable; for signs of distress will be carefully watched for, while no intelligence-system can gauge the state of the producer's pocket. To what reactions is this likely to give rise in the immediate future?

There can be little doubt that the prices now being realised, though much higher than would have prevailed in ordinary times, will be a disappointment to the Indian cultivator who has wheat to sell. Expectations had been raised by the high prices prevailing in the winter, and by the flood of rumour and gossip which has supplemented the thin stream of information regarding the war and its effects. The peasants may admit grudgingly that things might have been worse, but they will be disappointed that things are not better. And it is practically certain that the blame for this disappointment will fall mainly on the Government. The fact that Government has not appeared in the up-country markets will afford little protection; to the unlettered peasant its nonappearance makes the case worse. He would understand, and probably he would submit to, direct interference with the markets such as was practised by the Emperor Alá-ud-din and by many rulers of India before and after him. But in his eyes there is something sinister in actions of Government which take place behind the scenes. Probably every buyer of wheat throughout the country invokes the name of the Government when he is beating down the price-'he would pay more if he

dared, but the Government order is that wheat is to be cheap'-and the plain statement of fact will be supported and amplified by the lurid details which the imagination of an oriental market may be trusted to produce. The Indian peasant is at all times credulous; just now he is ready to believe even more than he is told. The incursions of hostile airships were last winter the common talk of Central India, and the country thrilled to the news that the German fleet had anchored in the Jumna off Agra; while the recent disturbances in the Panjab were in part based on the reported arrival of the German army within two days' march of Karachi. In this atmosphere inherent improbability either counts for nothing or is a guarantee of truth; and it is to be feared that both the actions and the motives of Government will be misrepresented in a way that Englishmen can scarcely realise.

The practical result may be twofold. In the first place holders of wheat may decide not to sell; in the second place cultivators may be discouraged from sowing wheat next season. So far as can be judged the withholding of stocks will not take place on such a scale as to produce a very serious effect on the market. The peasants in any case need a certain amount of money; they had not on the whole a successful year in 1914; and, owing to low prices, the cotton-crop, which is important in a large part of the wheat area, brought much less money than usual. The need for money is therefore probably greater than is commonly the case at this season; and, if distrust of the Government increases the strength of the ever-present impulse to hoard, the hoarding is most likely to be done in silver and gold, the commodities recommended by the tradition of the country as the safest resource in times of difficulty and uncertainty. The question of the next crop is more doubtful. The present need for wheat was foreseen in India last September; and, as seed-time approached, cultivators were urged by the authorities in some British provinces and by the rulers of some Native States to sow wheat in preference to other crops, such as oil-seeds, the need for which was less likely to be urgent. That these recommendations did not fall on deaf ears may be inferred from the figures recently made public of the

area sown with wheat for 1915, which was considerably larger than in any previous year. It may be questioned whether similar recommendations for the next sowings would be equally effective if made by a Government which is known to have interfered to reduce the price at which the crop could be sold, and the nature of whose interference has been magnified and distorted by the currents of popular rumour.

Now it is very possible that the Empire's need for wheat may be more urgent next summer than this. No wise civilian would prophesy regarding the course of a war where so many surprises have already been manifest; but it is obvious that this result may follow in various circumstances. The main sources of the world's wheat supply are: (a) Central and Eastern Europe, (b) North America, where the crop ripens in the autumn, (c) South America, (d) India, and (e) Australia, where the harvest takes place in the season which we know as the spring. If, as is probable, the 1915 crop in Europe should prove to be below the normal, the demand for wheat in the summer of 1916 may be very great; and, if Central Europe is then in a position to importwhether as conquerors or as conquered is immaterial to the argument-the call on Australia, India and South America to keep the world going till the autumn may be more urgent than any similar call since the establishment of oversea commerce on modern lines. On the other hand, it is not easy to imagine any combination of circumstances in which the demand next summer would be much less than usual; and the conclusion may be drawn that it is important for the Empire, perhaps for civilisation, that the Indian crop of 1916 should be as large as possible.

To secure this result, organisation will be necessary, no less than to secure an adequate output of munitions of war. But the organisation will take longer, because the yield at harvest depends primarily on the area sown. In India the wheat area is governed, first of all, by the weather in August and September. If the weatherconditions in those months are favourable, a large variety of crops is sown during October and November; and organisation is wanted to secure not only that the culturable land is fully occupied, but that it is

occupied by the most important crops. The Indian peasant cannot watch and forecast the market like an English or American farmer; and in existing circumstances this can be done for him only by the Governments, which can advise him, or in some Indian States even order him, what crops to sow, and can lend him the capital that he needs in order to follow the advice or obey the order.

It is at next seed-time, then, that the consequences of the action already taken by the Indian Government may become apparent. If that action, or the distorted popular idea of that action, has rendered the peasants distrustful, they will curtail their sowings of wheat and will not respond readily to any measures that the Government may take to increase the area under the crop. If this turn out to be the case, India in 1916 will have less to contribute to the world's needs, and her peasants will have lost what may be an unequalled opportunity of improving their own position. If, on the other hand, the authorities succeed in their immediate aim without seriously shaking the confidence of the peasants in their ulterior motives and in the future of the crop, then the undoubted advantages which have been secured in 1915 will be pure gain, and not merely a temporary profit to be set off against the greater losses and difficulties of the ensuing year; and they will have fully earned the credit which they will doubtless enjoy for the successful conduct of one of the most delicate economic enterprises that could be undertaken.

W. H. MORELAND.